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ABSTRACT 
Corruption remains one of the most enduring phenomenon across the world and notably in Sub 
Saharan Africa where its scope and depth still culminate generally at distressing levels to a 
greater or lesser extent across countries and regions. This study presents an empirical analysis 
of the causes and association types of corruption across SADC countries. Through quantitative 
methods of analysis, it delivers an assessment of the conditional effect of the human capital 
and social development along with their respective and combined impact on a corruption model 
using panel data and multivariate regression estimates across the fifteen SADC countries for 
the period 2005 - 2013. The research then identifies other covariates economic or institutional 
- and their functional dependence to the hypothesised triad nexus - that may predict the 
diversity of corruption level outcomes in the region.The hypotheses considered and tested 
suggest that both human capital (HC) and social development (SD) are key determinants of 
corruption outcome levels. We report consistently strong R squared (R2) and high magnitude 
coefficients for the two variables under several estimation models and for various other control 
economic and governance variables. For robustness testing, alternate measures of corruption 
are also used. The results mostly but not entirely support the initial findings. The inclusion of 
the institutional variables does not confirm for SADC countries the largely found negative 
association of corruption with democracy and press freedom. Hence young and developing 
democracies across  the region may not benefit from lower levels of corruption in the short run 
as institutional frameworks in formation remain weak. Meanwhile this research did not allow 
to derive clear arguments in relation to true causality and effects’ directions. The results remain 
agnostic with regards to causation between corruption and the selected explanatory variables. 
In the end human capital and social development in particular were found to be strong and 
consistent predictors of corruption control and the associations remain robust and significant 
under numerous specifications.  
While omnipresent rhetoric has largely focused on the political dimensions of corruption this 
study provides a substantial evidence and a nuance contribution to knowledge and literature to 
the concept of corruption by introducing the interaction effects of human capital and social 
development which indicate that both explanatory variables are consistent predictors of 
corruption control levels. In the footsteps of Sen’s theory, it offers a new frame which grants 
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an understanding of the phenomenon of corruption from a capability and human development 
approach as a new avenue for research. All of which has crucial policy implications for 
concerned governments. Indeed, efforts to stamp out corruption should be designed first to 
eliminate or mitigate the root - conditions of its incidence focusing on policies geared towards 
better education and higher living standards. Relying chiefly on oversight agencies and lending 
disproportionate attention to enforcement actions and regulatory frameworks would indeed 
prove to be a misplaced priority.  
Fundamentally this thesis argues a new scheme of intelligibility, a renewed “episteme” of 
corruption which refers to the order of human developmental structures underlying the 
production of corrupt practices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
This research project’s personal motivation is to pursue an undertaking which found its 
common grounds at a confluent of the writer’s own intellectual infatuation, professional 
interest as a United Nations civil servant, an audit practitioner in both areas of human 
development economics and its associated social demands of ethics and integrity.   
Such curiosity was among other motives prompted by the huge variety of patterns of growth 
and their differing levels of social inclusion and accountability systems across Sub Saharan 
Africa, notably in SADC countries – some of which account for the most unequal of societies 
worldwide.  Growth and equity outcomes in most SADC countries appear patently 
asymmetrical for similar levels of resources endowments while national integrity systems 
remain largely uneven.  The SADC Protocol against Corruption signed in 2001 has seen neither 
its committee established nor any of its provisions implemented.  (Peters, 2011: 157).  He 
further notes that “the picture concerning corruption in the SADC region is on the whole 
negative”. (2011: 158).  
1.2 Aims of the study 
Closer to our shores in the SADC region, studies, many descriptive, few empirical have 
highlighted issues around corruption, income inequality (Naidu and Roberts, 2004; Kalaba, et 
al., 2006; Peters, 2011; Jauch, et al., 2011; Van Vuuren, 2014) and human capital (Strydom 
and Fongwa, 2012; Bittencourt, 2013), however most of them offer a one way- approach to 
corruption unidimensionally linked to either growth, inequality or human capital.  Instead, the 
approach pursued in this study will provide a multi-pronged perspective untangling the 
interplay between human capital and corruption along its joint - and possibly opposing effects 
(Blackburn, et al., 2006) - not just on absolute growth but on growth relative to its social 
outcomes.  
More explicitly this study will deliver an assessment of the conditional effect of the human 
capital and social development and their combined impact on a corruption model in the SADC 
2 
 
countries.  Then it will attempt to identify other key determinants and covariates - and their 
functional dependence to hypothesised nexus of the triad human capital / social development / 
corruption - that may explain the diversity of corruption level outcomes among SADC 
countries.  
In exploring those intricacies of corruption, human capital and social development this research 
will offer a milestone towards a complete framework for understanding both the causal 
relationships between the three conceptual strands (corruption, human capital and social 
development) as well as the embedded mechanisms by which their relationships operate.   
The study hopes to expand the knowledge base pertaining to the influence of human capital 
and corruption on development economics and find a unifying explanation for these crucial 
links.  More tangibly, this work seeks to inspire policy solutions for public officials to act on 
addressing the inextricable question of how human capital and more broadly social 
development and corruption can affect the crucial national agenda of fighting and curbing 
inequality (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000; Bourguignon, 2004) and in the end, contribute 
to the framing of more effective anti- corruption strategies around SADC countries and beyond. 
1.3  Definition of key concepts 
Human Capital. This study will mainly consider human capital from an economic perspective 
and therefore it will be defined in macroeconomic terms as factor of production equivalent to 
the sum of skills, knowledge, and capabilities of the population of a country (Blair, 2011). 
Social Development. Just what is social development also termed by many as inclusive growth 
remains still a matter of debate which leaves it to be defined as a multidimensional concept far 
from a convergent path (Ranieri and Ramos, 2013).  The United Nations has provided an 
authoritative definition of social development (Human Development Report, 1996, UNDP) 
which emphasized “human development” measured by all aspect of well- being including life 
expectancy, health, access to education to people’s economic and political freedom; and 
concluded that “human development is the end and economic growth a means” (1996: 1).  
Hence, social development demands that countries meet human needs both by increasing 
productive capacities and by ensuring equitable opportunities and assistance for all (Brundtland 
United Nations report 1987).   
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Increasingly the literature of development economics – in the footsteps of Sen capability theory 
recognizing that incremental GDP is not an end by itself but a proxy for improvements in 
human condition - has stressed and widely agreed on the need to broadening the measurement 
of society’s well-being and reducing inequality as an enabling condition for economic 
advancement notably in the developing world (United Nations, Inclusive Wealth Report, 
2012).  The broadening of the contemporary notion of economic growth beyond its neo-
classical meanings led to closer scrutiny of other non-income based growth factors which 
brought to revelation new and wider in scope-concepts largely inspired by the ground-breaking 
development theory of capability approach by Amartya Sen (1985).  Earlier Simon Kuznets 
(1955) first among development economists   studied the links - through its inverted U shape 
model - between growth, income, structural change and inequality.  Later a more holistic 
accounting of countries wealth subsequently initiated by economists in multilateral institutions 
(UNDP Human Development Report 1990, World Bank Report Equity and Development 
2006) then set out more evaluative inquiries to determine in what forms human capital and 
other institutional determinants relate to economic progress.  
The idea of economic growth based solely on output/ income measures has been critically 
discussed.  Economic growth alone was largely deemed not enough particularly in the 
circumstances of developing countries in Sub Saharan Africa.  From the ground breaking 
propositions of the Brundtland United Nations report (1987) to founding writings (Perkins, et 
al., 2006), a growing body of literature has built a delineation and debated the difference 
between “economic growth” (seen as rate of outputs growth in goods and services for a given 
country) and the wider concept of “development” – which claim to encompass beyond 
economic growth changes in human development variables.  
Corruption. This study views corruption as “bureaucratic” corruption by government that is 
public corruption also defined by Transparency International (TI) as “the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain” and considered by the World Bank “… as one of the single largest 
obstacles to economic and social development.” (World Bank, 2012: 2). 
The practice may take various forms for example it may be due to diversion of public resources 
by public officials (Mauro, 2002) or to bribery, kickbacks, embezzlement, tax evasion and 
similar activities as explained by Blackburn, Bose, and Haque (2006). 
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1.4 Rationale  
Beyond the above personal significance, with the increasing recognition across the globe of the 
damaging effects of corruption on economic growth and social stability in Sub Saharan Africa, 
the policy debate on corruption and inequality in Africa seems inescapable.  The Global 
Financial Integrity’s (2013) report found that illicit financial outflows depleted 5.7 percent of 
GDP from Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade (2002 – 2011), more than any other region 
in the developing world.  This only epitomizes the inclusive growth challenges of African 
countries “not harnessing the human development opportunities from economic growth due to 
rising inequality in income as well as in access to education and health” (African Economic 
Outlook 2013: 86). 
The United Nations and African Union report noted not long ago that “Africa’s growth can be 
described as largely non-inclusive because of its limited contribution to job creation and overall 
improvement to people’s living standards” (UNECA 2011).  Also central to the debate is the 
countervailing evidence mainly from South East Asia with countries which posted in the last 
decades impressive results in wealth creation and poverty reduction most of which driven not 
by strong governance but by financial and human capital accumulation (Glaeser, et al., 2004). 
Human capital in the form of “diffusion of knowledge and investment in training and skills” is 
acknowledged as one of the main forces “pushing towards convergence that is towards 
reduction and compression of inequalities” (Piketty 2014).  From the above, Sub Saharan 
Africa then appears as an ideal place for greater scrutiny as it displayed “ample evidence that 
poor health, knowledge and skills is a brake on the structural transformation that Africa needs 
despite rapid economic growth (Gauci and Temah, 2011).  Indeed, the increasing evidence 
across the world and notably in Africa of the detrimental effects of corruption on sustainable 
economic growth and the social demand for strategies to curtail corruption has increased 
substantially.  As noted by Glynn, et al., (1997) the problem is not restricted to any particular 
continent or country as no region, and hardly any country, has been immune.  However, 
developing countries notably resource rich African countries are confronting these challenges 
more acutely than ever as weaker human and institutional capacities have created fertile ground 
for corruption.  As for SADC, it remains a region in “deep crisis [where] neither agricultural 
economies nor resource-rich countries have been able to significantly reduce wealth gaps and 
the rates of poverty and unemployment” (Frye, I.S. and Farred, G. 2011: 1).  
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Although seemingly pervasive corruption in Africa remains to some extent an unknown 
quantity to academics as Chahal and Daloz (1999) ominously noted: "corruption in Africa is 
one of the most familiar and the least understood of issues…It is familiar because, however it 
is defined, it is clearly endemic and ... poorly understood because we lack the investigative 
tools to make sense of its rationality." (1999: 102).  When under theoretical consideration 
corruption is seen as a causal factor rather than a consequence as in Rogers (2008) proposition 
and may inflict adverse effects on human capital and growth.  Similar views have also framed 
corruption as a determinant of human capital (Mauro, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001; 
Delavallade, 2006); or as a negative factor of growth and development (Barro, 1991; Gupta, 
1998; Blackburn, et al., 2006; Gymiah - Brempong and De Camacho, 2006; Okori 2010); or 
as a source of income inequality (Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2007; Papagapitos and Riley, 2009).  
In rare instances the role of corruption is recognized in a model linking human capital to growth 
(Haque, E.; Hussain, B. 2011) though not to social development.  In the end little has been 
studied on the impact of human capital on national transparency control levels and transitively 
on social development. 
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
The need to avoid duplication of existing research requires some knowledge of the already 
existing academic work on one’s subject matter.  A limited review of the literature and key 
definitional aspects is offered in this section in order to provide for the theoretical foundation 
of this study.  
Human capital was acknowledged as one the critical determinants of source of economic 
growth over time and has become a central conceptual device to labour economics, growth 
economics and development economics (Collier, 2007).  Human capital is a multidimensional 
concept.  It” identifies human characteristics which can be acquired and which increase income.  
It is commonly taken to include peoples’ knowledge and skills, acquired partly through 
education, but can also include their strength and vitality, which are dependent on their health 
and nutrition” (Appleton and Teal, 1998: 9).  
From an economic perspective the expression of human capital is evocative of the idea that 
workers’ skills and capabilities are important factors of production and that other resources 
spent on education, training, etc. may be comparable to investments in physical capital (Blair, 
2011).  In recent decades, countless studies of the sources of economic growth (Schultz, 1961; 
6 
 
Becker, 1993; Barro & Lee, 1993) – departing from the neo classical Solow growth model of 
physical and financial capital accumulation – have since demonstrated that human capital 
accumulation factors are among the main drivers of economic development.  Human capital, 
economic growth are closely interrelated as it is seen as an input which impacts significantly 
on the productive capacity and growth output of an economy.   
Historical evidence owing to the notable achievements of South East Asian economies has 
often been cited as glaring examples of the importance of human capital to economic growth 
(Clarke, 2011).  Indeed, despite their generally low endowment of natural resources, these 
countries have managed to post remarkable economic performances largely attributed to the 
quality of their human capital formation (Becker, 1992).  Researchers such as Schultz (1961), 
Bryant (1990), Barro (1991) Lucas, (1988) have applied the concept of human capital since, in 
a variety of ways but they all provided pertinent analysis of a positive link between human 
capital and economic progress mainly in the form of growth rate of per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
Numerous studies, for example Miyamoto (2008), Anyanwu (2011), have particularly 
highlighted the role of human capital in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows.  
More broadly a long and old stream of researchers have shifted attention away from the neo- 
classical focus on physical accumulation and have established – both theoretically and 
empirically - the linkage between human capital formation and economic fluctuations through 
direct or indirect returns.  An increase in human capital accumulation will lead to an increase 
in the return to schooling (Mincer, 1996).  Then an increase in human capital intensifies the 
growth rate of technology and innovation (Lucas, 1988).  Finally, an increase in human capital 
will positively impact   the level of output growth (Barro, 1991).  
Closer to the African shores the seminal work by the OECD on the central role of human capital 
in economic advancement (The Knowledge -Based Economy 1996) and the World Bank 
(Knowledge for Development 1998) have attracted the interest of the developing world 
including in Sub Saharan Africa a region increasingly aware that natural resources alone may 
not bring economic success (Maddison, 2000). 
The theoretical and applied literature on growth and development in Sub Saharan Africa has 
provided added rationale by claiming that human capital is a key contributor to growth and 
social development.  In South Africa researchers including Fedderke (2006) have also stressed 
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the importance of human capital on productivity growth.  Although widely recognized as a key 
contributing element in economic growth, human capital formation has been viewed mainly 
through economists’ eyes as a by-product of policy supply or a function of the labour market 
disjointed from its social surroundings.  The possibility that human capital and its knowledge 
effect may be critical factors in enhancing sustainable growth and social cohesion in developing 
countries – particularly in Sub Saharan Africa is largely ignored and has revealed an essential 
but relatively unexplored link with social development.  The African Economic Outlook 2013 
report concludes crucially that “African countries are not harnessing the human development 
opportunities from economic growth due to rising inequality in income as well as in access to 
education and health” (2013: 86). 
Economic growth alone is largely deemed not enough particularly in the circumstances of 
developing countries in Sub Saharan Africa.  The idea of economic growth based solely on 
output/ income measures has been critically discussed.  From the ground breaking propositions 
of the Brundtland United Nations report (1987) to founding writings (Perkins et al., 2006), a 
growing body of literature has built a delineation and debated the difference between 
“economic growth” (seen as rate of outputs growth in goods and services for a given country) 
and the wider concept of “development” – which claim to encompass beyond economic growth 
changes in human development variables.  This paradigm shift in is plainly described in the 
first Human Development Report (1990) and has had far reaching theoretical implications in 
development economics. 
The question on how economic growth dividends transform - or fail to convert - into human 
development became central to the policy making debate.  The quality of growth is viewed as 
critical as its quantity reiterating that the goals of social well-being are not just monetary but 
amount more fundamentally to people’s choice and freedoms.  As the report puts it “income is 
not the sum total of human life.” (1990: 2). 
The renewed approach of the concept of development (Haq, 1999) deemed more 
comprehensive, has stressed as one of its key finding the deterministic role of “intangible” 
wealth factors identified by the World Bank (2011) as human and institutional capital and 
critically important when applied to the context of economic progress in developing countries.   
In the well renowned publication Economics of Development, Perkins et al., (2006) clearly 
delineates the difference between “economic growth” - as rate of output growth for goods and 
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services - and the wider concept of “development” which involve more human variables such 
as education, health, life expectancy.  In the developing world the notion of human 
development was quickly complemented by the idea that development effectiveness is to 
include equitable access by individuals and communities to opportunities as precondition to 
improving people’s living standard.  
The World Bank (2011: 1) defines inclusive growth - a concept often assimilated to social 
development - as “growth that allows people to contribute to and benefit from economic 
growth.”  The AfDB argues more specifically that inclusive growth is “economic growth that 
results in a wider access to sustainable socio-economic opportunities for a broader number of 
people, regions or countries, while protecting the vulnerable, all being done in an environment 
of fairness, equal justice, and political plurality” (2012: 2).  Hence social development demands 
that developing countries meet human needs both by increasing productive capacities and by 
ensuring equitable opportunities and assistance for all. (UN, 1987). 
Increasingly the literature of development economics – in the footsteps of Sen capability theory 
recognizing that incremental GDP is not an end by itself but a proxy for improvements in 
human condition - has stressed and has since widely agreed on the need to broadening the 
measurement of society’s well-being and reducing social disparities as an enabling condition 
for economic advancement notably in the developing world. (UN, 2012).  Nonetheless, most 
the debate about growth and social development has remained largely conceptual with 
arguments that revolved around the question of whether market-led growth is sufficient to 
eliminate poverty and reduce inequality largely ignoring the crucial policy considerations of 
public intervention and crucially the need for governments to account for the corruption factor 
and design effective anticorruption strategies.  
International organizations and global watchdogs have in recent years recognized the relevance 
and urgency of the problem of corruption for international development.  Although it is present 
in almost all countries, corruption is most pervasive throughout the developing world and 
particularly in resources- rich of Sub Saharan Africa.  It is referred to by Nye (1967: 417) as 
“endemic in all governments” and” no region, and hardly any country, has been immune.” 
(Glynn, et al., 1997: 7).  Corruption is commonly defined as abuse of public power for private 
benefit.  Transparency International (TI) defines the concept as “the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain”   
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In examining the significance and human capital and social development as determinants of 
corruption we shall consider corruption less from an ethical perspective as “an immoral and 
unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society” 
(Gould, 1991: 468) but rather it will be viewed in its socio economic context as public 
phenomenon.  Therefore, this study will posit corruption as “bureaucratic” corruption by 
government in the context of this thesis.  The practice may take various forms for example it 
may be due to diversion of public resources by public officials (Mauro, 2002) or to bribery, 
kickbacks, embezzlement, tax evasion (Blackburn, et al., 2006).  According to Transparency 
International (2010: 1) “nearly three quarters of the 178 countries in the Corruption Perceptions 
Index score below five, on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), suggesting a 
perception of widespread corruption among public officials”. 
Corrupt practices have various determinants and particular repercussions in developing 
countries notably in Africa where often public funds that are needed for delivery of basic 
human needs are diverted at the personal benefit of the few.  The World Bank considers “… 
corruption as one of the single largest obstacles to economic and social development.” (World 
Bank, 2012: 2). 
Often driven by discretionary authority, economic rents, and weak institutions (Jain, 2001) 
corruption affects access to basic services, undermines fair market competition and particularly 
affects the poor.  As underlined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
corruption “siphons off scarce resources and diminishes a country’s prospects for development.  
In a country where corruption is endemic, the consequences are disproportionately borne by 
the poor who have no resources to compete with those able and willing to pay bribes.  In the 
end, corruption tightens the shackles of poverty on countries that can least afford it, on societies 
that need every dollar to pay for important social and economic programs” (2004: 3). 
From a sustainability perspective the nefarious effects of corruption on development have long 
been a concern for researchers through an established body of literature. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) conclude that corruption is a factor of disruption in the development process.  Jain 
(2001) inconclusively found, that the causes and consequences of corruption are often 
entangled. Earlier Mauro (1997) found the directional causation of corruption and development 
remains unresolved while Treisman (2000) asserts that developed countries were less prone to 
corruption.  
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Numerous studies (TI, 2012; Buehn and Schneider, 2012) have established a causal link 
between increased corruption and investments in high profile “white elephant” projects at the 
expense of useful infrastructure projects in education or health of crucial importance.  As a key 
determinant of socio – economic growth corruption is found to increase inequality (Dreher, et 
al., 2007) through unequal redistribution of income and wealth and to disfavour social 
programs intended for the poor (Ackerman, 2008).  Human capital formation through education 
also may be affected by corruption. Mauro (1997) concludes that education spending is 
negatively correlated with corruption.  This will result according to Dreher, et al., (2007) in 
low levels of school enrolment causing higher corruption, while Buehn and Schneider (2012) 
could not arrive at similar correlation.  
From a governance perspective political and institutional factors have relevant impact on the 
level of corruption according to Dreher, et al., (2007) who argue that deficit in democratic 
controls are likely to increase corruption and conversely stronger transparency and 
accountability systems are likely to deter corruption. Buehn and Schneider (2012) found similar 
evidence while Tanzi (1998) seems to emphasize particularly the effect of bureaucratic 
inefficiency - through convoluted regulations- as a major conduit for corruption. Corruption 
appears indeed as a multifaceted proposition driven here by socio- economic determinants 
which will be examined as to their functional dependence to human capital and social 
development.  In his seminal paper Treisman (2000) uses quantitative analysis to find the 
causes of corruption.  He considers 14 research hypotheses on the causes of corruption from 
political science, economics to sociology, and runs regression models across a multi – country 
setting (64 countries) with a vast set of independent variables on the Corruption Perception 
Index (TI  1996, 1997, 1998).  He arrived at mixed conclusions finding no effect of 
democratization on corruption levels while on the contrary economic development appeared to 
have curbing effects (2000: 46) on corruption. 
From a human development perspective Sen’s theory (1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 
2005) as an expansion of capabilities can be applied as a potent analysis of the intricacies 
between corruption, human capital and social development.  Sen (1985) describes the building 
blocks of the Capability Approach, with the concept of “functionings” and “capabilities”.  A 
“functioning” is an achievement of a person, what a person manages to do or be (Sen, 1985: 
10); a “capability” reflects a person’s potential to achieve a particular functioning (Sen, 1985: 
10).  Corruption may be seen as a limitation capability for individuals to achieve given 
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functionings including being educated or fulfilling their basic needs of well - being.  Human 
capital is indeed a foundational element of the capability framework as, “…being better 
educated can help in the conversion of incomes and resources into various functionings and 
ways of living”. (Sen, 1990: 55). 
Corruption becomes ultimately a capability problem in that its nefarious effect on social 
development is to curtail human capital formation and deprive people of the opportunities for 
the “enhancement of those freedoms and capabilities that matter most in the lives that we can 
lead” (Sen, 1990:55).  This approach provides the conceptual foundations for broadening the 
problematic of corruption beyond standard economic and utility frameworks for a richer 
conception grounded into a more “foundational understanding of the process of 
development…” (1997: 1960).   
The acknowledgment of the human capability redirects the focus on corruption not just as a 
deprivation of economic prospects for the vulnerable but more fundamentally as a denial of 
opportunities “on the expansion of human freedom to live the kind of lives that people have 
reason to value” (1997: 1960). 
From the above arguments I derive the below problem statement and subsequent research 
questions 
1.6 Problem Statement 
The role of human capital in economic growth has been a recurring and abundant study theme 
in the economic literature for both development theorists and practitioners.  A large body of 
analyses by economists has made attempts to examine human capital through labour markets 
efficiencies with concerns to its quantity and quality as they are deemed suitable and adapting 
to market needs.  Effects of human capital related to growth, economic development or FDI 
have been recurring subject matters for macro-economic researchers and development 
practitioners.  
While political scientists and economists have examined overwhelmingly corruption primarily 
in relation to economic performance and GDP growth rather than in relation to social 
development.  Corruption has mainly been attributed to economic factors such as rent seeking 
(Jain, 2001) and non-economic determinants linked to governance deficit and failure of 
institutions (Brunetti and Weder, 2003) and (Serra, 2006).  Moreover, much of the interest in 
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corruption and its socio-economic ills have been expressed generally in “normative” terms 
(Gould (1991: 468) largely advocated on ethical or human right grounds if not on political 
claims.  
When corruption is linked to inequality or poverty the analysis is generally framed in 
qualitative if not ideological terms whether political, ethical or both.  Most studies for Southern 
Africa offer narratives framed in descriptive terms (Naidu and Roberts, 2004; Kalaba, et al., 
2006; Peters, 2011; Jauch, et al., 2011) which for some amount to political scientists ‘diatribes 
mainly arguing that corruption is caused by the failure of the institutions or by rent seeking, if 
not by state capture leading to harmful effects on economic performance (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
et al., 2005; Ugur and Dasgupta 2011).  
Despite abundant literature on corruption and economic growth the link to human capital 
(Rogers 2008) is seldom considered.  The analysis remains confined to the human capital-
growth equation (Romer, 1990; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro, 1999; Atardi and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003; Pritchett, 2006; Cohen, et al., 2007; Fukase, 2010; Kwabena, et al., 2010; 
Schundeln, et al., 2014) or corruption – growth relationships (Tanzi, et al., 1997; Mauro, 1995; 
Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Kaufmann, 2003) and stop short of examining the 
relationship with poverty reduction aspect and social development.  Indeed, some of the 
missing and little-documented elements of this equation are the social advancement factor and 
the possible compounding effect of human capital on corruption under the development 
conditions of Sub Saharan African countries.  Hence there is still a long way towards 
understanding the fundamental processes at work in order to develop effective anti – corruption 
strategies and provide for integrity systems fit for socio – economic progress.  
Furthermore, the consequences of the combined effects of human capital levels and social 
development variables more broadly as root causes of corruption have been so far studied by 
very few contemporaneous empirical studies notably in African studies and for the SADC 
region in particular.  Therefore, failing to recognize with Szeftel (1998) that indeed corruption 
levels are to be construed as outcomes of political and socioeconomic undercurrents.   
In light of the theoretical ambiguities this study puts forward a contention that even fewer have 
contemplated that is the crucial question of why for similar resource endowments and 
comparable economic outlooks, a number of SADC countries display striking heterogeneities 
in corruption levels linked to similarly discrepant levels of social development?  Does human 
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capital stock and its uneven dispersion have a pivotal role to play in unravelling the links 
between corruption and social development?   
In the literature on human capital, social development and determinants of corruption, it is 
noted a relative scarcity of test for the functional relationships of such variables notably for 
African countries.  To the best of this researcher’s knowledge little to none grand theoretical 
explanation of this phenomenon has been argued, the present endeavour offers one of the first 
systematic cross-country quantitative studies focusing on the causal and directional effects and 
predictive powers of human capital and social development on corruption outcome levels in 
Southern Africa 
1.7 Research Objectives 
The objective of this study is to undertake an assessment of the relationship between human 
capital, social development and corruption.  Precisely, this study seeks to provide a theoretical 
framework on the impact of human capital and social development in explaining the incidence 
of corruption outcomes in developing countries and particularly in the SADC region.  
It deals with such undertaking at it attempts to identify (1) the effects of human capital on 
corruption, (2) assess the impact of social development on corruption; and (3) and analyse the 
combined effect of these main variables on corruption  
1.8 Research Questions 
1. What is the effect of human capital formation on corruption? How does the causal direction 
of their relationship operate? 
2. What is the effect of social development on corruption? How does the causal direction of 
their relationship operate?  
3. What is the simultaneous effect of human capital and social development on corruption? 
1.9 Research Hypotheses 
Intuitively, it makes sense to expect that high levels of education will result in people being 
aware of the devastating effects of corruption on the economy.  Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to expect that high human capital is likely to result in lower levels of corruption.  Similarly, it 
may be reasonably assumed that high levels of human capital accumulation have the “potential 
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for ensuring a more equitable distribution of income among individuals by equipping them 
with the needed tools to pull themselves out of poverty (De Mello and Dutz, 2012).   
Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between human capital and corruption 
In line with Podobnik, Shao, Njaviro, Ivanov and Stanley (2008) this study sets 
forth that:  
Hypothesis 2: There is negative relationship between corruption and social development  
Contrary to Haque, et al., (2010) who conclude to little effect of education on 
growth when corruption is prevalent the following hypothesis is put forward: 
Hypothesis 3: Human capital has a higher predictive power on corruption than other social 
development indicators as suggested by Barro (1991) Lucas, (1988). 
1.10 Data, Models and Methodologies 
This study will be mainly concerned with identifying the nature and causal direction of the 
relationships between human capital and corruption; between corruption and social 
development; and to explain how human capital and social development interrelate to explain 
corruption in the SADC region.  The study will use Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) to estimate 
the growth equation specified above using the E-Views statistical package.  The study will also 
use a pooled fixed-effects specification which allows to control for unobserved country 
heterogeneity and associated omitted variable bias (Startz, 2013).  Before running the Ordinary 
Least Square to approximate the coefficients of the regression equation, the study will test for 
the stationarity of the variables.  The stationarity of the time series will be tested using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test.  The Granger Causality test will be used to determine 
the nature and direction of causality among the variables in equations. 
1.10.1 Data Description and Population  
The main component of this empirical analysis consists of annual time- series panel 
data sourced from world class international databases available from the UNDP, 
UNESCO, the World Bank, IMF the AFDB, SADC countries, United Nations 
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Statistics, Freedom House database.  The regression model tested in the study will 
include the interaction of human capital, corruption and inclusive growth. 
The fifteen SADC countries to be considered (Angola, Botswana, D.R Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  The sampling of SADC countries for 
this review is largely dictated by the objectives.  The majority of the countries has 
reached a middle to higher MIC economic status in terms of per capita income and / or 
enjoy significant levels of human or natural resource endowments.  However, high level 
of revenues and abundance of resources have often cultivated corruption and 
undermined social progress in the process of building their market economies.   The 
target countries while faced with serious inequality and integrity - related challenges, 
also present striking disparities in terms of poverty rates, institutional capacity and 
social development all of which will be key factors of consideration in this study.  When 
investigating patterns of corruption, it is suitable to consider countries where the level 
of corruption is significantly and durably high. 
This informs the choice of the SADC region countries for this study, where the 
corruption perception indexes from TI and WB showed stable patterns of high levels of 
corruption “The perceived level of corruption in the SADC member states in 2010 was 
higher than in 2000” (Peters, 2011). Indeed, abundance of natural resources can benefit 
developing countries or be a curse (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009).  This particularly 
applies to most of the selected countries where huge natural resource endowments 
present opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour among bureaucrats and politicians 
tempted to drain resources away from more socially advantageous projects to the 
detriment of the disaffected (Ploeg, V. 2006)  
Therefore, the above features made them attractive for the purpose of this research.  
Due to data limitation data will be collected for the period 2005- 2013 across the fifteen 
SADC countries as this time span seems to be less prone to gaps in data availability.  
The data will have fifteen panels and nine periods which will amount to 135 
observations. 
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1.10.2 Data Sources 
The analysis for this study will require compilation of relevant data on human capital 
stocks, corruption indexes and economic growth.  In addition to the relevant human 
development indicators and income distribution estimates (GDP, GINI, HDI) across 
host SADC countries and across time (2005 - 2013). 
For cross-country time series data the following sources will be consulted for the 
purpose of this examination: Country tables in the World Bank annual publications of 
key economic indicators, Statistical Appendices to the World Bank’s annual World 
Development Reports, Statistical Appendices to the UNDP’s annual Human 
Development Reports, Statistical tables from UNESCO Institute of Statistics, World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database, Freedom House Data  
1.10.3 Variables and Unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis used will be the sampled member-state. Analysis of such data may 
be arduous due to the data could vary greatly across time and space.  The analysis 
therefore will attempt to use a variety of techniques to control for the special statistical 
hurdles inherent to such statistical methodology.  The level of corruption through the 
human capital and social development effects is the ultimate phenomenon we are 
attempting to explain.  For all hypotheses to be considered the level of corruption will 
be the dependent variable all other variables (human capital, social development and 
other control variables) are assumed as independent explanatory variables.   
As a measure of a country’s social development (SD) this study will use the HDI index 
as a proxy.  The HDI is considered the most comprehensive measure of a country’s 
economic progress besides GDP.  It provides information on the human development 
aspect of economic growth.  It is constructed around three indicators: longevity 
measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment measured by a 
combination of adult literacy rate and the combined school levels enrolment ratios; and 
standard of living measured by GDP per capita.  Due to its availability for a large set 
of countries and for a long time span we use the HDI and its education and health sub 
categories to measure inclusive growth.  As a measure of human capital (HC) this study 
will use the average years of secondary education in the population aged 25 and over 
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as a proxy.  Commonly human capital has been viewed as a function of education and 
experience including both training and learning by doing (Becker, 1964; Barro, 1991).   
By analogy to investment in physical capital we will consider expenditures on 
education as investments and therefore use education budget costs data - combined with 
literacy and schooling levels data disaggregated by school levels - as a proxy for human 
capital.  As a measure of corruption this study will use corruption perception indexes 
(CPI) developed by the World Bank Institute. 
Control Variables.  A number of socio- economic, political variables and institutional 
measures identified as significant by previous studies are selected eight independent 
variables.  Social Development, Human Capital Trade openness, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, Democracy, Press Freedom, Social Connectivity (Telephone line per 100 people) 
will be included in the model based on availability of data se 
1.10.4 Model Specifications 
With the aim to ascertain a number of variables assumptions, the base model 
specifications derived from our research questions are as follows:  
1. What is the effect of human capital formation on corruption? How does 
the causal direction of their relationship operate? 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 +  𝑢𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                 (1) 
 
2. What is the effect of social development on corruption? How does the 
causal direction of their relationship operate?  
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                     (2) 
 
3. What is the simultaneous effect of human capital and social 
development on corruption? 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 +  𝑐1 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝑤𝑖 +  𝑤𝑡 +  𝑤𝑖𝑡                              (3) 
 
Where i indexes countries and t the time period.  The error term in all three 
equations is made up of three components: ui, vi and wi stand for country-
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specific component; ut, vt and wt stand for time-specific component; and uit, 
vit and wit stand for random error term of a panel data model.  
1.10.5 Econometric Methodology 
The statistical analysis will test the relationships hypothesized between the levels of 
human capital, and social development functions and their resulting effect on corruption 
outcomes.  
This study will be mainly concerned with identifying the nature and causal direction of 
the relationships between human capital and corruption; between corruption and social 
development; and to explain how human capital and social development interrelate to 
explain corruption in the SADC region.  The study will use Ordinary Least-Squares 
(OLS) to estimate the growth equation specified above using the E-Views statistical 
package.  The study will also use a pooled fixed-effects (FE) specification which allows 
to control for unobserved country heterogeneity and associated omitted variable bias 
(Startz, 2013). 
 
Before running the Ordinary Least Square to approximate the coefficients of the 
regression equation, the study will test for the stationarity of the variables.  The 
stationarity of the time series will be tested using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
test.  The Granger Causality test will be used to determine the nature and direction of 
causality among the variables in equations.  Using panel data model is advantageous 
because it allows for the capability “to capture not only the variation of what emerges 
through time or space, but the variation of these two dimensions simultaneously” 
(Podesta, 2000 : 9).  It is also the most common estimation method in the literature which 
allows for comparison with other studies.  And it best fit the data to generate better 
estimations (e.g. higher T statistics, adjusted R- square, F- statistics). 
1.11 Significance of the Study  
This research offers an empirically grounded contribution and adds to the mostly normative 
and descriptive studies about public corruption.  Using panel data analytical framework, the 
study examines the implication/causation forms as they affect human capital, social 
development and corruption in order to elicit the patterns of relationships underlying the three 
theoretical strands.  The methodology moves from a deontological approach mostly focused 
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on the narrative of policy and rights imperatives to a positivist perspective for the empirical 
analysis of the conditions of human capital and social development with their respective 
formation mechanisms that affect corruption levels across SADC countries  
1.12 Assumptions 
Assumptions are described as concepts not tested but accepted without being necessarily 
proven (Creswell, 2009: 49).  In academic inquiry they are defined as “postulates, premises, 
and propositions that are accepted as operational for purposes of the research” (Lunenburg and 
Irby, 2008: 135).  One commonly recognized flaw of quantitative researchers is to “often 
neglect philosophical assumptions in favor of the methods…Too much emphasis is given to 
the technical procedures necessary to implement a study, while the principles grounding these 
procedures are often neglected or not sufficiently considered” (Gioacchino, 2012: 111).  Such 
lack of critical awareness fails to recognize that “science is itself a (meta) theoretical human 
construction which heavily depends on the worldviews of those who have constructed it” 
(Gioacchino, 2012: 112).  In light of these observations this study is premised on several 
assumptions both theoretical and practical which provide for its basic philosophical 
foundations.  This section is meant to plainly articulate the beliefs underlying this empirical 
analysis with particular reference to the philosophical - ontological and epistemological - 
paradigms – that sustain such views. (Slife and Williams, 1995).  
First, corruption is a topic abundantly researched and defined in countless ways and meanings.  
Corruption is assumed here as a determined outcome in the public domain, hence its private 
manifestations and psychological undertones are beyond the scope of this review.  Second, the 
philosophical corollary of such reality of corruption - transcendent of the outside observer - is 
embedded in the positivist view that indeed it has its own rationalities objectively knowable 
through “scientific” inquiry (Cohen, et al., 2007: 7) and susceptible of causal understanding.  
Third, from this ontological premise it is derived epistemologically a frame of knowledge 
which allows for a deductive approach in order to produce valid causal inferences about 
corruption and its correlates.  It is posited that the data of interest on corruption and its 
covariates may be reliably measured and analysed by means of statistical analysis.   
The goal here is to test our research hypotheses on corruption derived from this positivist theory 
which strives “for objectivity, replicability and control with the aim of causal explanation and 
generalization” (Gioacchino, 2012: 113).  However, the proposed knowledge framework does 
not imply, that this empirical research - which is not grounded on a reductionist empiricism – 
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“does not carry any trace” (Högskola, 2012: 32) of the researcher.  In the footsteps of Bachelard 
(1938) this epistemological stance is premised on “the importance of the subject in science, but 
without making of science something subjective “(Högskola, 2012: 33).   
On human capital there have been other dimensions identified by researchers that account for 
human capital from health to migration, but this study has retained education as a prime focus 
for the empirical analysis. 
And one last assumption worthy of note. There have been countless attempts to describe social 
development linked either to categories of social capital, or sustainable growth, or seen as an 
inclusive process of removing inequalities. This study opted for the human development 
approach of social development measured by the HDI and focusing the development thinking 
more towards the enhancement of people’s freedoms and capabilities (Sen, 1989; UNDP, 1990) 
1.13 Delimitations 
The main goal of this quantitative approach was to investigate corruption and its underlying 
causes, thus harvesting more knowledge on how best to curb the phenomenon at policy level.  
However, prudence is advised before making generalizations from the results which do claim 
universality status as delimitations apply.  This section explains the boundaries and scope of 
the review.  Unlike limitations which relate to elements that may affect the study but are beyond 
the researcher’s own resolve, delimitations are factors that may affect the analysis but are 
determined by the researcher; they are “self-imposed boundaries set by the researcher on the 
purpose and scope of the study” (Lunenburg and Irby, 2008: 134). 
This study is geographically focused on the SADC countries.  The target region was not 
randomly selected but instead such decision was largely dictated by the particulars of the region 
as they relate to the objectives this review.  This may indeed limit the generalizability of the 
results therefore caution must be observed as they may not be necessarily applicable to other 
sub Saharan African regional groupings.  Regarding the data source, the fact of utilizing pre-
existing databases in the form of secondary data has also restricted the research in terms of the 
conceptualization of variables and the scope of research. 
Because a quantitative methodology was decided in relation to the research questions it was 
not possible to fully to explore and account for hard - to measure variables linked to socio - 
cultural norms including for instance the notion of power distance that would have been of 
interest in accounting for more societal factors of corruption. 
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1.14 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis will be organised as follows: 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
CHAPTER II: Literature Survey. Political Economy of Corruption 
CHAPTER III: Literature Survey. Economics of Human Capital 
CHAPTER IV: Conceptual Framework 
CHAPTER V: Methodology 
CHAPTER VI: Empirical Findings 
CHAPTER VII: Discussions and Conclusion 
1.15 Conclusion 
This Chapter lays the foundation for this thesis by first discussing the motivation, the rationale 
for pursuing the study and the purpose of the thesis.  This is followed by the definition of the 
key concepts of this work – corruption, human capital and social development.  This chapter 
introduced the research problem and the research questions.  The overall aim of the study which 
is to provide a theoretical framework on the impact of human capital and social development 
in explaining the incidence of corruption in developing countries and particularly in the SADC 
region was justified.  The proposed method to achieve this aim was presented.  The 
philosophical, ontological, axiological and causality assumptions were presented and the 
structure of the thesis was outlined.  On these foundations, the thesis proceeds with a critical 
evaluation of the political economy theory in explaining corruption, human capital and social 
development.   
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Corruption has been widely and negatively associated with economic and development 
outcomes.  The World Bank (2011) estimated the amount of bribes paid across the developed 
and the developing world for the years 2001/2002 at 1 trillion USD that is approximately 3% 
of the world GDP.  The African Union (2002) estimates that corruption costs African 
economies more than $148 billion a year.  These figures only point to financial transfers 
between corruptors and corruptees but do not indicate the true negative impact of the 
phenomenon as corrupt practices remain hidden and difficult to estimate.  Such harmful effects 
are substantial enough and worthy of worldwide concern for the World Bank (1997) to name 
corruption as “…among the greatest obstacle to economic and social development.”    
The interest in recent years of the research and political economy literature about public 
corruption has had some resurgence owing to the renewed debate after the 2008 financial crisis 
about the re-affirmation of the role of the state as an indispensable actor for economic 
development and social welfare in a triumphant all - market driven world economy.  Corruption 
and good governance have been among the most deliberated concepts informing the 
development economics debate and the two notions have been the subject of examination and 
decision by researchers and policy makers for some time. 
Our approach is to capture the definitional variances of corruption which we posit as a 
multidimensional “umbrella concept” (Varraich, 2014) impacted by multiple economic, 
institutional, social or cultural dynamics, in order to set the conditions for a critical analysis of 
the macro- level theories dealing with the structural causes and effects of the corruption 
phenomenon which define its political economy. 
2.2 Corruption: Short Genesis of a Long History 
Corruption has affected nations throughout history and is known as an old age practice with a 
universal footprint throughout the centuries and around the globe. The phenomenon was 
already a worry in the early days of documented human evolution “In the history of the ancient 
Egyptians, Babylonians, Hebrews, Indians, Chinese, Greeks, and Romans corruption often 
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surfaced as a problem…” (Alatas, 1990: 13).  The author further refers to the excerpts of the 
Old Testament Book of Exodus (earlier than 1200 BC) which expressly condemned the bribery 
and other injustices.  “Beware of accepting bribery: they blind even the prudent and disturb the 
judgment even of just men” (Alatas, 1990: 13).  Writers of Ancient Greece such as Aristotle 
expressed concern about the “organized bribing of judges”. (Aristotle cited by Alatas, 1990: 
15).  Such concern was equally present in the Roman Empire where “the intensity and variety 
of corruption … was probably greater” (Alatas, 1990: 16).  Documented history in Asia and 
China in particular shows equal concern for corruption and the “Chinese sages warned against 
it in no uncertain terms” (Alatas, 1990: 40).  The concern remained undying throughout the 
literature.”  In ancient times corruption ultimately prevailed over Greece and Rome as their 
rulers abused power for private leading to the downfall of the great empires (MacMullen, 
1988).  
In the late Middle Ages “Dante placed bribers in the deepest part of Hell reflecting the medieval 
distaste for corrupt behaviour.  Shakespeare gave corruption a prominent role in his plays” 
(Alatas, 1990).  Later another Italian Machiavelli in his most renowned work (The Prince, 
1513) will cynically note that the best people may be subject to corruption owing to greed and 
ambition.  In contemporary times the interest has continued to gain momentum and the amount 
of interest paid to corruption in recent years by researchers and policy makers at both national 
and international levels is unparalleled for the developing world (Tanzi, 2001) and particularly 
for Sub- Saharan Africa.  Earlier the World Bank (1997) had recognized such intensified 
scrutiny and published one of its first pivotal study noting that “there is increasing evidence 
that corruption undermines development” (1997: 1).  The interest and concern about the 
incidence of corruption have since been unrelenting and continues unabated across academia 
and government circles.   
2.3 African Origins of Corruption 
Origins of corruption in Africa have been linked to both internal and external factors.  Most of 
the literature has traced not the incidence – which is evidently ubiquitous and inherent to human 
failings - but the prevalence of public corruption back to its colonial roots.  Indeed, the 
beginnings and spread of corruption may be linked to others socio- historical dimensions but 
its primary causes are “rooted in Africa's colonial past and its associated legacy” (Mulinge and 
Lesetedi, 2002: 53).  Albeit the authors argue for a more exhaustive chronology from the “pre-
colonial sociocultural practices of gift giving, through the practices of colonial 
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administrators…” (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 53). Of those practices the “technique of 
divide and rule” among indigenous communities provided the fertile ground for “corrupt 
practices such as tribalism and nepotism which have become deeply entrenched in most African 
countries” (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002:56).  Colonial practices institutionalized nepotism and 
autocratic rule, ultimately schooling African leaders in the methods of patrimonialism, 
monopolistic power and self- enrichment.  Sadly, the African nascent bourgeoisie “unlike those 
of Europe did not promote essential values for development” (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 
55).  Instead such practices will survive durably the colonial times into modern days and 
become deeply entrenched into African bureaucracies.  As noted by Szeftel “the roots of 
African clienteles were bequeathed by the nature of colonial development and the post-colonial 
settlement which succeeded it” (2000: 430). 
The post-colonial period and early days of independence and one party- rule saw most African 
countries drifting into patrimonial practices if not outright tribalism leading to civil conflicts 
and political unrest.  Indeed, the newly formed countries were not only bureaucratic but also 
monopolistic both politically and economically under the one party system with little concern 
for accountability rules (Dia, 1996) which allowed corruption to fester and economies to be 
looted across the newly independent African states (Ayittey, 1992).  This led to the nefarious 
forms of patrimonialism and clienteles which are characterized by the loyalty of officials to the 
strong man rather than to the state institutions (Dia, 1996).  
 
If colonialism appears to be at the initiation of the corruption phenomenon in Africa, the 
process of globalization can be regarded as its catalyst in the modern era through the actions 
of multinational firms and international organizations and foreign governments. “Corruption 
in sub-Saharan Africa is not a problem that is caused and sustained by internal factors alone. 
Rather, it is also a consequence of external factors manifested through the activities of foreign 
governments, aid organizations and private companies seeking to further their own (economic) 
interests through actions and practices that condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt in 
themselves” (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 62). 
 
In our time whether systemic or sporadic corruption has become highly prevalent across Sub 
Saharan Africa and “…has led to a cooperative and institutionalized abuse of public office for 
personal” (Hope,  2000: 18).  Sadly, the trend seems unrelenting and “for more than four 
decades, corruption has spread like a hurricane throughout post-independence Africa.  No 
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country or region of the continent has remained untainted, to a greater or lesser degree, by the 
corruption pestilence” (Uneke, 2010: 112). And SADC conspicuously has been no exception.   
2.3.1 SADC and Corruption 
Similarly, to other parts of the world, the SADC organization conforming to growing 
international interest in corruption matters in recent times adopted a SADC Protocol 
against Corruption in 2001 which went into force in 2005.  This provided the framework 
for assessing corruption both in theory and in practice across SADC countries.  The 
SADC Protocol Against Corruption in its Article 1 offers a comprehensive definition of 
corruption and reads: “corruption means any act referred to … and includes bribery or 
any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the public 
and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, private employees, 
independent agents or other relationships of that kind and aimed at obtaining undue 
advantage of any kind for themselves or others.”  (2005: 1).  If the SADC definition falls 
within the generally accepted conceptual standards and seems theoretically sound - 
inspired like many others by the “Weberian” principal-agent model - its practical 
corollary however remains elusive.  The oversight committee to monitor implementation 
has yet to be put in place and all deadlines have been ignored by SADC member states 
(Peters, 2010) and there are no regionally accepted standards for assessing and 
monitoring the incidence of corruption. 
 
Meanwhile corruption in SADC countries has been recognized as a concerning problem 
and is seen by the UN (2002) as a “serious developmental issue”.  This is confirmed less 
euphemistically by Peters (2011) who notes that “on the whole the majority of SADC 
countries can be perceived as corrupt” (2011: 158).  
 
On records the data on the incidence of corrupt practices and its perception levels is 
limited and generally stems from various sources and methodologies which make it 
difficult to use for comparative analysis.  The perceived corruption of public officials 
remains high.  From the latest Afro barometer release (2013) which surveyed 34 African 
countries -including twelve SADC countries - more than half of respondents believe that 
corruption among public officials was high (56%).  The growing concern of perceived 
corruption is confirmed by the corruption perception index (CPI) published by 
Transparency International (TI) in the last 4years (2012 -2015) which features 10 out of 
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15 SADC countries at the bottom of the index with less than 50 of the maximum of 100 
points.  Indeed the sustained gaps persist between policy and implementation and 
similarly to other parts of Africa, corruption in SADC countries remains generally and 
sadly a challenge which undercuts the moral compass of public officials and undermines 
the regional capacity to provide for growth, reduce poverty and curb inequality.  
2.4 Definitional Issues 
Despite some scepticism in the anthropologist camp the concept and reality of corruption have 
been overwhelmingly acknowledged by the mainstream literature and largely researched by 
academics in recent years fuelled by accrued interest around good governance issues in 
developing countries.  The categorization of the various types of corruption models found in 
the literature can be distributed in three major strands with the first normative and “ethical”, 
the second rational and “Weberian” and the third utilitarian and “market efficient”.  
2.4.1 Corruption: An ethical Lapse 
This perspective focuses on individuals rather than systems or institutions.  Corruption 
is seen as a moral deviance which Klittgaard regards as “an impairment of virtue, 
integrity or moral principle” (Klitgaard, 1988: 190).  Corruption is seen as a deviation 
from established norms and binding public duties.  In that regard Nye (1967) sees it as a 
“behaviour which deviates from a normal duty of a public duty because of private 
pecuniary or status gains.” (1967: 469).  A corrupt act appears as a transgression of public 
office duties and can be construed as “the abuse of trust in the interest of private gains” 
(Alatas, 1990).  Thus it amounts to a failure of ethical leadership “an act undertaken with 
the deliberate intent of deriving or extracting private and or personal rewards against the 
interest of the state” (Hope, 1997).  Such attitude may be triggered by the failing 
conscience. Douglas (1977) indicates that individuals losing their puritanical faith and 
religious beliefs are more prone to corrupt acts.  More cynically Rose Ackermann (1978) 
finds that corruption is at the confluence of individual choices and circumstantial 
opportunities which conspire to create a corrupt conduct.  
But corruption can be defined not just as a moral category, a deviant personal behaviour 
as its dynamics apply not only to individuals but to systems and situational conditions 
whether in corporate settings, state structures or in society at large. It is at the confluence 
of private and public circumstances.   
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2.4.2 The Weberian Rationale 
Widespread corruption is not just a consequence of ethical failings of imperfect human 
beings it is also a symptom of the degeneration of the state.  It is therefore a failure of 
the bureaucratic order mostly seen by the mainstream literature as a departure from 
Weberian norms of legal-rational administration.  Such rationale following the 
principal - agent model is grounded on the distinction between public and private 
spheres as the foundation of non-corrupt politics and administration (Médard, 1991).  
Corruption then becomes an exception from the Weberian legal-rational model 
bureaucratic rules, a deviation from the tenets of public duty.  Indeed, this rational-legal 
paradigm appears critical for the understanding of corruption as the non-respect of the 
distinction between public and private.  Its causes may pertain to an incomplete process 
of modernisation, remnant of “traditionalism” of modernising countries (Myrdal, 
1968).  Consequently, corruption is destined to dwindling proportion with the 
consolidation of the state and the growing separation of the public and private spheres.  
However, such approach continues to consider corruption as an exception to the 
bureaucratic rules within a principal- agent framework.  Instead Charap and Harm 
(2002) argue that corruption should not be regarded as exogenous practice and “viewed 
as a decentralized and coincidental phenomenon…it should be considered as systemic 
and deliberate: it is the natural result of efficient predatory behaviour in a lawless 
world” (2002: 137).  Corruption manifests itself as endogenous “a systemic device for 
the ruler to extract rents…” (2002: 137).  This argument only highlights the multi- 
dimension and multi - layered complexity of the theory and practice of corruption.  In 
short its relativity.  
2.4.3. Corruption: A Relative Concept 
Corruption is generally framed as a failure of virtuous leadership and of institutional 
order and most commonly defined as “the abuse of a public office for private benefits 
and gains” (World Bank, 1997: 8).  
This definition presumes the existence of a public domain that is clearly separated from 
the private sphere.  The question is how this definition, which is informed by the 
Weber’s rational-legal paradigm, applies to non-Western contexts. (Andvig, et al., 
2001).  In fact, corruption “corruption is also complicated by the conflict of values and 
norms as they differ from culture to culture” (Bauer, 2000: 219).  But just what is private 
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or public?  Aren’t these categories dependent on the various contexts which give them 
social meanings?  
Social anthropologists have generally argued that the conventional definition of 
corruption was too reductionist and tended to ignore what in fact pertains to matters of 
social experience.  Andvig, et al., (2001) note that peoples own assessments of courses 
of action do not arise from a set of culturally universal, invariable norms that help to 
decide if certain actions are to be classified as “corrupt” or not.  Rather, what is seen as 
corruption varies from one region to another.  Given such variations, explorations of 
how the actors themselves evaluate social practices are required.” (2001: 46).  Wood 
(1994) argues that “it does not proceed from an a priori assumption that such 
[Weberian] rationality is or can be the norm in society” (1994: 520).  As Torsello puts 
it “this definition is problematic in its very essence for anthropology: the dichotomy 
private-public, informed by the Weberian rationality of the western bureaucratic 
machinery is context-specific.” (2011: 3).  Indeed the dichotomist views provide little 
understanding of corrupt practices that are often deep seated in well-established forms 
of social interaction that allow space for their flourishing and where corruption becomes 
“   the space in which the state dissolves at local level and is replaced by a plethora of 
socio-cultural practices and relations (2011: 8). 
Furthermore, the very notion that corruption should be deemed immoral may be open 
for debate as it derives from a normative approach to corruption.  Sardan (1999) is at 
odds with such a “weberian” view and finds a new rationality within African indigenous 
practices described as “moral economy” under which under “a number of culturally 
constructed practices (gift giving, brokerage, solidarity networks, predatory authority 
and redistributive accumulation) corruption becomes banalised, as commonly accepted 
and esteemed practice” (Torsello, 2011: 12).  In fact, such “western-centric” view is 
not only narrow but also too worried with the legalities of “corrupt” practices.  This 
legalistic approach is founded on the premise that legal frameworks are neutral and 
universally applicable.  However corrupt activity is not an objective form of practice, 
it may be construed as a social act and its meaning must be understood within social 
and historical contexts. (Williams, 1999).  Such view is also supported by Scott (1969) 
who distinguishes between social and legal norms which translate into “parochial 
corruption” and “market corruption”: the former amounts to patrimonialism where ties 
of family and affiliation provide access to favours while the latter implies an arm’s 
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length, more business –like process in which favour is extended against payment.  
Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2000) contend that corruption is largely an ambivalent 
practice with normative connotations to be recognized.  Hence with such ambivalence, 
what is corruption and what is not can only be agreed within wider social and cultural 
circumstances as “types of human conduct that are frowned upon in one culture and 
attract the label of corruption may be common practice and accepted (or tolerated) as 
such in other cultures” (Carr, 2009: 156).  This anthropological approach however 
intends not to legitimize corrupt practices through some cultural relativism but to 
demonstrate that the meaning for corrupt behaviour is not universal.  While there is no 
universal acceptable understanding of corruption there isn’t total convergence either on 
the effects of corruption viewed by some as harmful and to the contrary beneficial by 
others - subscribing to a functionalist view- as a means for curtailing bureaucratic 
apathy and circumventing government red tape.  
2.4.4. Corruption: A market Equilibrium by-product 
The idea that corruption impairs economic efficiency and has only negative effects on 
growth has largely been challenged by other scholars.  Some have argued that truly 
corruption ought to be taken as a trade-off for economic progress a “welcome lubricant 
easing the path to modernisation” (Huntington, 1979: 69) which may present 
opportunities for positive outcomes and can be seen as a market equilibrium business 
practice.  First corruption can improve bureaucratic efficiency.  Leff (1964) and 
Huntington, (1968) argue that corruption can remove government rigidities and 
bottlenecks that obstruct investment and allow entrepreneurs to circumvent bureaucratic 
obstruction and excessive red tape.  Hence corruption appears as a functional tool, 
beneficial to grease a rigid bureaucracy and contribute to a nimbler system by reducing 
or avoiding the financial costs of pervasive regulation through the means of bribery.   
Huntington says “in terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with 
a rigid, over-centralized dishonest bureaucracy, is one with a rigid, over-centralized, 
honest bureaucracy.” (1968: 386).  Osterfeld (1992) has comparable views and sees 
corruption as a way to increase output and efficiency through more free market. Cuervo-
Cazurro (2008) finds that some corruption can grease bureaucratic rigidities and facilitate 
economic transactions.  
Corruption can also allow a better allocation of time and increase economic efficiency. 
Lui (1985) suggests comparing corruption with a queuing model that offers a more 
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efficient allocation of time by allowing those most productive and time- conscious the 
opportunity to move to the front of the line. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) contend that 
practices in corrupt societies will favour the ablest in rent-seeking activities and suggest 
that corruption may contribute to awarding deals to most efficient companies and most 
able entrepreneurs willing to pay for the opportunity cost of doing business, and in turn 
will make the most out of the paid bribes. Dreher and Gassebner (2007) also state that 
corruption can help entrepreneurial dynamism in highly controlled economies while 
Bardhan (1997) relates corruption to free market and free thinking entrepreneurs. In the 
same vein, DiRienzo and Redington (2014) through a cross- country study conclude that 
some “minimal” level of corruption can ‘grease the wheels’ enhance productivity and 
add economic efficiencies. 
However, while preoccupied by the efficiency implications of corruption some empirical 
literature may have been fixated on the margins of the phenomenon and disregarded most 
of the negative consequences of corruption and its dysfunctional effects on economies, 
institutions and societies at large.  Put shortly what are the harms of corruption? But first 
what causes corruption? 
2.5 Determinants of corruption 
The mainstream literature has broadly classified the causes of corruption into three main 
categories which relate to their economic, institutional and cultural connotations.  
2.5.1 Economic Triggers 
One of the major contributing factors has been linked to distortions at the public policy 
level including the dominant role attributed to the state in Africa.  As noted by Hope 
(2000).  “Along with the emergence of the patrimonial state came the expanded role of 
state activity.  Economic decision making became centralized and public enterprises 
proliferated.  This resulted in an expanding bureaucracy with an increasing discretionary 
power which was put to use as conduit for graft.  Public enterprises then became a 
playground for corruption” (2000: 20).  Corruption is directly associated with the state 
involvement and crucially with its dominance and authoritarian power (Abed and Gupta, 
2002), and this ascendancy of the state control as a main variable of public corruption is 
also noted by Hope (2000) who argue: “this exercise of state power has led to the 
supremacy of state over civil society and in turn to the ascendancy of the patrimonial 
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state with its characteristic stranglehold on the economic and political levers of power 
through which corruption thrives for it is through this stranglehold that all decision 
making occurs and patronage is dispensed” (2000: 19).  
The other significant factor is related to the scarcity of resource exacerbated by a 
competition for survival and fuelled by a greed mentality in the developing world (Hope,  
2000).  But Huntington (1979) contends that the march out of poverty through 
modernization with its accompanying value changes may also be viewed as a source of 
corruption.  The situation may be exacerbated by the abundance of resources and its 
exploitation seen as a high rent- seeking commerce which cultivates rent-seeking conduct 
amongst insatiable state officials (Leite, et al., 1999).  The economic survival of public 
bureaucrats and civil servants then becomes source of corruption.  
The relationship between wage level and corruption index has been tested empirically by 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) and found to be significant and negatively correlated.  
Higher wages in public sector may be efficient in deterring perpetrators by increasing the 
potential loss in case of detection. 
Market conditions framed through competition or lack thereof may also be a structural 
factor to induce or reduce corruption.  Leite and Weidmann (1999) provided empirical 
evidence that trade openness negatively impacts on the level of corruption.  But in Africa 
corruption thrives owing not just to economic circumstances and market conditions but 
crucially to the flaws of government, weak institutional capacity and lax implementation 
of state regulations. 
2.5.2 Governance Drivers  
Crucial to sound functioning of the public sphere is the rule of law.  In many countries 
the lack of transparency in rules and laws provides a conducive ground for corruption 
(Hope and Chikulo, 2000). Disrespect for judicial processes allows then the ruling elite 
to interfere with the functions of the state for their private and selfish end. This is also 
typically a symptom of a faltering leadership which is another critical ingredient to 
institutional quality. Where leadership is in deficit “personal and private gains take 
precedence over national interests. The state is an artificial entity. Public officials have 
no fear for being held accountable for their actions” (Abed and Gupta, 2002: 34).  
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Accountability will not be enforced owing to lack of oversight and credible penalty 
system.  Indeed “the penalty imposed plays an important role in determining the 
probability that criminal or illegal acts would take place” (Abed and Gupta, 2002: 35).  
And for the oversight to be exercised against corruption,  institutional controls are 
required as they are “the first line of defence. Honest and effective supervisors, good 
auditing offices, clear rules on ethical behaviour should be able to discourage or 
discover corrupt activities” (Abed and Gupta, 2002: 35).   
In effect most of the academic analysis has adopted an economistic if not materialistic 
approach and has commonly presented the phenomenon of corruption through its 
underlying tangible causes - whether institutional or economic - without truly focusing 
on the various cultural forms and the social circumstances in which corrupt practices 
flourish.  
2.5.3 Indigenous Variables 
While the geography and prevalence of corruption may be driven by factors such as 
institutions or resources of a country other characteristics and circumstances such as 
cultural and social customs are just as significant.  Indeed, it is manifest that public 
corruption cannot be fully explained by individual moral factors or economic motives 
alone.  Societies and their collective inclinations can also be an enabler to provide for the 
social norms and legitimized ground in which corrupt practices flourish. 
The influence of family links and loyalties has been often seen as a source of corruption 
in Africa (Hope and Chikulo, 2000).  Associations between customs, kinships and power 
have been fertile ground for either tolerating or condoning corruption (Alatas, 1990).  
This provided the foundation for a very tenuous distinction between public and private 
interests characteristic of clientelism and nepotism to be constituted (Medard, 1998).  
Earlier in a pivotal study Ekeh (1975) noted that public officials in Africa, obedient to 
clientelistic rather than bureaucratic rules tend to direct their primary loyalty to kinships 
and entourage before public interest.  Hence bribery and favouritism become embedded 
in a web of every day practices, customs, personal allegiances which Sardan (1999) 
describes as “corruption complex” governed by “logics of corruption” where networks 
of patronage are fostered by common social values and practices.   
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Husted (1999) after Hofstede (1991) identify another pertinent cultural attitude termed 
“power distance” which is "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions 
and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" 
(Husted, 1999: 343).  Where societies display a “high distance power” as in most African 
(and Asian) traditions there is a belief “that power and authority are facts of life.  Both 
consciously and unconsciously, these cultures teach their members that people are not 
equal in this world and that everybody has a rightful place, which is clearly marked by 
countless vertical arrangements.  Social hierarchy is prevalent and institutionalises 
inequality”. (Samovar, et.al., 1998: 71).  Such societal attitude driven by a high 
acceptance of authority and low accessibility to people in command will in turn provide 
room for corrupt behaviour from the rent- seeking elite and powerful.  But while 
corruption may be driven by soft causes its consequences are indeed tangibly genuine 
and its effects have a hard-hitting reality particularly for the most vulnerable and deprived 
of society. 
2.6 Costs of Corruption 
The effect of corruption on the major economic variables has been widely researched.  While 
some studies have recognized some marginal economic benefits to be derived from corruption 
by helping to ease bureaucratic inertia, the overwhelming majority of findings of the empirical 
literature has concluded on the cost burden and the harmful effects of corruption, namely by 
reducing the pace to growth, hindering productive public expenditure, limiting foreign 
investment and obstructing the efficiency of service delivery.  Transparency International (TI) 
considers corruption as one the greatest cost burden for developing economies “which 
undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to misallocation of 
resources, harms the private sector and private sector development and particularly hurts the 
poor” (TI, 1997: 7).  Abed and Gupta (2002) summarize through the empirical literature both 
the qualitative and quantitative damages caused to the economy by corruption in its various 
facets:  
- Corruption distorts markets and the allocation of resources  
- It reduces the ability of governments to impose necessary controls and inspections to 
correct markets failures 
- Corruption is likely to increase poverty because it reduces the income earning potential 
of the poor 
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- It reduces investment and as a result it reduces the rate of growth.  
- It decreases expenditure on health and education which does not lend itself to corrupt 
practices.  
- It lessens the productivity of public investment and of a country’s infrastructure.  
- And limits foreign direct investment because corruption operates as a tax.  
2.6.1 Corruption and Growth 
In its ground- breaking findings Mauro (1995, 1997) observes significant negative association 
between corruption and investment or the rate of growth.  The same linkage has been also 
recognized among many others by Hope (1997) and Van Rijckghem and Weder (1997).  
However quantitative evidence on the direct impact of corruption on growth remains open to 
debate.  Lambsdorff (1999) argue that if there is robust parallel between a country’s GDP size 
and ranking on corruption indexes however no true causality from corruption to growth can be 
drawn.  The OECD (2014) suggests a more nuanced approach with a relationship through 
institutions channels.  “In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a 
significant negative effect on growth; while in the regime with low quality institutions, the 
estimated corruption coefficient is not statistically significant intuitive explanation for this 
result is that the better the quality of public sector governance, the more its subversion by 
corruption will hurt economically.   
In the other extreme, bypassing a completely dysfunctional governance regime via corruption 
will not hurt economic performance, and may even improve it” (OECD, 2014: 28).  In the 
absence of robust evidence on the impact of corruption on growth it is also hypothesized that 
corruption may affect the accumulation of capital but does not necessarily impact its 
productivity (Abed and Gupta, 2002).  The authors (2002: 206) also suggest that “corruption 
and investment assume a positive relationship between investment and growth” (2002: 206).  
Therefore, if corruption affects investment it must also affect growth.  
2.6.2 Corruption and Investment 
If the link between corruption and growth remains an open question the effect of 
corruption on investment has been one the most scrutinized in the literature with a larger 
research consensus.  Most scholars and much of the economic theory (Mauro, 1995, 
1997) Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) investment 
conclude through empirical work that corruption has a significant negative impact on the 
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ratio of investment to GDP.  Campos, Lien and Pradhan (1999) in a cross-section of 59 
countries, Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) and others find a statistically significant negative 
effect of corruption on investment.  Not only corruption affects total investment level but 
in particular it puts severe constraints on foreign direct investment (FDI).  Corruption 
may weaken a country's ability to attract foreign capital inflows (Brunetti and Weder 
1998) due rent- seeking costs which reduce profitability (Javorcik and Wei, 2009), and 
increase unpredictability (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). 
However, it has also been noted that the directional causality may be reversed as FDI 
may be a major source of corruption particularly in developing and resource- rich 
countries as international investors contend for access to markets at times through bribes 
(Pinto and Zhu, 2013).  Nevertheless, can one argue that an important channel through 
which corruption affects capital productivity is by impacting both the quality and the 
composition of public expenditures?  The question has been largely and more 
consensually examined in the literature. 
2.6.3 Corruption and Public Spending 
Indeed, the majority of scholars have focused on the quality-effect of corruption on 
government expenditure.  In Africa as noted by Okori (2010: 112) “…bribery, inflation 
of contracts, and brazen mismanagement, corruption account for the channelling of 
scarce public funds to uneconomic and highly-capital intensive projects, such as 
pipelines and refineries, dams, and power plants, at the expense of more necessary 
infrastructure projects, such as water and electricity supply, hospitals, schools, and 
roads”.  Earlier Shleifer and Vishny (1993) equally found that government officials tend 
to favour capital intensive projects in lieu of more social human –capital oriented 
programmes which often leads to inefficient allocation of capital and uneconomic 
projects (Frisch 1995).  In the same vein Mauro (1997) confirms that public investments 
may be redirected to low if not unproductive sectors more prone to misappropriation of 
funds and finds evidence that corruption lowers expenditures on education.  Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997), analysing cross-country data also conclude that corruption significantly 
augments public investment while sinking its productivity due to added rent –seeking 
charges.  Such capital misallocation accounts for the “cemetery of white elephants” or 
“cathedrals in the desert - abandoned super highways, uneconomic dams, industrial 
plants - that litter the African landscape” (Okori 2010: 119). 
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The evidence overwhelmingly seems to point to a negative impact of corruption on the 
allocation and use of public resources which provide for the enabling environment of 
private sector development.  Therefore, corruption must also affect private firms and the 
corporate environment.   
2.6.4 Enterprise and Corruption   
While the negative effect of corruption on the performance and profitability of private 
firms is widely acknowledged by the literature, (Alam, 1995 and Di Tella, 1999) it 
however may have varying impact owing to the size of the enterprises involved.  It is 
suggested that large corporations may benefit from corrupt practices by securing 
monopolistic markets and little competition whereas for “SMEs it is of cost increasing 
kind because they have to make payments which do not contribute to the productivity or 
profitability of the firm” (Alatas and Hants, 1990: 203).  Such cost inflation is also noted 
in the African context as bribes and kickbacks only contribute to escalate projects final 
expenditures (Hope, 2000).  Not only that corruption has a damaging effect on the firms’ 
profits and productivity but it also leads to decreasing private investment as uncertainty 
and unpredictability arise (OECD, 2014).  Such decline in investment may affect transfer 
of technology and cause delay of technological advancement (Mahagaonkar, 2008) as 
private financial inflows are seen as major channel for innovation.   
Clearly most of the literature has stressed the harmful effects of corruption and its overall 
detriments to the growth of the private sector leading to misallocation and wasteful use 
of resources.  
2.6.5 Resource Endowment and Corruption  
In contrast to the mixed evidence on the correlation between corporate turnover and 
corruption, the link between endowment of natural resources and corruption has been 
found as generally strong in low income countries notably in Africa where “one of the 
main sources of misappropriation of public resources is generated by the lack of 
accountability of funds generated from natural resources” (Vazquez, et al., 2007: 47).  
Earlier Sachs and Warner (1995), from a cross- section study of 70 countries, report a 
negative relationship between the ratio of natural resources exports and the growth rate, 
and when the economic growth is hampered then the problem may crucially arise from 
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the revenues accrued out of mineral exports as they prompt the prevalence of rent - 
seeking behaviour from officials (Khan, 1994).   The phenomenon would not only affect 
the country’s macro- economic variables but also its institutions as the high incidence of 
bribery threatens “the quality of legal and political institutions, and the level of political 
instability (Ayitteh, 2000: 181).  Indeed, for many countries in Sub Saharan Africa, 
abundance of nature has not brought windfall gains and prosperity to the people but rather 
created opportunities for graft and self- enrichment for politicians and bureaucrats all 
conspiring to weaken the state and compromise political stability (Coolidge and 
Ackerman, 2000).   
The more vital effects will translate into threats to already dire economic conditions for 
many and increased vulnerability to the livelihoods of the poor, all of which may 
compromise human development. 
2.6.6 Corruption and Social Development 
Corruption affects not only major economic variables such as growth and investment 
but it also has direct impact on other development variables including the welfare 
outcomes of growth across society.  Hence the corruption social inequality nexus has 
been of particular concern to researchers in developing countries and particularly in 
Sub Saharan Africa.  Generally, corruption is found to exacerbate inequality and 
poverty in numerous ways. First at the policy level, Gupta, et al., (2002) note that 
“government officials may use their authority for private gain when designing and 
implementing public policies, intentionally distorting public policy decisions in an 
attempt to create opportunities for bribery and” (2002: 458) giving preference to 
investment in capital intensive projects (Rose Ackermann, 1999) instead of socially- 
oriented programs (Gupta, et al., 1998).  Such choice will harm the poor’s wellbeing as 
Mauro, (1998) found corruption to be associated with lower spending on education and 
health.  
The impact of corruption on poverty is also function of the government officials’ 
involvement in implementation.  Large portions of public funds are embezzled or 
misallocate to benefit the powerful (Tanzi, 1995 and Gupta, et al., 2002).  Such practice 
will concur to produce unequal distributional consequences (Ward, 1989) and preserve 
status quo and inequality (Johnston, 1989).  In a cross - section study of 37 countries 
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Gupta et al. (1998) empirically conclude to a significant positive correlation of 
corruption with inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.  Apart from extending 
income inequality by favouring the well-offs corruption indeed tends to harm 
developmental outcomes by directing lesser public funding towards social programs.  
Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) argue that corruption is correlated with lower life 
expectancy and school enrolment.  Such findings of damaging effects on human capital 
were earlier reported by Gupta, et al.,1998.   
Ultimately corruption is seen as having multiple regressive effects on many socio- 
economic fronts and pre-empting the state ability to transform the economy and change 
society as reported by the OECD (2014: 2): “the true social cost of corruption cannot 
be measured by the amount of bribes paid or even the amount of state property stolen.  
Rather, it is the loss of output due to the misallocation of resources, distortions of 
incentives and other inefficiencies caused by corruption that represent its real cost to 
society.  In addition to these output losses, corruption can inflict additional welfare 
costs in terms of adverse effects on the distribution of income and disregard for 
environmental protection” (2014: 2).  The same perspective is confirmed by Aidt’s 
empirical work (2009) which demonstrates a significant relationship and a negative 
impact of corruption on wealth formation (which adjusts fixed investment for depletion 
of resource and human capital).  Afrobarometer in its latest survey (2013) suggests that 
the poor are more exposed to corruption than others notably in countries with high 
incidence of such phenomenon namely African countries. 
But most importantly, corruption undermines public trust in the government, thereby 
diminishing its ability to fulfil its core task of providing adequate public services, 
eventually distorting the “allocation of economic benefits, favouring the haves over the 
have-nots and leading to a less equitable distribution of income” (Ackerman R, 2006: 
33).   
In extreme cases, it may entail the delegitimization of the state, leading to severe 
political and economic instability.  The resulting general uncertainty is detrimental to 
the concerned countries’ ability to manage public resources effectively and to commit 
to a long-term development strategy, the lack of which make equitable and sustainable 
development elusive.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
Indeed, whether in the public or private domain corruption is seen as a diversion of 
collective resources towards selfish ends that crucially affect an economy and more 
broadly a society through multiplier effects which all make up the political economy of 
the phenomenon that we reviewed in this section.   
Although there seems to be some mixed evidence - markedly with regards to growth- it 
is generally widely accepted that corruption is one of the most damaging variables for 
development with negative implications for economic progress and social welfare.   
The varied empirical results of various studies however points to the facts that although 
we may have learnt a lot about the causes and effects of corruption we still have to learn 
much more about the root causes of the phenomenon and its diffusion channels.  This 
may also lead to recognize the greater complexity of corruption as a ubiquitous practice 
with dimensions that might have unique and non-generalizable origins and effects. 
African countries - including SADC - should be well aware of such idiosyncrasies as they 
have not only analytical but practical implications for the success of good governance 
public policy- initiatives and the implementation effectiveness of anti- corruption 
strategies.   
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMICS OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
3.1 The concept of human capital 
3.1.1 Definitional Aspects  
The notion of human capital widely referenced in development economics is seen as one 
the key factor of production in economic output and one of the most critical input for 
economic growth in modern economies.  The concept generally refers to the “to the skills 
knowledge and capabilities of a workforce of a firm or of the population of the country 
as well as the organizational arrangements and networks of relationships those people 
have formed that enable them to be more innovative and productive” (Blair, 2011:50).  
In the economic literature the suggestion that the human factor is essential to production 
goes back to Adam Smith (1776) who pointed that investment to equip workers with 
special skills and capabilities are key to improving productivity.  This provided the 
theoretical foundation for expenditures on human capital to be categorized as investment 
instead of consumption good.  Later, Mincer (1958) Schultz (1961) Becker (1964) 
successively recognized the importance of human capital as capabilities and skills gained 
through investment in education which allow for higher private returns and differences 
in workers’ earnings.  Coff (2002) designates human capital as the set of knowledge, 
skills and abilities which can be categorized as tacit or explicit and which refers to the 
extent of transferability of such knowhow (Crook, et al. 2011) 
At a macroeconomic level the term was later coined by Becker (1993: 16) who put 
forward that the growth not explained by physical capital or quantity of labor is to be 
linked to residual factors of “labor quality” he later called – reluctantly – human capital.  
More recently and comprehensively the OECD (2001: 18) proposed a more extensive 
scope of individual attributes and has defined human capital “as the knowledge, skills, 
competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitates the creation of 
personal social and economic wellbeing”.  This definition represents a widening of the 
scope of human capital to not only traits but also to contextual and social elements.  It 
also points to the multi – dimensions of human capital which can be “framed as 
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heterogeneous and its value contingent on the context of its application – and these 
contexts vary widely from the national and firm level to the individual level” (2011: 187). 
3.1.2 Categories of Human capital  
Indeed, human capital is not a unidimensional construct.  If it is the sum of knowledge 
and training skills embodied in an individual, it is for businesses the addition of 
capabilities which form a workforce while it represents for policy the capacity of the 
educated in a country.  This translates into distinct intellectual capitals that have been 
categorized in human, relational and organizational types (Stewart, 1997).  As Blair puts 
it human capital can be “framed as heterogeneous and its value contingent on the context 
of its application – and these contexts vary widely from the national and firm level to the 
individual” (2011: 187). 
As an individual asset human capital is viewed as the antipode of physical capital. One 
important difference is that human capital is not alienable “its services can be rented but 
the capital itself remains the property of the original owner” (2011: 153).  It refers here 
to knowledge embodied in individuals and acquired through formal education, learning 
and workplace training.  But if human capital is viewed as a function of individual traits, 
its value in practice is predicated by the social environment which is the contextual 
element (Burt, 2005) to explain its different manifestations within the educated populace.  
Such link has been notably proposed by Coleman (1988) emphasizing the importance of 
the family environment in education outcomes.  Blair (2011) later suggested that “social 
capital provide both the theory and evidence to illuminate the ways in which connections 
and relationships shape the development and realization of human potential” (2011: 79).  
Human capital becomes defined as a relational resource, breaking away from “the 
reductionist neo –classical model of human capital in which individuals are presumed to 
invest on the basis of instrumental, self - maximizing motives” (2011: 78).  The 
economistic view which implies human capital is invested in return for economic value 
is challenged in favour of an understanding of its wider social context (Schuller, et al., 
2004; Erault and Hirsh, 2007).  The shift towards a more social view of human capital 
also caused the OECD to provide a new and wider definition of human capital now seen 
as “the knowledge, competencies, skills, attributes embodied in in individuals that 
facilitate the creation of personal social and economic wellbeing” (OECD, 2001: 18).  
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If in an organizational context, human capital remains within the paradigm in which 
knowledge and skills are its main attributes embodied in an individual, for policy makers, 
human capital amounts to the capabilities of a country’s population and comprising a 
health factor which has come “to be seen as a fundamental component of human capital” 
(Blair, 2011: 79).  Here the importance of human capital is derived from its collective 
significance as a key variable for the purpose of national planning and managing 
economic output.  It evolves from an individual to a more social stance over time 
retaining its distinctive character from physical capital.  The fundamental difference is 
“that human capital is not alienable.  Human capital ownership cannot be alienated from 
its original owner.  Its services can be rented but the capital itself remains the property 
of the original owner (Blair, 2011: 153) as it stands, unlike other forms of capital as an 
inalienable asset tied to the individual.  Meanwhile this review of the multiple forms of 
human capital is also pertinent to the issue of categorizing and measuring human capital.  
3.2 Metrics of Human capital  
A host of proxies have been suggested in the labor economics literature to account for human 
capital.  Attempts to provide for some estimate human capital were suggested on the onset in 
the early definitions (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1965) which posited the sum of knowledge and 
skills of the population as a form capital instrumental to the supremacy of developed countries.  
Human capital is then measured through the education level of the population to which 
estimates are assigned such as literacy rate (Romer, 1990) or enrolment rates (Barro, 1991; 
Mankiw, et al., 1992) or average years of schooling (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Benhabib 
and Spiegel, 1994).  
Another thread of research has highlighted the occupational element as a measure of human 
capital that is the type of work performed instead of intellectual knowhow (Florida, et al., 
2008).  
3.2.1 Human capital: A Cost Center 
These views are linked to the neoclassical approach which provided the basis for labor 
economists and policy planners to use as a measure of human capital, the inputs needed 
for its acquisition such as years of education, years of training.  The neoclassical approach 
is further elaborated by Mankiv, Romer and Weil (1992) who suggest a “Cobb – 
Douglass production function with human capital as an H factor of the workforce.” 
(Blair, 2011:57).  It follows that measuring human capital amounts more to measuring 
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not its value but its cost through estimates of direct costs of education and training seen 
as investments and used by labor analysts to “… measure the economic effects of such 
investments in terms of wages salaries and other forms of compensation for workers” 
(Blair, 2011: 56). 
At an organizational level, human capital is defined by the American Accounting 
Association (1973) as the “process of identifying and measuring data about human 
resources…”  The focus is initially more towards quantifying human resources on the 
balance sheet treated as “expenses” and not “assets” (Brummett, et al., 1968).  
Then new frameworks provided wider scopes to account for human capital (Boedker, 
2007) not just in terms of outlays but relied on other human and performance dimensions 
(Kaplan, et al., 1992).  Such approach included “…accounting for knowledge 
information, culture, values, skills, links to the community, practices to improve the 
environment, and customer service” (2011: 383).  The emphasis is no longer on the 
financial accounting but rather on the wider delineation of human capital which accounts 
for more strategic elements such as “competitive advantage of human capital and 
organizational effectiveness (Blair, 2011: 384) not to mention its monetary value. 
3.2.2 Human Capital: A Revenue Stream  
A well - established strand of research has long provided evidence of economic returns 
at the individual level.  From the pioneers (Schultz, 1961) who first described spending 
on education as an investment instead of consumption meant to develop workers ‘skills 
and improve their earnings potential, to Becker (1964) who also found knowledge to 
accumulate towards increased future income, all recognized the key role of education 
and improved skills to improved marginal productivity and improved workers’ earnings.  
Later Mincer (1974) determined the rate of earning for an additional one year in school 
to be 11.5%.  Investments in education are seen as means to accrue monetary benefits 
and educational choices become “rational choices of optimizing agents, who compare the 
present value of earnings to be expected from education and its related costs, over a life-
cycle period” (Blair, 2011: 76).  
In more recent empirical studies, the higher productivity yield of human capital is also 
confirmed.  Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) conclude that in developing countries 
the average return to education is superior than that to financial capital.  The OECD 
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reports (2012) have shown across countries a strong positive association between private 
earnings and years of schooling. 
If the accrual of human capital through education and training seems to be recognized 
throughout the literature as the main driver behind private returns it also has more 
encompassing effects at the macroeconomic level.  Human capital affects not only 
individuals but also national growth. 
3.3 Impact of Human Capital 
The effect of human capital accumulation to explain the divergent economic fortunes among 
countries has long been established in development economics.  Early on Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations (1776) suggest the important role of human capital as a factor of higher 
productivity.  The research has since overwhelmingly found strong associations between levels 
of human capital and economic prosperity. 
3.3.1 Human Capital and Economic Growth 
A long stream of economic and social research has recognized the critical contribution 
of human capital in explaining the divergent paths to growth among nations.  
Pioneers in human capital theory such as Becker (1964), Schultz (1972) first recast the 
human element as a capital which accumulation is a key contributor to both individuals’ 
productivity and nations’ growth.  Later Lucas (1988) found a strong association between 
gains in productivity and levels of school attainment notably in secondary and tertiary 
education.  Across economies the human factor is linked more explicitly to economic 
output after Becker (1993: 16) identifies that “human capital was the key to unlocking 
the mystery of the growth not linked to known factors of production and inputs such as 
physical capital, equipment, or technology”.  Investigating growth in the US economy.  
Denison (1985) finds significant correlation between workers’ education and per capita 
income for the period 1929 to 1982.  Other studies brought renewed concurrence to the 
discussion with the prominent writings of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1992) reasserting 
education as a long term factor to explain differences in GDP evolutions among 
countries.  Mankiv, et al., (1992) using the Solow model pointed to the key role of human 
capital to account for variations in growth rates between countries.  Barro (1991) while 
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analyzing data across 98 nations for the period 1960 -1985 found a strong association 
between human capital and the growth rate of per capita GDP.   
Indeed, investment in human capital is critical to a country’s economic development as 
it is also recognized to drive other investments and notably for direct investment (FDI). 
Markusen (2001) found human capital and knowledge to be key determinants for foreign 
investment inflows.  While Nonnemberg and Cardoso de Mendonça (2004), conclude 
that FDI is strongly correlated to education attainment among other factors in a panel 
data analysis across 38 developing countries for the period 1975 to 2000.  Similarly, 
Reiter, et al., (2010) confirm a positive relationship between human development and 
foreign investment particularly in countries with lower corruption levels.  
However, some economists albeit in the minority have questioned such positive 
association between human capital and economic growth.  Caselli, et al., (1996) find no 
positive relationship between the two variables which was later concurred by Pritchett 
(2001).  Instead these authors highlighted factors of quality and not quantity in education 
as diminishing returns may affect yields in human capital investment.  It is not just the 
returns on the quantity of education to be considered but the quality which provides for 
learning abilities and faster knowledge acquisition.  Some studies (Barro and Lee 1993, 
1996; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008) using test scores clearly established the 
importance of quality education in relation to income distribution and national growth 
levels. 
How to account for human capital in the incidence of growth and incorporate knowledge 
in the growth models has been a continuing interest for the contemporary economic 
literature.  The various economic models can be grouped into exogenous or endogenous 
categories according to their approach in linking human capital and economic growth. 
3.3.2 The Exogenous Economic Model 
Human capital as an exogenous output to economic growth has been best framed after 
the Solow model (1957) and looked at knowledge as a given factor outside the economic 
growth model. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992: 432) in their ground breaking paper reframe the 
production model by adding human capital as a new input factor.  Human capital 
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similarly to physical capital is taken as an input factor in the production function, "It is 
accumulated by investing a fraction of income in its production, depreciates at the same 
rate as physical capital, and is produced with the same technology as both physical capital 
and consumption” (Schutt, 2003: 9).  Such approach externalizes the human capital factor 
and like physical capital is subject to diminishing returns “it can depreciate over time if 
worker become ill, weaker of less physically or mentally able as they age. It can also 
depreciate if certain skills become obsolete” (Blair, 2011: 52).  
However, under the neo – classical model factors determining the long - run growth such 
as savings rate or rate of technical progress are exogenous to growth variations and 
remain unexplained. The endogenous growth model is an attempt to unlock such 
unknown. 
3.3.3 The Endogenous Growth Model 
Distinct from the previous approach which hold the long - run growth model outside the 
model the second approach “emphasizes the role of the human capital stock in the process 
of innovation and adoption of new technologies” (Schutt, 2003: 9).  Romer (1986) and 
Lucas (1988) are first to theorize the endogenous framework for human capital and 
suggest a new growth theory which accounts for human capital from within the model.  
Technological progress becomes a catalyst of the growth engine rather than an external 
factor.  The long- run growth is no longer a mystery as it “becomes self-sustained 
and…driven by the accumulation of human capital” (Schutt, 2003: 10). Both human 
capital and technical knowledge are seen with increasing returns which drive the 
economic growth.  This model underlines the importance of investment in human capital 
formation as it becomes another internal source of growth.  Knowledge is no longer 
subject to diminishing returns and “because there are no diminishing returns to the 
acquisition of skills, human capital can grow without bound, thereby generating 
endogenous growth” (Schutt, 2003: 10)  
Others will follow suit with new variants of the basic endogenous growth model.  Barro 
(2001) uses an endogenous growth model and also concluded to the positive relationship 
between education and growth in his sample of 100 countries for the period 1960 to 1995. 
Using another approach of endogenous growth theory Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) 
propose to model total factor productivity (TFP) growth as a function of human capital 
47 
 
formation.  Human capital is no longer a detached production factor generating growth 
but as an added source of growth produces spillover effects into the economy.  Similar 
approach is taken by Altinok (2006) using the endogenous model who finds a positive 
relationship of human capital indicators with growth across 105 countries for the period 
1960 to 2000.  More recently the function of human capital in the form of knowledge in 
spreading social progress was recognized more explicitly by Piketty (2014) as he put it: 
“Knowledge and skill diffusion is the key of the overall productivity growth as well as 
the reduction of inequality both within and between countries” (2014: 21).  Arguably 
human capital is revived as a critical resource at the macro – level for growth but it also 
appears as a key determinant at the micro – enterprise level.  
3.3.4 Human Capital and Corporate Performance  
The idea of human capital has become a dominant concept not only in development 
macroeconomics but also in the theory of the firm and human resource management 
within the context of assessing enterprise performance and corporate governance.  
Human capital defined as the sum of knowledge skills and experience of workers is 
viewed as a critical resource in organizational environments, “a value generating 
potential of employee knowledge skills and abilities” (Kang, et al., 2007: 333).  Benefits 
to be accrued from investing in human capital include higher productivity through 
enhancing worker’s ability to manage information about input costs (Welch, 1970), 
higher potential for innovation through learning and learning by doing.  Professionals 
with high human capital are likely to induce lesser staff costs due to a lower turnover rate 
(Chang and Wang, 1996) and greater capability to deliver consistently high level of 
quality services (Pennings, et al., 1998). 
Increased productivity is also likely to be derived from the spillover effect induced by 
multinational firms through the spread of technology and knowledge from the global to 
local markets.  Porter (1990) suggests that international firms have a key role in the 
trickledown effect of human capital as they use foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
maximize profits by leveraging cutting edge technology and highly trained workers.  
Human capital is described as a critical resource for firms to sustain their competitive 
advantage.  Patibandla and Petersen (2002) confirm that multinationals are more willing 
and able to invest in skills development which in turn will benefit the local market 
through staff movement. 
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Despite being a high productivity generating potential for firms, human capital unlike 
other factors of production cannot be alienated from its owner, bought or sold.  It is not 
owned by the employer but only rented through the labor market.  This entails that human 
capital may only be available to firms through contractual workplace relationships as in 
the form of principals and agents (Williamson, 1985).  In an agency framework agent - 
employees while acting in their self-interest are committed to discharge their tasks and 
willing to also act in the interest of the principal - employer (Crawford 2009).  Then such 
relationships construed as human resources will need to be managed strategically across 
contracts within firm structures with the aim for companies to maximize employees’ 
potential and build the competitive edge for a lasting survival 
3.3.5 Human Capital and Governance 
But the effects of human capital go beyond improved economic returns in the form of 
individual earnings or national growth.  Indeed, human capital is “an intensely political 
process constantly being negotiated between state market and labor” (Blair, 2011: 602) 
which provides for the various political forms of human capital formation regimes. 
Liberal regimes as market – oriented structures are generally characterized by weaker 
public spending on education (Pontusson, 2005).  The burden of education spending is 
borne significantly by the middle class notably for the higher education.  On the contrary 
social democratic regimes with a more egalitarian approach to social stratification are 
regarded as systems with higher public spending in all levels of education in which 
policies are geared towards strong support to human capital promotion. (Pontusson, 
2005).   
These various political formations and institutional arrangements will in turn produce not 
only economic but also non-economic returns for human capital particularly with regards 
to improved public governance and enhanced social convergence.  As Piketty (2014) 
argues “the main forces for convergence are the diffusion of knowledge and investments 
in training and skills” which are even more powerful than the economic “law of supply 
and demand” (Piketty, 2014: 21) 
3.3.6 Human Capital and Corruption 
The literature has predominantly focused on the incidence of corruption on growth, 
investment or foreign aid.  Meanwhile the research on the impact of corruption on human 
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capital has been scarce and has generally paid one directional attention to its effects. 
Seldom is a theoretical or empirical scrutiny offered on the impact of human capital on 
corruption. 
One pioneer study by Ehrlich and Lui (1999) suggest that corruption is likely to impede 
human capital formation as talented individuals spend more time in rent - seeking 
activities and have less incentives for seeking education opportunities.  The same concern 
for the sub optimal use of human resources is also identified by Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2001) who find that countries with high corruption tend to have more humanities than 
technical skills in higher education, which points to possible unproductive allocation of 
resources.  Through its seminal review Rogers (2008) confirms empirically using 
corruption index cross country data the low impact of human capital on growth in highly 
corrupt countries. 
Corruption not only has direct harmful effects in many respects but it also engenders 
indirect consequences on the human capital stock.  Renown empirical studies (Li, et al., 
2000, Tebaldi and Mohan, 2010) have established the negative impact of corruption on 
social programs mostly due to diversion of funds resulting in increased inequality and 
reduced access to education programs. (Gupta, et al., 2002; Gymiah-Brempong, 2002).  
Dridi (2014) using empirical analysis not only found that corruption affect human capital 
accumulation by squeezing the share of funding for education but emphasizes the 
magnitude of the effect.  “A one-point increase in the corruption index is associated with 
a decrease in the secondary school enrollment rates of about 10 percentage points” (2014: 
489) while Mo (2001) finds earlier “that a one-unit increase in the corruption index is 
associated with a decrease in average schooling years by 0.25 years” (2001: 66).  Mauro 
reports a similar result which concludes “that a one standard-deviation improvement in 
the corruption index leads education expenditure to increase by over six percentage 
points of total government consumption expenditure” (1998: 276).  
If it is generally found in the literature that countries with high levels of corruption 
allocate less for education, Pellegrini (2011: 53) takes exception and underlines that 
corruption has no significant effect on average years of schooling.  This is however not 
in line with the most overwhelming argument which is that corruption is acutely 
detrimental to the setting of an economic and institutional space that promotes 
enlargement of education and quality human capital accumulation.  It still remains that 
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in view of the aforementioned, in rare instances the role of corruption is recognized in a 
model linking human capital to its causation, which is the concern of this study. 
3.4 Human Capital in Developing countries 
The history of economic development across nations worldwide suggests that mass education 
has been the precursor of giant leaps in economic growth first in the 19th century in the West 
and more recently in the last quarter of the 20th century in Asia.  Indeed, in the last few decades, 
human capital appears at the center of localized growth across developing continents in a much 
globalized economy. 
3.4.1 The Case of Asia 
Numerous studies on the source of large scale economic growth in Asia have established 
a strong link to human capital. Becker (1992) suggests that countries like Taiwan, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong have transformed their economies and 
standards of living by relying first on mass education and skills development in the 
absence of natural resources.  Through massive investment in human resources to 
produce highly skilled workers these countries have achieved unprecedented and 
sustained rates of growth (World Bank, 2002).  This is also confirmed by Olaniyan & 
Okemakinde (2008: 157) who found that quantity and quality education were a strong 
predictor of high growth in East Asian economies.  Such spectacular economic and social 
advances included “productivity growth in agriculture, rapid growth in manufacturing 
exports, declines in human fertility, increases in labor productivity and high rates of 
domestic savings” (Blair: 627). 
The formula for economic success has relied heavily on large public investments to allow 
access to the education system, while creating the conditions of a sustained and fast 
growth derived from “from high rates of capital accumulation, technological change, and 
the influx of young educated workers” (Yusuf, 2003: 27).  The infusion of education for 
the enhancement of human capital formation not only has assisted in promoting economic 
growth but it has also proved an effective means of raising human development standards 
“reducing income inequalities, promoting health and enhancing social development” 
(Yusuf, 2003: 27). 
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The next model of growth for these Asian countries is to move “from a supply- driven 
economy of simple mass- produced products, to an innovative, customer - driven 
knowledge economy” (Yusuf, 2003: 27) where human capital is leveraged into high 
added – value manufacturing and advanced technology goods.  
3.4.2 Human Capital in Africa and SADC 
Africa’s human capital and skills development levels remain a challenge to its economic 
development and that of its private sector.  The African Development Bank (2011) 
identified that “Africa suffers from crippling shortages of human capital and skills. Only 
1 % of African adults had completed tertiary education by 2010, compared to a global 
average of 3.9 %. (2011: 102).  This translates into a low human capital development 
base, weak levels of adult literacy and inadequate support mechanisms for education.  
The potential returns for human capital along with the challenges are enormous with a 
population of approximately 1 billion projected at 2.3 billion in 2050. 
The AfDB (2011) further notes that “after Asia Africa is the world's largest and most 
populous continent and accounts for about 15% of the world's population… it is also the 
youngest region in the world... By 2040, Africa will have the largest workforce in the 
world” (2011: 5).  With these demographic features the continent stands to reap the 
benefits of high accumulation both in quality and quantity of human capital or to face the 
dire economic and social consequences of uneducated and unemployed citizens 
particularly the youth.  Currently most African countries still rely on their natural 
endowments under commodity – based models which do not require high skill – labor 
and continue to reproduce low quality of human capital.  
In order to reverse the economic fortunes of a continent with such important labor 
resources African countries need according to the World bank “to invest heavily in 
physical infrastructure and productive capacity…However, maximizing productivity and 
achieving competitiveness will depend upon success in augmenting human capital and 
raising its quality” (2009: 9).  Indeed, it is the human capital that will provide the 
conditions for skills - based development, knowledge – intensive growth and a 
sustainable path to economic resilience.  But the advent of such outcome as warned by 
the AfDB will require “continued, high impact, investments in human development – in 
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education, nutrition and health, science and technology...” (2011: 4) in the absence of 
which African economies will remain uncompetitive  
The SADC region with a population of approximately 300 million that is almost one third 
of the continent’s population is also confronted with the same human capital challenges.  
Naidu and Roberts (2004: 37) already noted that the region was challenged by a host of 
education and health issues.  Khembo (2013: 151) confirms in his study that the 
educational variable was significant when accounting for economic growth in the region.  
The SADC organization in its SADC Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap 2015-2063 
identifies that “all the countries have serious skills deficits” (2014: 9) and recognizes the 
need for “education systems …to be restructured and re-purposed with focus on technical 
and vocational skills of all kinds, especially those appropriate for a modern, knowledge 
economy” (2014: 13).   
Put simply, the requisite transformation across the region will require a more and better 
educated workforce in order to move SADC economies up the value chain with the view 
of improving workers’ employability, maximizing production and achieving 
competiveness.  In fact, the path to economic prosperity in the 21st century lies in how 
countries can harness available knowledge and cutting edge technologies to sustain 
productive capacities and build comparative advantages. 
3.5 The Knowledge Economy Growth Model 
Most of the economic literature when examining the human capital theory has notably focused 
on developed countries (Malik, 2006) and has often considered physical and natural resources 
as the major sources of economic growth (Lucas, 1988).  But economic growth models in the 
last decades have seen a paradigm shift towards knowledge - based economies.  A long stream 
of research which begun with the framing of the “information society” (Mattelart, 2003: 113) 
then deepened into the theorization and adoption of the concept of knowledge economy across 
the developed and then the developing world.  The new growth theory fueled by the 
endogenous approach emphasized the increasing returns of intangible assets (ideas, skills) 
instead of accumulation of physical capital as the path to growth (Easterly, 2001; Evans, 2007).  
A knowledge economy relies for its performance primarily on the application of technologies 
and know how rather than crude exploitation of raw materials.  
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The World Bank (1998) identifies the importance of knowledge and information in spurring 
economic development in their leading “Knowledge for Development” report (1998) and then 
emphasizes that “…knowledge, and its application, are now widely acknowledged to be one of 
the key engines of economic growth” (World Bank, 2004: 1).  Such recognition of the 
knowledge factor in the resurgence of economies was made earlier by the OECD (2005) in its 
renown report, “The Knowledge- Based Economy” (1996) which further elaborated on the 
concept outlining the knowledge economy around four pillars: human capital, innovation, new 
technologies and enterprise dynamics. (2005: 19).  The value of knowledge and technology as 
determinant of economic success and firms’ viability has been almost universally 
acknowledged.  Both developed and developing countries have placed high reliance on the 
skills and competencies which can drive research and development, innovation and high value 
added manufacturing. Brinkley (2006) identifies that “advanced industrial economies around 
the globe are steadily moving to the unprecedented position where knowledge based industries 
and knowledge based organizations will within the foreseeable future generate more than half 
of total GDP and total employment (2006: 6).  
Asian countries including Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, India, China moving away 
from an export – driven model of basic mass – products have also committed to programs 
emphasizing high returns to human capital as the key to economic growth by means of large 
investments in education and training.  The Asian Development Bank (2007) suggests that 
“knowledge can eventually become a means of mass production – similar to manual labor in 
the industrial economy – once web – based information and communication technologies have 
reached worldwide penetration levels” (2007: 1).  Faced with competition from the West and 
Asia, a more knowledge intensive route to economic development could provide Africa an 
avenue for raising its productive value added and building a more resilient competitive edge. 
3.5.1 Africa and the Knowledge Economy 
A chance is presented to the African continent to leap through periods of economic 
development from mostly commodity – based productions to knowledge – intensive 
growth models.  
The World Economic Forum (2015) notes: this incentive to “bypass manufacturing and 
shift into high-productivity services” (2015: 7) is even greater as the commodity crisis 
looms larger amidst a slowing global demand with nefarious consequences on growth 
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rates across African countries.  As argued by Anyanwu (2011: 2) the global knowledge 
economy has created for African countries “new challenges as well as new windows of 
opportunity”. 
And the key to unlocking economic success lies in how Africa will adapt knowledge into 
its growth models with the aim to increase allocative efficiencies, boost productive 
capacities and sustain competitive pressures in a globalized world.  Such move remains 
critical for any prospect of long term development as “a country which is unable to 
develop the skills and knowledge of its people and to utilize them effectively in the 
national economy would be unable to develop anything else." (Harbison 1973: 18) 
In theory, many academic views on African economies have placed human capital at the 
center of productivity growth.  Fedderke (2006) includes variables such as human capital, 
research and development (R&D) in a Schumpeterian growth model to estimate output 
growth in South Africa.  Babatunde and Adefabi (2005) estimate association between 
education and growth between 1970 and 2003 in Nigeria and found a strong correlation 
in the long run. 
In reality there is urgency for Sub Saharan Africa to carve its ways to skills – based 
development, and devise the requisite accompanying policies so as “to diversify into 
higher value, knowledge – intensive business sectors less exposed to competitive 
pressures.  For now, as ominously noted by Anyanwu (2011) “from the available 
indicators, knowledge in Africa today appears to be on the retreat. Africa’s overall score 
in the knowledge index fell between 2000 and 2009…” (2011: 14). 
In all the three pillars of the knowledge index - which are education, innovation and 
information technology - Africa’s comparators are lagging behind the rest of the world.  
Productivity growth has been a challenge with a vast scope for technology catch up 
(Ndulu et al., 2007) which still remains a potential as the fundamentals have barely 
moved.  
Bloom, Canning, and Chan (2006) in a World Bank review identified that Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s output is 23 percent below its production capacity due to gaps in human capital 
The World Economic Forum in its 2015 Africa Competiveness Report suggests little 
improvement and identifies “the majority of African countries as being among the least 
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competitive in the world and indicates that, despite 15 years of strong growth, Africa’s 
overall competitiveness has remained stagnant” (2015: 14).  This unfortunate 
performance has been attributed not just to an education deficit but also to a lacking 
innovation system, an inadequate information infrastructure and a weak economic and 
institutional regime. 
Closing the knowledge gap in order to leapfrog to a knowledge–driven economy will 
indeed necessitate large investments in physical and human capital along with a sustained 
policy direction over extended periods.  
But optimistically Anyanwu contends that “a major part of what is required is not money 
but the political commitment… and accountability … to formulate the requisite 
strategies… as well as the institutional changes” (2011: 36).  Meanwhile such dire 
situation seems to be compounded as Africa’s already low level stock of human capital 
continues to be depleted by the flight of its ablest and talented brains. 
3.5.2 Africa and the Human Capital Flight 
Labor economists following the neoclassical model have generally considered 
movements of international migration as an outcome of markets largely driven by the 
ebbs and flows of supply and demand of labor in the origin and destination countries. 
According to the United Nations Global Migration Database in 2015, the number of 
international migrants worldwide reached 244 million, an increase of 71 million, or 41per 
cent, compared to 2000.  Within the broader context of international migration, the more 
conspicuous brain drain phenomenon takes place, mostly borne out of the asymmetries 
of international development.  It refers to “the international transfer of human capital 
resources and it applies mainly to the migration of highly educated individuals from 
developing to developed countries” (Docquier, 2014: 2).  International migrants 
according to the United Nations statistics (2015) represented 10% and 15% of the 
population in Europe and North America against 3% for the rest of the World.   
In Africa the expatriation of skilled professionals towards richer countries in the West 
has left many countries acutely short of the human capital resources needed for their 
advancement in the drive to a knowledge-based economy (Imran, et al., 2011).  The main 
reasons for such depletion are mainly socio – economic and marginally political.   
56 
 
Researchers (Olumide and Isioma, 2012; Dzvimbo, 2003) have framed these reasons 
around push and pull factors.  The push factors refer to the adverse conditions from origin 
countries which cause people to emigrate. They include unemployment, low wages and 
poor education systems.  The pull factors relate to the attractive conditions prevailing in 
the destination countries.  They consist among others of better salary packages, more 
professional opportunities and higher living standards. (Imran, et al., 2011) 
If talent migration is indeed a contributing factor to the skills shortage in Africa, the 
findings of the literature remains inconclusive as to the overall effects of the brain drain 
on human capital accumulation and economic growth.  The phenomenon is generally 
found to have an ambivalent effect (Beine, et al., 2001), on the educational and 
occupational structure of the workforce. 
A number of studies on one hand, has argued that the effect on the source countries 
economic progress may be on the whole harmful (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2010) with 
due regard to the social returns lost to the origin countries which are greater than the 
private returns for the departing individuals.  The arguments include the increasing 
educational technological gap between the sending and receiving countries, the fiscal 
losses due to unpaid taxes, and occupational distortions with shortages in specialized 
skills. (Imran, et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, a brain drain was also found by others (Kamoche, 2011; Batista, et 
al., 2011) to be advantageous to source countries. The benefits include the income 
generation from the remittances flows, the participation of highly skilled migrants in 
business and technology transfers are among the many “diaspora externalities” 
(Docquier, 2014: 5) to be provided by the talent migration. Beine, et al., (2001) suggest 
that the opportunity for migration and earning higher wages abroad may create incentives 
for investment in education and produce overall human capital accumulation.  This is 
confirmed by Easterly and Nyarko (2008) who found that “the opportunity for brain gain 
does stimulate skill accumulation and that this effect seems to offset the direct loss of 
skills from brain drain” (2008: 4). 
In the end the effects of the human capital flight whether positive or negative on the 
whole remain an open debate.  In reality, as Sub Saharan Africa redoubles its efforts at 
mitigating the effects of the talent outflow, the remedy is surely not to erect walls around 
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source countries as “talent will flee from where it finds no gainful use” (Ndulu, 2007: 
158) but to set the appropriate policies for talent retention and return namely around 
education policy, quality of institutions, and wages (Ndulu, 2007; Docquier, 2014). 
3.6 Social Development and Human Capital 
Modern economic growth theory has long recognized the importance of human capital 
formation as a key contributor to economic output.  Furthermore, the literature has also 
identified educational attainment as a key ingredient towards ensuring social development and 
a more inclusive growth.  Ali and Son (2007) suggest that reinforcing capabilities in the form 
of human capital is a significant factor for social development and shared growth.  Such link is 
mediated at the country level by policy initiatives geared towards priority investments in health 
and education.  
The World Economic Forum report (2015) recognizes that “economic policies to promote 
structural transformation and create productive employment for poor people will need to be 
complemented by investments in human capital and other programmes to support social 
inclusion…” (2015: 2).  Social development is hence framed as a broad based - growth (World 
Bank, 2013) that involved a sectors of sectors across a country’s economy including critically 
human capital drivers such as education and health. Balakrishnan, et al., (2013) found that 
larger spending on health, education and social safety nets have contributed to higher standards 
of social development and a more inclusive economy.  Ali and Zhuang (2007) earlier suggest 
that social development requires policy interventions in key domains which include education, 
health, and other social services. 
Investment in education and human capital is viewed as essential for the advent of social 
development.  Skills acquisition through education allows labor market access to the 
disadvantaged and marginalized which in turn help curtail poverty rates and enhance social 
cohesion (Duflo, 2011; CAFOD, 2014). 
Empirically there is also large evidence which indicates strong association between investment 
in human capital and better social development outcomes with social sector fiscal spending 
robustly linked to decline in poverty rate and inequality (UNESCO, 2007; Anand, et al., 2014).  
Conversely social protection programmes will enhance human capacities such as health and 
education while ensuring longer term social development outcomes (Browne 2015). 
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From a human development perspective, it becomes critical to consider the role of human 
capital not as a catalyst to the rate of economic growth but also relative its impact on social 
cohesion and equity.  Indeed, education and skills training not only are recognized as growth 
element but also help reduce poverty and inequality through better employability of job seekers 
enabling more economic inclusion and superior social cohesion (AfDB 2011, 2014). 
But the extent to which human capital expands advancements in economic opportunities and 
improves living standards, is prejudiced more exhaustively by a mix of structural and 
institutional elements of political economy, some of which this chapter has attempted to 
ascertain. 
3.7 Conclusion 
It is widely admitted nowadays that modern economic growth has become increasingly reliant 
on skill – intensive production models, technical competencies and high levels of education 
(Cohen and Soto, 2007).  As knowledge and qualified human resources carry an ever a growing 
bearing on development outcomes in a globalized world, it becomes crucial for Sub Saharan 
Africa to recognize the skills requirements of a knowledge – intensive development which calls 
for a reappraisal of its economic fundamentals.  
For too long the continent has relied for its economic revival on a commodity - based growth 
model fueled by the higher prices of energy and raw materials (Ndulu, 2007) taking no notice 
according to the IMF (2015) that “enhanced education outcomes will be particularly important 
to improve the employability and increase the productivity” (2015: 35) of a new economy.  Its 
repositioning towards building a more resilient economy involves a paradigm shift in 
recognizing the pivotal role of human capital.  
Such orientation will include reprioritizing of investment towards education, stronger 
institutional support towards innovation which is “not so much a matter of pushing back the 
frontier of global knowledge, but more the challenge of facilitating the first use of new 
technology in the domestic context (Dahlman, 2006: 31).  
Crucially it will not just require knowledge it will also entail an enabling environment of 
institutions, networks and focused policy support without which the human capital 
accumulation cannot be effective.  Only then the incidence levels of corruption may be 
affected, which is the main focus of this study.  That is the political economy of corruption 
through the human capital formation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical approach to understanding the 
relationship between human capital, corruption and social development.  In examining the 
significance of corruption and human capital as determinants of social development, this work 
considers corruption less from an ethical perspective as “an immoral and unethical 
phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society” (Gould, 
1991: 468) but rather viewed in its socio economic context as a public phenomenon.  
Corruption is viewed as “bureaucratic” corruption by public officials.  The practice may take 
various forms, for example it may be due to diversion of public resources by public officials 
(Mauro, 2002) or to bribery, kickbacks, embezzlement, or tax evasion.  Corruption commonly 
defined as abuse of public power for private benefit is referred to by Nye (1967: 417) as 
“endemic in all governments” and no country has been immune to its spread. The scourge 
remains ubiquitous and ever present around the globe. 
According to Transparency International “nearly three quarters of the 178 countries in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index score below five, on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly 
corrupt), suggesting a perception of widespread corruption among public officials”.  
International organizations and global watchdogs have in recent years recognized the relevance 
and urgency of the problem of corruption for international development.  Although it is present 
in almost all countries, corruption is most pervasive throughout the developing world and 
particularly in resource-rich Sub Saharan Africa.  
While economists and social scientists have abundantly examined the idiosyncrasies of 
corruption across countries and continents, cross - country empirical studies about corruption, 
causes and their uneven levels remain much more infrequent notably for African regions.  Most 
of the debate about growth and social development has remained largely conceptual with 
arguments that revolve around the question of whether market-led growth is sufficient to 
eliminate poverty and reduce inequality largely ignoring the crucial policy considerations of 
public intervention and notably the need for governments to tackle the scourge of corruption 
and design effective anticorruption strategies.  However, such policy attention requires first an 
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analytical focus geared towards an understanding of the layers of political economy which 
provide the possibility conditions of corruption.  Following the blueprint of the renewed 
approach of economic development by Haq (1999) and later Perkins et al. (2006), which 
posited a wider concept of development involving more human variables such as education, 
health; this study sets out to investigate the deterministic role of “intangible” (World Bank, 
2011) factors identified as human and social development, when applied to corruption 
occurrences across SADC countries. 
4.2 Corruption and Human Dimensions 
Human capital was acknowledged as one the critical determinants of source of economic 
growth over time and has become a central conceptual device to labour economics, growth 
economics and development economics (Collier, 2007).  Human capital is a multidimensional 
concept that identifies human characteristics which can be acquired and which increase income.  
It is commonly taken to include peoples’ knowledge and skills, acquired partly through 
education, but can also include their strength and vitality, which are dependent on their health 
and nutrition (Appleton and Teal, 1998: 9).  From an economic perspective the expression of 
human capital is evocative of the idea that workers’ skills and capabilities are important factors 
of production and that other resources spent for example on education, training may be 
comparable to investments in physical capital (Blair, 2011). 
In recent decades, countless studies of the sources of economic growth (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 
1993; Barro and Lee, 1993) – departing from the neo classical Solow growth model of physical 
and financial capital accumulation – have since demonstrated that human capital accumulation 
factors are among the main drivers of economic development.  Human capital and economic 
growth are closely interrelated as the former is seen as an input which impacts significantly on 
the productive capacity and growth output of an economy.  Historical evidence owing to the 
notable achievements of South East Asian economies has often been cited as glaring examples 
of the importance of human capital to economic growth (Clarke, 2011).  
Indeed, despite their generally low endowment of natural resources, these countries have 
managed to post remarkable economic performances largely attributed to the quality of their 
human capital formation (Becker, 1992). 
Researchers such as Schultz (1961), Bryant (1990), Barro (1991) Lucas, (1988) have applied 
the concept of human capital since, in a variety of ways but they all provided pertinent analysis 
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of a positive link between human capital and economic progress mainly in the form of growth 
rate of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
Numerous studies, for example Miyamoto (2008), Anyanwu (2011), have particularly 
highlighted the role of human capital in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows.  
More broadly, a long and old stream of researchers have shifted attention away from the neo- 
classical focus on physical accumulation and have established – both theoretically and 
empirically - the linkage between human capital formation and economic fluctuations through 
direct or indirect returns. 
An increase in human capital accumulation will lead to an increase in the return to schooling 
(Mincer, 1996).  Then an increase in human capital intensifies the growth rate of technology 
and innovation (Lucas, 1988).  Finally, an increase in human capital will positively impact   the 
level of output growth (Barro, 1991). 
Human capital formation through education also may be affected by corruption.  Mauro (1997) 
concludes that education spending is negatively correlated with corruption.  This will result 
according to Dreher, et al., (2007) in low levels of school enrolment causing higher corruption, 
while Buehn and Schneider (2012) could not arrive at similar correlation.  The influential work 
by the OECD on the central role of human capital in economic advancement (The Knowledge-
Based Economy 1996) and the World Bank (Knowledge for Development 1998) have attracted 
the interest of the developing world including, Sub Saharan Africa, a region increasingly aware 
that natural resources alone may not bring economic success (Maddison, 2000).  The theoretical 
and applied literature on growth and development in Sub Saharan Africa has provided added 
rationale by claiming that human capital is a key contributor to growth and inclusive 
development. 
In South Africa for instance researchers including Fedderke (2006) have also stressed the 
importance of human capital on productivity growth.  Although widely recognized as a key 
contributing element in economic growth, human capital formation has been viewed mainly 
through economists’ eyes as a by-product of policy supply or a function of the labour market 
disjointed from its social surroundings.  The possibility that human capital and its knowledge 
effect may be critical factors in curbing corruption in developing countries – particularly in 
Sub Saharan Africa is largely under-studied and has revealed an essential but relatively 
unexplored link with anti – corruption strategies.  The African Economic Outlook 2013 
concludes remarkably that “African countries are not harnessing the human development 
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opportunities from economic growth due to rising inequality in income as well as in access to 
education and health” (2013: 86).  But according to the Oxfam Research Report (2011) if 
economic growth remains highly indispensable and critical as a precondition to poverty 
reduction “it is the distribution of that growth that matters for poverty reduction, rather than 
the pursuit of growth for its own sake” (2011: 3)  
4.3 Corruption and economics 
Among the multitude of causes which can be inventoried in the literature, economic 
development as a key function of perceived level of corruption remain the most constant 
finding (Gupta, et al., 1998; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; OECD, 2014; Aidt, 
2009). 
If there is large consensus in the research as to the robust association of corruption with 
economic growth, just what it means and how do they relate to each other remains an open 
debate.  Does economic growth lessen corruption or conversely does corruption hinder the path 
to development?  Are they affected by more fundamental determinants?  
Corrupt practices have various determinants and particular repercussions in developing 
countries notably in Africa where often public funds that are needed for delivery of basic 
human needs are diverted at the personal benefit of the few. 
The World Bank considers corruption as one of the single largest obstacles to economic and 
social development (World Bank Live Q&A: Anti-Corruption, 2012).  Often driven by 
discretionary authority, economic rents, and weak institutions (Jain, 2001) corruption affects 
access to basic services, undermines fair market competition and particularly affects the poor. 
As underlined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), corruption “siphons 
off scarce resources and diminishes a country’s prospects for development (UNDP, 1997).  In 
the UNDP report (UNDP, 1997) it is further argued that in countries where corruption is 
widespread, the consequences are disproportionately borne by the poor such that poverty is 
entrenched in communities that can least afford it.  In the case of Sub Saharan Africa there is 
overwhelming evidence that corruption impairs economic and social development (Osoba, 
1996; Hope, et al., 2000; Okori 2010). 
From a sustainability perspective the effects and negative impact of corruption on development 
have long been a concern for researchers.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) conclude that corruption 
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is a factor of disruption in the development process.  Jain (2001) inconclusively found, that the 
causes and consequences of corruption are often entangled.  Earlier Mauro (1997) concluded 
that the directional causation of corruption and development remains unresolved while 
Treisman (2000) asserts that developed countries were less prone to corruption. 
Numerous studies (TI, 2012a, para. 4; Buehn and Schneider, 2012) have established a causal 
link between increased corruption and investments in high profile “white elephant” projects at 
the expense of useful infrastructure projects in education or health of crucial importance.  As a 
key determinant of inclusive growth corruption is found to increase inequality (Dreher, et al., 
2007) through unequal redistribution of income and wealth and to disfavour social programs 
intended for the poor (Ackerman, 2008). 
Meanwhile on the economic front Ades and Di Tella (1999) finds that growing economies 
create more opportunities for rent seeking and hence for corruption.  On the contrary corruption 
is due to decline as trade openness deepens market competition to the detriment of monopolistic 
firms curtailing profits available for corruption.  
4.4 Corruption and governance 
As to the dual relationship between corruption and institutions, Ahrend (2002), Brunetti and 
Weder (2003) and Chowdhury (2004) agree that higher levels of corruption are consistently 
correlated with low levels of press freedom. 
From a governance vantage point political and institutional factors have relevant impact on the 
level of corruption according to Dreher, et al., (2007) who argue that deficit in democratic 
controls are likely to increase corruption and conversely stronger transparency and 
accountability systems are likely to deter corruption.  Buehn and Schneider (2012) found 
similar evidence while Tanzi (1998) seems to identify more precisely the effect of bureaucratic 
inefficiency – through convoluted regulations- as a major conduit for corruption. 
Glaeser, et al., (2003) after Mauro (1998) argue that education and human capital formation 
are crucial to economic and institutional progress.  Rodrik, et al., (2004) believe sound 
institutions are key to economic advancement while Triesman (2000) emphasizes a nonlinear 
relationship which means that effects of good governance only yield economic returns in the 
long run. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Most analyses have used a one pronged approach which connects broadly along three dominant 
links: corruption to either human capital/ education (Mauro, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001; 
Delavallade, 2006; Ndikumana and  Baliamoune, 2007; De la Croix and Delavallade,  2009) 
or corruption to growth / income inequality (Barro, 1991; Gupta, 1998; Gymiah-Brempong and 
De Camacho, 2006; Ullah and Ahmad 2007;  Tebaldi and Mohan 2010),  or human capital to 
growth (Schutt, 2003; Miller, 2006; Hanushek and  Woessmann, 2007; Haque and Babar, 2011) 
and  income inequality (Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2007; Papagapitos and Riley, 2009).  
In his seminal paper Treisman (2000) provides a wide – ranging analysis of corruption causes 
using quantitative methods.  He considers 14 research hypotheses on the causes of corruption 
from political science, economics to sociology, and runs regression models across a multi – 
country setting (64 countries) with a vast set of independent variables on the Corruption 
Perception Index (TI, 1996, 1997, 1998).  He arrives at mixed conclusions as to possible 
associations and could only acknowledge the challenge of finding directions of causality 
among variables.  As he puts it “To establish a direction of causation, one needs good 
instruments, which are unfortunately in short supply … problems of endogeneity are severe 
…some plausible determinants are highly correlated among themselves, rendering it difficult 
to disentangle their separate effects” (2006: 14 -17).  
Such large scope may still be partial as indeed Caiden remarks “the complexity of the 
phenomenon makes it impossible to provide a comprehensive account of the causes of political 
corruption.” (Caiden, 2001: 21- 26).  
In the end corruption appears as a multifaceted proposition driven here by socio-economic 
determinants which are examined as to their functional dependence to human capital within the 
framework of social development. 
From the above arguments and their corollary theoretical ambiguities, I derive the below 
research hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design, data collection, data analysis methods that were 
deemed most suitable to address the research questions.  But first the rationale of the selected 
methodology is ascertained along with its theoretical underpinnings.  Then the general method 
and procedures of investigation used to assess the associations between human capital, 
corruption and social development is described.  This is followed by a description of the data 
collected and a discussion of the selected variables along with their operationalization and 
measurement in the statistical analysis. 
The research questions already formulated in Chapter are restated here.  
1. What is the effect of human capital formation on corruption?  How does the causal direction 
of their relationship operate? 
2. What is the effect of social development on corruption?  How does the causal direction of 
their relationship operate?  
3. What is the simultaneous effect of human capital and social development on corruption? 
5.2 Philosophical underpinnings  
Our heuristic aim in this study is practical if not ideological; it is to design a research that will 
generate valid inferences about corruption and provide reliable policy prescriptions in the real 
world. (Ashby, 1964).  Research design is defined by Polit and Hungler (1999: 155) as a 
structured process which provides for the plan to generate answers to the research questions. 
To that effect the quantitative approach – which is not just a mechanical process of data analysis 
– first needs to outline the theoretical prerequisites that inform the   relevance of its questions 
and the internal validity of its conclusions.  Hence there is a necessity to ascertain the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions that predicate this quantitative 
review.  Indeed, any serious empirical inquiry claiming the mantle of academia must not leave 
its philosophical premises implicit and needs to outline “the theoretical stance informing the 
methodology and thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria.” 
(Crotty, 2003: 7).  In the case at hand the design and methodology offered here were 
66 
 
fundamentally affected by the explanatory – rather than descriptive – nature of the 
hypothesized research questions leading to causal and correlation- type explanations more 
amenable to quantitative inquiry.  Quantitative research is described by Burns and Grove 
(1993: 777) as an objective orderly process meant to test associations and examine cause and 
effect relationships among variables. 
To be clear this empirical analysis is epistemologically grounded on a positivist stance using a 
deductive approach in order to produce valid causal inferences about corruption and its 
correlates.  Its ontological corollary is that the reality of corruption – albeit social – exists 
beyond what it is perceived to be, it has its own and independent rationalities knowable through 
“scientific” inquiry (Cohen, et al., 2007: 7; Pring, 2000: 59) and susceptible of both descriptive 
and causal understanding.  Put differently the reality of corruption has an existence 
transcendent of this author’s own perceptions. 
In fact, corrupt practices although an outcome of social interactions – and as such cannot be 
detached from societal ideologies – are not just a construct out of the researcher’s 
representations but an objective reality that may be responsive to quantitative “scientific” 
scrutiny. (Gallagher, 2008).  Because the researcher and the researched object in this present 
undertaking are seen as separate independent entities this analysis seeks to contribute to value 
– free knowledge about a corrupt object deemed knowable outside the conscience of the 
researcher. (Crotty, 1998: 8).  This is indeed a departure from a relativist world view which 
posits that the world and its meanings do not exist independently of our knowledge of it (Grix, 
2004: 83).  
However, the proposed objectivity does not imply, that this empirical research – which is not 
grounded on a reductionist empiricism – does not carry any trace of the researcher.  It informs 
both on his theoretical and real - world leanings.  In the footsteps of Bachelard (1938) this 
epistemological stance emphasises “the importance of the subject in science, but without 
making of science something subjective “(Högskola, 2012: 33). 
In fact, what “objectivity requires is the disappearance of subjectivity” not of the researcher 
(Högskola, 2012: 33) which indeed acknowledges that the empirical results in this study are 
produced not only through a logical frame but also a perceptual frame. (Högskola, 2012: 33). 
In fact it is  a “ phenomenological “ school of thought -  to speak with Bachelard (1938) and 
later Canguilhem (1967) - which stands at equidistance between a dogmatic positivism 
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claiming science would be wholly independent from the scientist and a subjectivist relativism  
relying disproportionately on subjective experience, to account for an empirical truth, that 
despite its quantitative and universal claim, remains in the end a mediated rationality, a 
construct humanly and historically determined, bound in space and time. 
From this ontological perspective which provides the true reality of corruption sought after in 
this undertaking, an epistemology is derived to account for the nature of empirical knowledge 
warranted for the purpose of addressing the research questions.  This analysis used a 
quantitative statistical design to identify, describe and analyse explanatory factors, trends and 
patterns contributing to the occurrence of corruption.  This approach attempts to articulate the 
ways in which the findings are processed and the logic by which conclusions were arrived at 
and uses defined and codified procedures to analyse data and derive factual conclusions whose 
reliability and validity can be publicly and contradictorily assessed. 
On the contrary the “the sociological analysis of qualitative data often resides in a private world 
of penetrating but unfathomable insights and ineffable understandings…[however,] science . . 
. is public, not private.” (Merton, 1968: 71-72).  This indeed makes it difficult for other 
researchers to learn from or replicate their results (Scotland, 2012: 8) and for policy makers to 
rely on non-generalizable and highly contextualized findings.  Conclusions reached through 
qualitative, interpretive approach as they differ from one individual to the next often appear 
unworkably equivocal and fail to produce the universal threshold of facts that can be 
consensually relied upon (Angen, 2000: 384). 
As a result, the knowledge produced has limited validity dispersed across various individual 
perspectives with little unified substance.  In this case conclusions around corruption would be 
burdened by value – judgements and suffer from extreme subjective relativity and limited 
transferability. 
The above epistemological stance leads to this study’s empirical methodology geared at 
explaining associations and possible causal relationships.  It attempts to identify causal links 
which influence corruption outcomes (Creswell, 2009: 7).  A deductive approach is undertaken 
which is meant to uncover rules and patterns to allow for prediction and generalization; 
statistical testing methods are out to seek verifiable evidence about corruption.  Meanwhile 
some theoretical precaution may be called for before we further delve into our quantitative 
analysis so as to contextualize the theory of this research.  The literature abounds more with 
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studies that enunciate propositions on the possible causes of corruption rather than those that 
arrive at a strong causal chain that relates to corruption.  As argued by Theobald (1999: 473): 
“There is a danger that we are simply describing symptoms rather than identifying underlying 
causes”. 
In fact, in the realm of quantitative research statistical significance may be often mistaken for 
causality as perhaps true causality may be beyond reach.  In the epistemological convention it 
is predicated – for causality to ring true – that the “cause” always coincide with the 
“consequence” (Hume, 1990) which grounds the “necessity criterion” (De Graag, 2007) for 
causation to be found.  For the purpose of this study our causation model does not seek to 
emulate this theoretical threshold.  That is the causes to be identified may not be wholly 
necessary and sufficient and may not always lead to corruption in a deterministic sense.  A 
Granger test causality is used to approximate such type of causal relationship as it implies 
causality in a realist sense of predicting the outcome rather than in a positivist experimental 
sense.  
In summary, analytical approach relies on deductive method using statistical and verifiable 
inferences instead of subjective interpretations of social meanings (Crotty, 1998: 42), all of 
which are grounded on the ontological premise of a social reality deemed objectively 
knowable.  Nevertheless, this analysis would be liable of culpable naivety or worse, of arrogant 
scientific presumption if it were to claim absolute certainty as to the observations and findings 
it has reached.   
Indeed, the subject matter of this study that is corruption deals with humans and not objects 
and therefore its quantitative approach does not amount to a narrow deterministic view of what 
is after all a social phenomenon whose human, historical dimensions and cultural traits do not 
allow for a mechanistic blueprint.  This theoretical approach to the social world is rather 
“dialectical” (Marx, 1845) than idealistic, hence it argues that corruption is to be viewed as an 
outcome of interconnected processes affected by underlying deep ideological and socio -  
economic structural determinants. 
Therefore, this quantitative approach using causal thinking is epistemologically more 
probabilistic than deterministic (Suppes, 1970).  Because the corruption occurrence isn’t 
uniformly determined it cannot be reduced to simple deterministic inferences which may 
trivialize the complexities of social interactions and cultural contexts of the phenomenon. 
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Mindful of the possible pitfalls of making invalid inferences the empirical results can only 
claim a probabilistic status, not be mistaken with absolute certainty, as they remain constrained 
by “observables” (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 10) or possibly blind sighted by unknown 
variables.  As summed up by Keohane and King “… uncertainty is a central aspect of all 
research and all knowledge about the world.  Without a reasonable estimate of uncertainty, a 
description of the real world or an inference about a causal effect in the real world is 
uninterpretable” (1996: 9).  Indeed, while reckoning with the assumptions of partial and 
imperfect knowability” (1996: 9), this analysis provides however a genuine attempt to improve 
the internal validity and reliability of its discoveries by strictly abiding by the rules and rigor 
of quantitative inference. 
The proposed framework is aimed much less at forming a dogmatic “episteme” or paradigm 
(Foucault, 1980) but instead at formulating a disciplined approach which provide verifiable 
accounts of reliability and validity that credibly justify the methods used and the results reached  
(Cohen, et al., 2007: 133-149).  But more importantly the theoretical assumptions that underpin 
this study are meant – beyond the philosophical nuances and the subtleties of dogmatic 
paradigms – not just to produce dependable accounts of corruption for analytical sake – but to 
add to reliable findings responsive to action – oriented public policy pronouncements.  After 
all, when all things are considered ‘the differences between the quantitative and qualitative 
traditions are only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant” (Keohane 
and King, 1996: 4).  They are both deserving of academic status provided that their approach 
is orderly, conducted systematically and follows formal rules. 
The ultimate theoretical stance of this review, which is also political – is to stop “interpreting” 
the world of corruption in countless prescriptive deliberations and speculative diatribes and to 
begin “changing” it (Marx, 1845). 
5.3 Study Approach 
One of the challenges involved in inserting soft variables in an economic analysis is how to 
measure certain types of constructs or concepts.  While some categories are discrete and 
measurable others are latent and intangible and therefore harder to quantify.  In the areas of 
political and economic sciences space and time have been often combined in comparative 
research with the aim to investigate relationship between institutional, social practices and 
economic variables by comparing observations across space or observations over time.  
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For the purpose of this study bivariate and multivariate regression analyses will be the 
techniques to be applied on the pooled cross-national time series data.  Using this method 
allows to identify whether levels of human capital stocks and social development corruption 
control may determine the patterns of corruption across selected SADC countries.  
The time and space components of this quantitative method will allow to investigate how 
changes in the levels of human capital and social advancement of a particular country affect 
that country’s corruption outcome levels.  Hence the time-series cross-sectional structure of the 
data is fit for a rigorous test to our theoretical arguments and can provide a refined analysis to 
our research questions.  In case of missing data fixed effects will be considered as indeed “the 
fixed-effects framework … represents a common, unbiased method of controlling for omitted 
variables in a panel data set”. (Yermack, 1996: 185). 
5.4 Data Description and Population 
The main component of this empirical analysis consists of annual time- series panel data 
sourced from world class international databases available from the UNDP, UNESCO, the 
World Bank, IMF the AFDB, SADC countries, United Nations Statistics, Freedom House 
database.  The regression models tested in the study include the interaction of human capital, 
corruption and inclusive growth. 
The fifteen SADC countries were considered as population (Angola, Botswana, D.R Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  Population is defined as the whole of units that 
conform to a set of specifications and to which the research results can be generalised (Polit 
and Hungler, 1999: 43). 
The choice of SADC countries for this review is largely dictated by the objectives.  The 
majority of the countries has reached a middle to higher MIC economic status in terms of per 
capita income and / or enjoy significant levels of human or natural resource endowments.  
However high level of revenues and abundance of resources have often cultivated corruption 
and undermined social progress in the process of building their market economies.  The target 
countries while faced with serious inequality and integrity – related challenges, also present 
striking disparities in terms of poverty rates, institutional capacity and social development all 
of which will be key factors of consideration in this study. 
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When investigating patterns corruption, it is suitable to consider countries where the level of 
corruption is significantly and durably high.  This informs the choice of the SADC region 
countries for this study, where the corruption perception indexes from TI and WB showed 
stable patterns of high levels of corruption “The perceived level of corruption in the SADC 
member states in 2010 was higher than in 2000” (Christian Peters, 2011). 
Indeed, abundance of natural resources can benefit developing countries or be a curse (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2009).  This particularly applies to most of the selected countries where huge 
natural resource endowments present opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour among 
bureaucrats and politicians tempted to drain resources away from more socially advantageous 
projects to the detriment of the disaffected (Ploeg, 2006). 
Therefore, the above features made them attractive for the purpose of this research.  Due to 
data limitation data will be collected for the period 2005- 2013 across the fifteen SADC 
countries as this time span seems to be less prone to gaps in data availability. 
The data has fifteen panels and nine periods which amount to 135 observations. 
5.5 Data Source 
The analysis for this study required compilation of relevant data on human capital stocks, 
corruption indexes and economic growth.  In addition to the relevant human development 
indicators and income distribution estimates (GDP, GINI, HDI) across host SADC countries 
and across time (2005 – 2013).    
For cross-country time series data, the following sources were consulted for the purpose of this 
examination: 
- Country tables in the World Bank annual publications of key economic indicators  
- Statistical Appendices to the World Bank’s annual World Development Reports 
- Statistical Appendices to the UNDP’s annual Human Development Reports 
- Statistical tables. UNESCO Institute of Statistics 
- World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database 
Freedom House Data 
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5.6 Variables and Operationalization 
Variables. The analysis considered two major independent variables included in the base 
model: Social Development with associated measures of Human Development Index (HDI), 
Human Capital/ Education with associated measures of Adult literacy.  Corruption is the 
dependent variable with associated measures of Word Bank and Transparency International 
corruption control indexes (CCI and CPI). 
As a measure of a country’s social development (SD) this study used the HDI index as a proxy 
owing to its availability for a large set of countries and for a long time span.  The HDI is 
considered the most comprehensive measure of a country’s economic progress besides GDP.  
It provides information on the human development aspect of economic growth. It is constructed 
around three indicators: longevity measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment 
measured by a combination of adult literacy rate and the combined school levels enrolment 
ratios; and standard of living measured by GDP per capita. 
As a measure of human capital (HC) this study considered the average years of secondary 
education in the population aged 25 and over as a proxy.  Commonly human capital has been 
viewed as a function of education and experience including both training and learning. 
Six other control variables were also selected based on availability of data set:  Trade openness, 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, Democracy, Press Freedom, Social Connectivity (Telephone 
line per 100 people), which are included in the model. 
The statistical analysis tested the relationships hypothesized between levels of human capital, 
and social development   functions and their resulting effect on corruption outcomes.  Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis was conducted on a panel data series.  Using this 
model was advantageous because it allowed for the capability “to capture not only the variation 
of what emerges through time or space, but the variation of these two dimensions 
simultaneously” (Podesta, 2000: 9).  It is also best fitted to generate better estimations (e.g. 
higher T statistics, adjusted R- square, F- statistics) and as one the most common estimation 
method in the literature, which it also allowed for comparison with other studies. 
The unit of analysis used is the member-state for the population of SADC countries.  Analysis 
of such data was indeed arduous due to the data could vary greatly across time and space.  The 
analysis therefore attempted to use a variety of techniques to control for the special statistical 
hurdles inherent to such statistical methodology.  The level of corruption through the human 
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capital and social development effects was the ultimate phenomenon we tried to explain. 
Additional control variables were included in the estimation to account for various socio- 
economic and institutional impact levels. For all hypotheses considered the level of corruption 
was the dependent variable all other variables were assumed as independent explanatory 
variables.   
As a measure of corruption this study used two corruption perception indexes.  The two indexes 
of perceived corruption are the most commonly used in empirical work.  The Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International (TI) and an index of 
controls of corruption (CCI) from the World Bank.  Both indexes aggregate information from 
a variety of sources that include surveys of international or local businesses polls of country 
populations, and country risk ratings from specialised agencies  
5.7 Model Specification 
With the aim to ascertain a number of variables assumptions, the base model specifications 
derived from our research questions were as follows:  
 
1. What is the effect of human capital formation on corruption?  How does the causal 
direction of their relationship operate? 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                   (1) 
2. What is the effect of social development on corruption?  How does the causal direction 
of their relationship operate?  
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖 +  𝑣𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                     (2) 
3. What is the simultaneous effect of human capital and social development on corruption? 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 +  𝑐1 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝑤𝑖 +  𝑤𝑡 +  𝑤𝑖𝑡                                                     (3) 
Where i indexes countries and t the time period.  The error term in all three equations is 
made up of three components: ui, vi and wi stand for country-specific component; ut, vt 
and wt stand for time-specific component; and uit, vit and wit stand for random error term 
of a panel data model.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
This study was mainly concerned with identifying the nature and causal direction of the 
relationships between human capital and corruption; between corruption and social 
development; and to explain how human capital and social development interrelate to explain 
corruption in the SADC region.  
Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) were selected to estimate the corruption equation specified 
above using the E-Views statistical package.  The analysis used a pooled fixed-effects (FE) 
specification which allows to control for unobserved country heterogeneity and associated 
omitted variable bias (Startz, 2013).  The random effects (RE) were also included for the 
purpose of the generalizability of the results.  Before running the Ordinary Least Square to 
approximate the coefficients of the regression equation, the study tested for the stationarity of 
the variables.  The stationarity of the time series was tested using the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test.  The Granger Causality test was used to determine the nature and direction of 
causality among the variables in equations. Lastly the validity of our models and their 
robustness were validated through sensitivity analysis by using alternative proxy measures for 
corruption in the regressions.  
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This section presents the methodology used in this empirical investigation.  We first present 
panel data estimation its advantages and limitations.  Then we describe the econometric models 
used to analyse the causes of corruption incorporating both economic and institutional as 
controls.  OLS regressions, fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) considered.  We 
ascertain the causal relationships and its directions through Granger causality of the main 
variables which are corruption (CORR) human capital (HC) and social development (SD); we 
then perform a sensitivity analysis through the transmission channels of the effects of social 
development and human capital on corruption.  
Lastly we test the validity of our models and their robustness through replacement analysis by 
using alternative proxy measures for corruption in the regressions. 
6.2 Background 
Studies on corruption have flourished since the late 1990s.  Political scandals in countries 
across SADC over many years have discredited governments and public officials and caused 
increasing interest of the international community into matters of public corruption over the 
last two decades. 
Corruption is largely to be one the main obstacle to social development and economic 
advancement (Mauro, 1995; World Bank, 1997) yet reasons of high variance and high levels 
of heterogeneity for levels of corruption across countries and namely developing countries 
remain largely undetermined despite mounting policy and academic attention towards 
developing countries and Africa in particular. 
While many studies predominantly descriptive or using a normative script have analysed the 
details of the phenomenon mostly theorizing on the idiosyncrasies of corruption in certain 
regions or countries, cross- country quantitative research is a more exceptional undertaking.  
Through the anthropological filters of Africanist researchers (Ekeh, 1975; Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006) to more generic politico- scientist studies 
(Hofstede, 1997; Aidt, 2011) corruption despite its risk severity in Sub – Saharan – and 
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admittedly- widespread prevalence, remains by and large an elusive object of empirical study.  
In fact, by its very nature as hidden phenomenon – hard to observe and measure – and due to 
lack of good and accurate metrics (Treisman, 2000) corruption is as much of a nefarious 
practice for African development as it remains a reticent object of knowledge. 
Meanwhile when providing an empirical focus on corruption the research has had two main 
strands.  One that accounts for the majority of the studies focused at unpicking the 
consequences – many seen as harmful – of corruption hence taken as an explanatory variable. 
(Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Gupta, et al., 1998; Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005).  The 
other which is less prolific seeks to expose the determinants of corruption treated here as a 
dependent variable. (Treisman, 2000; Caiden, 2001; Huberts, 1998). 
In a most notable attempt to unravel the complexity of the phenomenon Treisman (2000) in its 
seminal study considers no less than14 determinants across 64 countries regressed against 
Transparency International CPI Index (1996, 1997, 1998).  Such large scope may still be partial 
as indeed Caiden remarks “the complexity of the phenomenon makes it impossible to provide 
a comprehensive account of the causes of political corruption.” (Caiden, 2001: 21- 26). 
Some theoretical precaution may be called for before we further delve into our quantitative 
analysis so as to contextualize the empirics of this research.  The literature abounds more with 
studies that enunciate propositions on the possible causes of corruption rather than those that 
arrive at a strong causal chain that relates to corruption.  As argued by Theobald (1999: 473): 
“There is a danger that we are simply describing symptoms rather than identifying underlying 
causes”.  In fact, in the realm of quantitative research statistical significance may be often 
mistaken for causality as perhaps true causality may be beyond reach. In the epistemological 
convention it is predicated – for causality to ring true – that the “cause” always coincide with 
the “consequence” (Hume, 1990) which grounds the “necessity criterion” (De Graag, 2007) for 
causation to be found.  For the purpose of this study our causation model does not emulate this 
theoretical threshold.  That is the causes to be identified may not be wholly necessary and 
sufficient and may not always lead to corruption in the philosophical sense. 
A Granger test causality is used to approximate such type of causal relationship as it implies 
causality in a realist sense of predicting the outcome rather than in a positivist experimental 
sense (Hume, 1777) of the same event invariably related to the same outcome that is A causes 
B; if A, then B.  
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6.3 Data, Models and Methodologies 
6.3.1 Data Description 
This study is based on cross – country data collected for fifteen SADC countries for the 
period of 2005 -2013. The data for each country over the period is defined as time series 
data; and data for all countries for a given year is categorized as cross-sectional data.  The 
review period was determined with the view to allow for optimal data availability in order 
to secure complete and balanced panel data.  The data has been compiled mainly from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) and other sources as per Table 1.1.  Table 1 
below gives the list of selected countries 
Table 1. List of Countries.  
1 Angola 9 Namibia 
2 Botswana 10 Seychelles 
3 Congo Dem. Rep 11 South Africa 
4 Lesotho 12 Swaziland 
5 Madagascar 13 Tanzania 
6 Malawi 14 Zambia 
7 Mauritius 15 Zimbabwe 
8 Mozambique   
 
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Before we begin to make inferences we examine descriptively the data to observe 
patterns, find possible violations of statistical norms and generate assumptions among 
variables. 
6.3.2.1 Variables 
Eight independent variables such as Human Capital, Social Development, Trade 
openness, GDP growth, GDP per capita, Connectivity, Democracy, and Press Freedom 
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were included in the model based on secondary data availability.  This analysis 
considers eight independent variables. Social Development, Human Capital Trade 
openness, GDP per capita, GDP growth, Democracy, Press Freedom, Social 
Connectivity (Telephone line per 100 people), which are included in the model based 
on availability of data set.  
Table 2. Variables  
Variables Definition Data Source 
CORR Corruption as per Corruption 
Perception Index  
WGI / World Bank 
CPI/ Transparency International. 
Accessed in 2014  
SD Social Development. Proxied by 
the Human Development Index  
UNDP database  
accessed in 2014 
HC  Human Capital. Mean Years of 
Adult Schooling 
UNESCO database  
accessed in 2014 
TRAD Trade openness (Export + import 
/ GDP)    
World Bank database.  
WDI accessed in 2014 
GDP Gross Domestic product growth 
(annual %)  
World Bank database.  
WDI accessed in 2014 
GDPC Gross Domestic product per 
capita 
World Bank database.  
WDI accessed in 2014 
DEM Democracy. Proxied by Political 
Freedom as per Freedom House 
Index. Ratings from 1 to 10 
ranging from “Free” to “Not 
Free” 
Freedom House Database 
accessed in 2014 
PF Press Freedom proxied as per 
Freedom of the Press index. 
Freedom House Database 
accessed in 2014 
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Ratings from 0 to 100 ranging 
from “Free” to “Not Free” 
CONN Connectivity. Social network 
connectivity. Proxied by mobile 
cellular subscription per 100 
people 
World Bank database.  
WDI accessed in 2014 
 
- Human Capital: A number of empirical and theoretical studies have determined that 
corruption is likely to hinder the provision of education and to affect the quality of a 
country’s human capital stock.  By lowering incentives to invest in education (Mauro, 
1998; Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 1998) or by increasing poverty and income 
inequalities, corruption could affect education which is a key determinant of a 
country’s human profile (Tebaldi and Mohan, 2010; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001; 
Gymiah-Brempong and de Camacho, 2006). 
 
- Social Development: Less corrupt countries tend to have a higher level of human 
development than more corrupt countries.  Corruption is generally related to 
diminishing levels of social spending (Mauro,1998; Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso- 
Terme, 1998) and has long been categorized as a strong deterrent to socio – economic 
development (Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Ali and Isse, 2003). 
 
- Trade Openness: Less corruption is expected where there are fewer trade restrictions.  
Trade openness has been linked in the literature to reduced corruption as increased 
competitiveness lessens rents seeking and opportunities for corruption. (Krueger, 
1974; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; Chang, 2009; Majeed, 2014). 
 
- Gross Domestic Product:  The link between corruption and economic growth is well 
established across the economic literature (Mauro, 1995, 1997; Hope, 1997; Van 
Rijckghem and Weder, 1997) throughout many studies with mainly two major 
competing perspectives (Svensson, 2005).  The “greasing the wheels” view which 
contends that corruption is beneficial to growth (Leff, 1964, Huntington, 1968; 
Osterfeld, 1992) as it evades bureaucratic red tape, and on the other hand the “sand in 
the wheels” opinion which argues that corruption is an obstacle to development and 
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leads to resource misallocation and higher transaction costs (Krueger, 1974; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Mauro, 1995; Leite, et al., 1999). 
 
- Gross Domestic Product Per Capita: The hypothesis of negative correlation between 
corruption and income is largely documented by studies such as Kunicova and Rose-
Ackerman (2005), Brown, et al., (2005), Lederman, et al., (2005). Abed and Davoodi 
(2000) also conclude to a negative association between real per capita GDP growth 
and corruption. While at the opposite end other studies find a positive relation between 
these variables including Frechette (2001) and Braun and Di Tella (2004). 
 
- Democracy: The majority of studies (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Abed and Gupta,  
2002) acknowledge that more democracy generally leads to less corruption.  
According to such views in democracy freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
free elections and vibrant civil society are effective means for more scrutiny on the 
powers of government and therefore ways to lessen public corruption.  Although other 
countries have seen less corruption while under authoritarian rule notably in Asia. 
 
- Press Freedom: A general consensus through several studies (Brunetti and Weder, 
2003; Chowdhury, 2004) has been established around the preponderance of a free 
press in fighting corruption as more demand for transparency and accountability leads 
to less corruption. 
 
- Connectivity: Researchers have long argued that social networks’ structures offer 
opportunities for individuals to be more integrated in community links, associational 
life and in political processes (Putnam, 1993; Jottier and Heyndels, 2011).  A dense 
network of communication creates a more open society and augments the likelihood 
of detecting illicit rent extractions and therefore preventing corruption (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). 
From the analysis of the existing literature the above independent variables are expected 
to have the following relationships with corruption 
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Table 3. Expected signs of variables 
No Independent 
Variables 
Abbreviations Expected signs Notes 
1 Social 
Development 
SD Negative Higher standards of living 
are less conducive to 
corruption  
2 Human Capital HC Negative  Highly corrupt countries 
have lower levels of 
human capital stock.  
3 Trade Openness TRA Negative Less corruption is 
expected where there are 
fewer trade restrictions 
4 Gross Domestic 
product / Growth 
% 
GDP Positive High rates of economic 
growth mean higher rents 
and may create more 
opportunities for 
corruption 
5 Gross Domestic 
product per capita 
GDPPC Negative Higher personal income 
may be less vulnerable to 
corruption 
6 Democracy DEM Negative Democratic countries have 
more check and balances 
to fight corruption. More 
transparency and plurality 
help reduce corruption 
7 Press Freedom PF Negative More demand for 
accountability and more 
press scrutiny lead to less 
corruption 
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8 Connectivity CON Negative More social network 
communication may lead 
to more open society and 
less corruption 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variables Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev. 
CORR -0.294577 -0.329177 1.141267 
 
-1.484902 0.680155 
HC 6.181481 6.100000 
 
9.900000 
 
2.900000 2.044694 
SD 0.524533 
 
0.498000 
 
0.832000 0.185000 
 
0.183853 
 
DEM 3.762963 3.000000 7.000000 1.000000 
 
1.853627 
PF 53.68148 52.00000 90.00000 26.00000 17.75230 
GDP 5.210708 5.382346 22.59305 -17.66895 4.509609 
TRA 79.39383 72.97729 164.5975 29.33353 
 
32.55491 
GDPPC 3221.416 1437.884 16185.90 213.1567 3450.910 
CONN 53.87245 43.41215 160.6411 2.789820 
 
39.74328 
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The above table (4) describes all the main variables that were reported in the study. Corruption 
has a maximum of 1.1 and a minimum.  Of -1.1 respectively which shows overall – despite 
some outliers – little differences for the levels of corruption across SADC Social development 
with maximum and minimum of .83 and .18 and a man of .52 shows rather uneven levels of 
human development across SADC.  The same applies to Human Capital with maximum and 
minimum of 9.9 and 2.9 respectively showing notable disparities of education profiles and skill 
levels across SADC countries.  Trade openness and connectivity with a maximum of 164 and 
160 and minimum of 79 and 53 seems to have a larger spread across countries.  GDP growth 
with a mean value of 5.2 displays a relatively steady pace of economic growth for the period 
under consideration (2008 – 2013) although with large disparities across countries with a 
maximum and minimum of 22 and -17 respectively. GDPPC with a maximum of 16185 and a 
minimum of 213 points to large income disparities across SADC countries between the richest 
and poorest nations.  
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6.3.2.2 Correlation Matrix between Variables 
Table 5.  Correlation Matrix 
 CORR  HC SD GDP GDPPC TRA DEM PF CONN 
          
          
CORRTI  1.000000 -0.686674 -0.720853  0.139703 -0.270193 -0.277765  0.746540  0.739048 -0.170627 
HC -0.686674  1.000000  0.846651 -0.211118 -0.000914  0.289069 -0.376260 -0.321221  0.208421 
SD -0.720853  0.846651  1.000000 -0.048857  0.201771  0.416123 -0.442227 -0.497659  0.219100 
GDP  0.139703 -0.211118 -0.048857  1.000000  0.018777 -0.069192 -0.030180 -0.042110  0.027050 
GDPPC -0.270193 -0.000914  0.201771  0.018777  1.000000 -0.039869 -0.254308 -0.425086  0.311655 
TRA -0.277765  0.289069  0.416123 -0.069192 -0.039869  1.000000 -0.054386 -0.001005  0.332363 
DEM  0.746540 -0.376260 -0.442227 -0.030180 -0.254308 -0.054386  1.000000  0.897807  0.138882 
PF  0.739048 -0.321221 -0.497659 -0.042110 -0.425086 -0.001005  0.897807  1.000000  0.129656 
CONN -0.170627  0.208421  0.219100  0.027050  0.311655  0.332363  0.138882  0.129656  1.000000 
 
The above results (table 5) show a strong and positive correlation between social development and human capital which is expected.  Whereas 
gross domestic product growth (GDP) seems to move in opposite direction with social development and human capital which is undesirable.   
Democracy has a positive and high correlation with press freedom which is expected.  Meanwhile GDP is weakly correlated with both democracy 
and press freedom which may imply little impact of the institutional environment on economic growth.  Connectivity appears to have a rather 
modest relationship with the other variables.  GDPPC is negatively correlated with corruption which is expected while it is negatively associated 
with both democracy and press freedom which is unexpected and confirms the ambiguous impact of income level on institutions.   Corruption 
seems to display a strong negative correlation with both human and social development which is anticipated while it appears to be weakly 
associated with GDP growth.  However, these partial correlations remain only indicative of association of variables, predictive powers and causal 
relationships of the variables will be further tested through the regression analysis.   
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Although there are many measures of association, correlation is the most commonly used 
approach.  Table 3 is intended to give an indication of the strength (high or low) and 
direction (positive, negative or none) of the linear relationship between the independent 
variables 
6.3.3 Model specifications 
This study sets out to investigate the determinants of corruption in SADC countries by 
using panel data estimation.  A panel analysis using country and time observations will 
provide the basis for estimating the relationship between corruption, human capital and 
social development along with other selected determinants. 
Advantages of panel method. Panel data includes multidimensional observations with 
space as well as time dimensions for the same entities which are countries in this review 
(Greene, 2003).  Our panel is balanced that is each country (i) is observed in all time 
periods (t).  According to Schmidheiny (2015) “Panel data are most useful when we 
suspect that the outcome variable depends on explanatory variables which are not 
observable but correlated with the observed explanatory variables.  If such omitted 
variables are constant over time, panel data estimators allow to consistently estimate the 
effect of the observed explanatory variables”. 
Multiple observations on each country can also provide superior estimates as opposed to 
cross-sectional models of association (Gujarati and Porter, 2009) while also allowing 
possible control for individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008).  In the case of SADC 
countries unobservable factors more intangible and more “constant” in nature such as 
values, culture may be correlated with the selected variables for which panel data can 
provide a better estimation while accounting for a corruption which tends to vary and 
display more heterogeneity across countries than within.  ‘Panel data give more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degree of 
freedom and more efficiency.’’  It is also a better estimation method to study the duration 
of economic states and the ‘‘dynamics of change’’ over time (Baltagi, 2001) 
Our base model is constructed by incorporating alongside the dependent variable which 
is corruption (measured as in most known empirical studies by the corruption perception 
indexes from TI and the World Bank) other socio- economic factors (as grounded in 
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previous studies and based on data availability) as right-hand side variables.  These are 
social development (proxied by HDI index) to focus on social standards of living, human 
capital to account for effect of literacy.  
With the aim to ascertain a number of variables assumptions, the base model 
specifications derived from our research questions are as follows: 
1. What is the effect of human capital formation on corruption?  How does the causal 
direction of their relationship operate? 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 +  𝑢𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                         (1) 
 
2. What is the effect of social development on corruption?  How does the 
causal direction of their relationship operate?  
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                            (2) 
3. What is the simultaneous effect of human capital and social development 
on corruption? 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡                                (3) 
Where i indexes countries and t the time period. The error term in all three 
equations is made up of three components: ui, vi and wi stand for country-
specific component; ut, vt and wt stand for time-specific component; and uit, 
vit and wit stand for random error term of a panel data model.  
6.3.4 Econometric Methodology 
In order to estimate the above hypotheses, the panel data estimates are based on equations 
(1) to (3). 
To construct an empirical model on corruption, panel data is used and OLS regression is 
performed.  The base model using specifically Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
is constructed on the footsteps of previous econometric work on the subject matter 
(Treisman, 2000; La Porta, et al., 1998; Ades and Di Tella, 1997).  A multiple OLS 
regression analysis will be performed by using the statistical package Eviews.  With a 
multiple OLS regression, the relationship between several independent variables and an 
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outcome/dependent variable can be explained (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), that is the 
behaviour in the dependent variable can be predicted by the independent variables. 
The study starts by using OLS to investigate the effect of human capital and social 
development on corruption.  One limitation with this model is that it does not 
discriminate between the various countries nor does it tell us whether the response of 
corruption to the explanatory variables over time is the same for each country. 
In other words, by grouping the countries together at different times the model does 
not recognize the heterogeneity that may exist among countries with the possibility 
that the error term may be correlated with the explanatory variables in the model.  If 
so, the estimated coefficients may be biased. 
Moreover, in the time series several variables are likely to be correlated, and causal 
relationships to possibly run in more than one direction.  Since many of the explanatory 
factors are likely to be correlated, there is high risk of omitted variable bias to test 
hypotheses individually without also controlling for their correlated factors.  A fixed 
effects model takes such characteristics into account to address possible endogeneity 
bias. 
6.3.4.1 Fixed effects model 
The variables included in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation may be subject 
to potential bias due to several reasons.  One likely bias is omitted variables bias as it is 
probable that some important factors omitted as explanatory variables may affect 
corruption, human capital and social development simultaneously.  Fixed effect model 
can adjust for unobserved effects that are correlated with covariates.  It is also possible 
to use a fixed effects model to account for time-invariant unobserved factors that might 
be correlated with the variables that are included in the regression equation.  
The fixed effects explore the relationship between corruption and the selected 
variables within each country (Baltagi, 2001).  
A critical assumption of the fixed effects which suits the corruption model estimate is 
that time-invariant characteristics (such as values, culture, religion) are unique to 
individual entities / countries and should not be correlated with other individual 
characteristics.  Each country’s corruption in this case has its own features which make 
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its level and magnitude unique.  Therefore, it’s assumed that the selected country error 
term and the constant should not be correlated with others.  Hence the results are adjusted 
for effects that are country specific and that may have biased the OLS estimates 
The following (FE) model is estimated:  
- Additional economic variables (FE) 
CP i,t = β 0 + β1(SD) i,t + β5(GDP) i,t +β6(GDPPC) i,t +β6(TRA)+ γi + δt +  Ɛ i,t     (4)   
CP i,t = β 0 + β2(HC) i,t + β5(GDP) i,t +β6(GDPPC) i,t +β6(TRA)+ γi + δt +  Ɛ i,t     (5)   
CP i,t = β 0 + β1(SD) i,t +β2(HC)I, t+ β5(GDP) i,t +β6(GDPPC) i,t +β6(TRA)+ γi + δt +  Ɛ i,t     (6)   
- Institutional Variables (FE)  
CP i,t = β 0 + β1(SD)I,t +β2(HC) β3(DEM) i,t+ β4(PF)i,t + β7(CON) i,t + γi + δt+  Ɛ i,t         (7) 
CP i,t = β 0 + β1(SD)I,t +β2( β3(DEM) i,t+ β4(PF)i,t + β7(CON) i,t + γi + δt+  Ɛ i,t         (8) 
CP i,t = β 0 + β1(SD)I,t +β2(HC)I, t+ β3(DEM) i,t+ β4(PF)i,t + β7(CON) i,t + γi + δt+  Ɛ i,t       (9)                                                     
 
Where:                                                                                                                                                                            
- CP i,t   is an observation on the dependent variable (Corruption perception index).  
- β is coefficient for independent variables  (SD, HC, DEM, PF, GDP, TRA, CON)  
- Ɛ i,t  depicts the error term across countries and time 
- γi, : stands for specific country characteristics constant over time 
- δt, :  depicts is a time-specific effect 
- i  =   countries 
- t  =  time 
The fixed‐effect method helps ascertain if the correlates of corruption hold when 
controlling for country and year fixed effects, or if they are mainly due to omitted 
variables.  Country‐fixed effects allow comparisons not to be made across countries, but 
only using within‐country variation.  This helps control for differences across countries 
that are not easily observed and measured.  And provide a consistent estimate of the 
corruption parameter under the assumption that all unobserved variables that influence 
the corruption outcome are time invariant, since these unobservables are removed by a 
within or first difference transformation (Wooldridge, 2002). 
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In order to confirm the appropriate use of the fixed effects method a Hausman test is 
performed which is the generally accepted mode of selecting between fixed and random 
effect models.  The Hausman test poses as null hypothesis that there is no material 
difference in the coefficients of fixed effect and random effect models.  If the null 
hypothesis (Ho) is rejected the fixed effect model will be found as appropriate method, 
alternatively the random effect should be used.  However, our Haussmann test estimation 
(p > 5%) provides no evidence against the null hypothesis (Ho) which suggests that 
random effects should also be considered to ascertain the issue of corruption as per our 
equations.  
6.3.4.2 Random effects  
Moreover, as this study is also interested in making sample inferences beyond the SADC 
dataset, using fixed effects model would only allow conclusions on the “fixed” number 
of SADC countries.  Hence the random effects (RE) is also considered which allows 
estimates on the broader underlying population of African countries thereby benefiting 
from the generalisability offered by such statistical approach.  However, the random 
effects model (RE) assumes no correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
individual country – specific effects, implying that, in the presence of endogeneity 
random effects (RE) will produce biased estimates.  Using the fixed effects (FE) model 
which can adjust for unobserved effects that are correlated with the covariate through the 
inclusion of a country-fixed-effect term eliminates this source of endogeneity bias. 
But before estimating the equations, an examination of the properties of the underlying 
data was effected.  Testing for stationarity of the data series was done using panel unit 
root method to ensure that the variables used in the regressions were not subject to 
spurious correlation.  As per below results it appears all main variables considered, 
corruption (CORR), human capital (HC) and social development (SD) are stationary at 
level and need not to be differenced.  
Also in order to subsequently test for Granger-causality between corruption (CORR) and 
human capital (HC) or social development (SD), it is necessary that the time series are 
stationary.  The stationary properties of the time series are tested using panel unit root 
method. 
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We further proceed with the VAR lag order selection criteria to choose the best lag length 
for the VAR time series model to examine the Granger causality and we perform the pair 
wise Granger Causality test for all the series.  As the Granger causality tests require the 
data to be stationary pre- testing for stationary property of the data is in effect necessary 
as most economic and financial time series exhibit trending behaviour in their means 
when plotted against time (Zivot and Wang, 2006; Razzak, 2007).  Hence the data would 
be transformed to stationary if necessary before analysis. In this case, the null hypothesis 
of presence of unit root is tested. 
6.3.4.3 Panel Unit Root Testing Stationary data 
Test summary1. Panel unit root test results 
 
Ho = CORR has unit root 
HA= CORR does not have unit  
If P value (0%) is less than 5% Ho is rejected; that is corruption (CORR) does not 
have unit the data is stationary 
  
Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  CORRTI
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 19:24
Sample: 2005 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -10.3759  0.0000  15  114
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -2.70952  0.0034  15  114
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  61.5508  0.0006  15  114
PP - Fisher Chi-square  60.2536  0.0009  15  120
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
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Figure1. Graphical output (CORRTI)  
 
 
Test summary2. Panel unit root test results 
 
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
A
n
g
o
la
 -
 0
5
A
n
g
o
la
 -
 1
1
B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
 -
 0
8
C
o
n
g
o
 -
 0
5
C
o
n
g
o
 -
 1
1
L
e
s
o
th
o
 -
 0
8
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r 
- 
0
5
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r 
- 
1
1
M
a
la
w
i 
- 
0
8
M
a
u
ri
ti
u
s
 -
 0
5
M
a
u
ri
ti
u
s
 -
 1
1
M
o
z
a
m
b
iq
u
e
 -
 0
8
N
a
m
ib
ia
 -
 0
5
N
a
m
ib
ia
 -
 1
1
S
e
y
c
h
e
ll
e
s
 -
 0
8
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 -
 0
5
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 -
 1
1
S
w
a
z
il
a
n
d
 -
 0
8
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
 -
 0
5
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
 -
 1
1
Z
a
m
b
ia
 -
 0
8
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
 -
 0
5
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
 -
 1
1
CORRTI
Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  HC
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 19:35
Sample: 2005 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.58559  0.0000  13  102
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -0.60493  0.2726  13  102
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  29.5442  0.2869  13  102
PP - Fisher Chi-square  45.9151  0.0093  13  104
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
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Ho = HC has unit root 
HA = HC does not have unit root 
If P value (0%) is less than 5% Ho is rejected; that is human capital (HC) does not 
have unit the data is stationary 
 
Figure 2. Graphical output (HC)  
 
  
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A
n
g
o
la
 -
 0
5
A
n
g
o
la
 -
 1
1
B
o
ts
w
a
n
a
 -
 0
8
C
o
n
g
o
 -
 0
5
C
o
n
g
o
 -
 1
1
L
e
s
o
th
o
 -
 0
8
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r 
- 
0
5
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r 
- 
1
1
M
a
la
w
i 
- 
0
8
M
a
u
ri
ti
u
s
 -
 0
5
M
a
u
ri
ti
u
s
 -
 1
1
M
o
z
a
m
b
iq
u
e
 -
 0
8
N
a
m
ib
ia
 -
 0
5
N
a
m
ib
ia
 -
 1
1
S
e
y
c
h
e
ll
e
s
 -
 0
8
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 -
 0
5
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 -
 1
1
S
w
a
z
il
a
n
d
 -
 0
8
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
 -
 0
5
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
 -
 1
1
Z
a
m
b
ia
 -
 0
8
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
 -
 0
5
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
 -
 1
1
HC
93 
 
 
Test summary3. Panel unit root test results 
 
 
Ho = SD has unit root 
HA = SD does not have unit  
If P value (0%) is less than 5% Ho is rejected that is social development (SD) does 
not have unit the data is stationary 
  
Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  SD
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 19:38
Sample: 2005 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.16149  0.0153  15  118
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  1.11864  0.8684  15  118
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  24.3689  0.7551  15  118
PP - Fisher Chi-square  38.4225  0.1392  15  120
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
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Figure 3. Graphical output (HC)  
 
 
From the above statistical evidence – both from the test results and the graph pattern 
– we conclude the data is free from unit root therefore it is stationary and doesn’t need 
to be differenced.  
6.3.4.4 Hausman test results  
We run the Hausman test to choose the appropriate estimation method.  The generally 
accepted way of choosing between a fixed and a random effect model is running a 
Hausman test.  The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis to determine if the coefficients 
of the random effects model are the same as the ones of fixed effects model. If they are 
and therefore have an insignificant p-value, then it is safe to use random-effect models 
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Test summary4. Hausman test results 
 
 
The Hausman test conducted for the model in this section however shows insignificant p- value 
(> 5%) as per above results and therefore suggests the use of random effect.  Thus in this 
context to estimate the coefficients, a panel data analysis with random effect models is also 
conducted.   
Therefore, this study will include three panel data regression models:  
1. Panel least Squares (cross section),  
2. Fixed Effects, and  
3. Random Effects 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 5.169996 2 0.0754
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
HC 7.448756 0.614005 13.544501 0.0633
SD -70.845269 -130.687282 3100.109569 0.2825
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 19:45
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 84.16080 39.77937 2.115690 0.0365
HC 7.448756 5.593899 1.331586 0.1856
SD -70.84527 74.37370 -0.952558 0.3428
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.933183     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.924123     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 11.08254     Akaike info criterion 7.765880
Sum squared resid 14493.08     Schwarz criterion 8.131730
Log likelihood -507.1969     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.914551
F-statistic 103.0004     Durbin-Watson stat 0.965504
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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6.4 Panel Estimation Results 
6.4.1 OLS Regressions Results 
Table 4 below reports the results of the Panel Least Square (PLS). 
Column (1) shows the results of the first research question i.e. how does human capital 
affect corruption? 
Column (2) reports the on the results of the second research question i.e. what is the 
impact of social development on corruption?  
Colum (3) reports on the results of the third question i.e. how the combined effects of 
human capital and social development simultaneously affect corruption?  
Column (4) reports the estimation results which capture the socio – economic factors 
(GDP, GDPPC, TRA) along with human capital to measure their combined impact on 
corruption level. 
Column (5) reports the estimation results which capture the institutional factors (DEM, 
PF, CON) along with human capital to measure their combined impact on corruption 
level 
Column (6) reports the estimation results which capture the socio – economic factors 
(GDP, GDPPC, TRA) along with social development to measure their combined impact 
on corruption level 
Column (7) reports the estimation results which capture the institutional factors (DEM, 
PF, CON) along with social development to measure their combined impact on 
corruption level 
Column (8) reports the results which include all variables to ascertain their overall impact 
on corruption level 
 
97 
 
Table 6. OLS estimates for explanatory variables and corruption (TI) relationships  
Dependent Variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI from TI)  
Hypotheses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 HC/CORR SD/CORR SD,HC/CORR HC+ GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA/CORR 
HC+ DEM, 
PF, 
CONN/CORR 
SD+ GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA/CORR 
SD+ DEM, 
PF, 
CONN/CORR  
HC+SD, 
GDP, 
GDPPC,TRA, 
DEM, PF, 
CONN/CORR 
Variables  PLS (1)  PLS (2 ) PLS (3)  PLS (4)  PLS (5) PLS (6)  PLS (7)  PLS(8) 
HC -13.511*** 
(1.204) 
 
 
-5.306*** 
( 2.182) 
-12.961*** 
(1.229) 
-8.450*** 
(0.859) 
  -7.167*** 
(1.821) 
SD  -157.746*** 
(13.151) 
-107.785*** 
(24.269) 
  152.009*** 
(14.628) 
-89.855*** 
(11.179) 
-4.383 
(22.461) 
GDP    -0.009 
(0.534) 
 0.974* 
(0.527) 
 0.755** 
(0.368) 
GDPPC    -0.003***  -0.001***  0.000 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TRA    -0.121 
(0.075) 
 0.016* 
(0.081) 
 -0.113* 
(0.059) 
DEM     5.489*** 
(1.966) 
 9.911*** 
(2.064) 
5.194*** 
(2.178) 
PF     0.896*** 
(0.199) 
 0.223 
(1.477) 
0.974*** 
(0.259) 
CONN     -0.169*** 
(0.413) 
 -0.165 
(0.045) 
-0.159*** 
(0.048) 
R- squared: 0.819 
Adj. R- squared: 0.808 
Legend: HC is human capital, SD is social development, GDP is gross domestic product, GDPPC is GDP per capita, TRA is trade openness, 
DEM is democracy, PF is press freedom, CONN is social connectivity. 
Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported 
***, **, * indicate significance level at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
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Column (1) shows the result of hypothesis (1) i.e. does human capital affect corruption?  The 
coefficient of HC has the expected negative sign and is quite significant at 1% level which suggests 
that higher human capital stock has a limiting effect on corruption level.  It also indicates that that 
a one standard deviation increase in the human capital level decreases the CPI score by 27.61 
points on a scale of 100.  This also confirms Rogers (2008) findings which establishes the impact 
of human capital among low corrupt developing countries. 
(NB: A one STD increase in the human capital level is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of 
HC (-13.511) and the STD of HC (2.044) which gives -27.616) 
Column (2) reports the estimation results of hypothesis (2) i.e. how does social development link 
to public corruption level?  The coefficient has the expected sign with high significance at 1% 
level tends to confirm the generally accepted view that higher social prosperity has a serious 
dampening effect on corruption.  It also indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the 
social development variable level decreases the CPI score by 28.866  points on a scale of 100. 
(NB: A one STD increase in the social development variable is calculated by multiplying the 
coefficient of SD (-157.74 ) and the STD of SD (0.183) which gives -28.866) 
Column (3) reports the estimation results of hypothesis (3) that is how the combined effect of both 
human capital and social development interact with levels of corruption?  Both signs point to the 
expected negative direction with the SD (social development) variable showing a significant 
coefficient at 1% level confirming its strong correlation with levels of corruption. 
Column (4) displays the regression results which include other socio- economic factors (GDP, 
GDPPC, and TRA) along with HC (human capital) to measure their simultaneous impact on 
corruption.  Interestingly GDPPC (GDP per capita) is singularly significant (at 1% level) among 
other variables such as GDP and trade which are insignificant (over 10% level) while the HC 
(human capital) variable retains its negative sign and significance at 1% level.  A one standard 
deviation increase in the per capita income variable level decreases the CPI score by 10.352 points.  
This suggests that income level and distribution may indeed have a critical role in curbing 
corruption levels as increasing prosperity reduces the need for rent seeking. 
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(NB: A one STD increase in the per capita income variable is calculated by multiplying the 
coefficient of GDPPC (0.003) and the STD of GDPPC (3450.91) which gives -10.352) 
Column (5) captures the estimation results which incorporate institutional determinants (DEM, 
PF, CONN) along with HC (human capital) to ascertain the role of these factors in determining 
the corruption level.  With the inclusion of governance factors human capital (HC) retains its 
expected negative sign.  It’s worthwhile noting that the other variables do not display the expected 
negative sign.  This tends to suggest institutional factors do not necessarily have a linear 
relationship with corruption levels.  This result would reinforce the conclusions of Ades and Di 
Tella (1999) suggesting that political conditions have no major significant effect on countries’ 
corruption levels. 
Column (6) shows the results which include economic indicators (GDP, GDPPC, TRA) along with 
social development (SD) to measure the incidence of these variables on corruption.  The inclusion 
of economic variables confirms the strong correlation of social development with corruption as 
illustrated by a high significance (at 1% level) and the large magnitude of the coefficient with the 
unexpected positive sign.  Similarly, GDP growth appears not to have a diminishing effect on 
corruption with a positive sign which is not in line with Mauro’s (1995), Blackburn, et al., (2002) 
findings that establishes a negative correlation between growth, rate of investment and corruption.  
Although the result which shows a negative direction for GDPPC (GDP /capita) at a significant 
1% level confirms for the income variable Mauro’s conclusion which suggests that corruption and 
bureaucratic efficiency are negatively and significantly associated with the average GDP/capita.  
Column (7) displays the regression results which comprise the institutional variables (DEM, PF, 
CONN) along with social development (SD) to measure the impact of these determinants on 
corruption.  The inclusion of governance variables continues to reaffirm the strong and negative 
sign of social development (SD) as determinant significant a 1% level and with a large magnitude 
coefficient.  Meanwhile the other institutional variables (DEM, PF) do not display the expected 
negative signs except for the social connectivity (CONN) variable which shows the expected 
negative direction at a significant level of 1%.  This would suggest that social connectivity as an 
enabling link for social communication does contribute to increased transparency and decreased 
corruption level.  The mixed results would indicate that governance factors do not have necessarily 
a linear relationship with corruption.  
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Column (8) shows the estimation results for all considered variables.  With this all-inclusive 
equation both human capital (HC) and social development (SD) retain their expected negative sign 
although the social development (SD) variable appears insignificant.  Other independent variables 
both economic and institutional persist with their unexpected positive signs except trade for 
openness (TRA) and social connectivity (CONN).  The latter confirms its negative sign and high 
significance at 1% level reinforcing its relevance as a determining factor for corruption level.  
Unlike Press freedom (PF) which displays high magnitude coefficient but not the expected 
negative direction.  This is not consistent with the major findings of Brunetti and Weder (2003) 
and Chowdhury (2004) which conclude that low levels of press freedom are associated with greater 
corruption.  The high R square and Adjusted R2 at respectively 0.82 and 0.81 ??? suggest the high 
fit of the regression and the strength of the relationship between our selected regression model and 
the response variable along with the relevance of the selected variables to explain corruption.  
 
Table 7. Fixed Effects (FE) estimates for explanatory variables and corruption (TI) relationships 
Dependent Variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI from TI) 
Hypothes
es 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 HC/COR
R 
SD/CO
RR 
SD, 
HC/CO
RR 
HC+ 
GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA/CO
RR 
HC+ 
DEM, 
PF, 
CONN/C
ORR 
SD+ GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA/COR
R 
SD+ DEM, 
PF, 
CONN/CO
RR  
HC+SD, 
GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA, 
DEM, PF, 
CONN/CO
RR 
Variables FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) 
HC -3.719 
(8.531) 
 -7.256 
(8.568) 
-2.952 
(9.032) 
-2.320 
(8.705) 
  -6.491 
(9.454) 
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SD  -
176.059
** 
(88.826) 
-
191.110
** 
(90.697) 
  -174.121* 
(90.664) 
-174.365* 
(89.418) 
-191.169 
(93.869) 
GDP    -0.254 
(0.272) 
 -0.241 
(0.266) 
 -0.100 
(0.291) 
GDPPC    -0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
TRA    -0.031 
(0.101) 
 -0.018 
(0.099) 
 -0.0302 
(0.102) 
DEM     3.365 
(2.597) 
 3.580 
(2.486) 
3.177 
(2.165) 
PF     0.249 
(0.417) 
 0.211 
(0.402) 
0.238 
(0.437) 
CONN     -0.016 
(0.093) 
 0.093 
(0.144) 
0.022 
(0.099) 
R2 0.937 0.939 0.939 0.940 0.942 0.939 0.942 0.942 
 
Legend: HC is human capital, SD is social development, GDP is gross domestic product, GDPPC 
is GDP per capita, TRA is trade openness, DEM is democracy, PF is press freedom, CONN is 
social connectivity. 
Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported 
***, **, * indicate significance level at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
Table 7  reports the regression results for the cross - section fixed effects with very strong R 
squared for all columns of over 0.90 which would suggest a better model fit.  But remarkably most 
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coefficient for most variables are of small magnitude and insignificant except for social 
development (SD) which shows a significant coefficient at 5% level and the expected negative 
sign along with human capital (HC).  
Table 8. Random Effects (RE) estimates for explanatory variables and corruption (TI) relationships 
Dependent Variable: Corruption Perception Index (CPI from TI) 
Hypoth
eses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 HC/CO
RR 
SD/CO
RR 
SD, 
HC/CO
RR 
HC+ 
GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA/C
ORR 
HC+ 
DEM, PF, 
CONN/C
ORR 
SD+ 
GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA/C
ORR 
SD+ 
DEM, PF, 
CONN/C
ORR  
HC+SD, 
GDP, 
GDPPC, 
TRA, 
DEM, PF, 
CONN/C
ORR 
Variabl
es  
RE (1) RE (2)  RE (3)  RE (4)  RE (5) RE (6)  RE (7)  RE (8) 
HC -7.137 
*** 
(2.984) 
 0.614 
(5.212) 
-
7.595**
* 
(3.141) 
-7.595*** 
(3.141) 
  -5.380* 
(3.059) 
SD  -
126.262
*** 
(33.792) 
-
130.687
*** 
(49.308) 
  -
174.121
** 
(90.664) 
-
115.867**
* 
(26.307) 
-56.175 
(37.166) 
GDP     0.258 
(0.250) 
-0.241 
(0.266) 
 0.018 
(0.254) 
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GDPPC     0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
 -9.760 
(0.000) 
TRA     -0.250 
(0.893) 
-0.018 
(0.099) 
 -0.048 
(0.079) 
DEM       4.165* 
(2.296) 
3.685 
(2.324) 
PF       0.490 
(0.302) 
0.688 
(0.307) ** 
CONN       0.044 
(0.396) 
0.041 
(0.045) 
 
Legend: HC is human capital, SD is social development, GDP is gross domestic product, GDPPC 
is GDP per capita, TRA is trade openness, DEM is democracy, PF is press freedom, and CONN 
is social connectivity. 
Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported 
***, **, * indicate significance level at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
Table 6 reports the results of the cross – section random effects which are to some large extent 
similar with the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results namely for the variables of human capital 
(HC) and social development (SD) which confirm their negative sign and highly significant 
coefficient at 1% level.  This tends to reiterate that higher literacy rate and higher standards of 
living have a curtailing effect on corruption also shown under the previous models (OLS and FE).  
However, the other variables generally display coefficients of small magnitude and significance.  
Overall the results presented under Tables 4, 5, 6 show that there is a strong and negative 
relationship between corruption and both human capital and social development with evidence of 
an even stronger correlation for the latter which remains robust and significant under various 
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specifications.  From these results human capital (HC), social development (SD) were found to be 
strong predictors of corruption control even after controlling for both economic and institutional 
variables, but the results provide evidence against the simple linear relationship between 
corruption and socio economic variables as correlations remain inconsistent or weak and 
coefficient insignificant at many times.  This should cause caution against the idea (Kaufmann, et 
al., 2009) that countries with better governance practices or higher literacy rates (Gupta, et al., 
2001; Mo, 2001) are necessarily less corrupt.  All of which confirms that corruption remains indeed 
an intricate area of study, due to its secret nature and the many probable elements that may affect 
its incidence 
6.4.1.1 Granger Test Causality  
The Panel Least Squares (PLS) or other models (FE, RE) results considered so far do not convey 
much about the causation of the variables.  They do not tell us if a higher corruption is causing 
human capital or vice versa and similarly for social development.  To ascertain this issue of reverse 
causality running in both directions a Granger causality test is applied to the relationships firstly 
between corruption and human capital; secondly and between corruption and social development.  
Indeed, neither the panel least square (PLS) the fixed effects (FE) model do not explain the 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variable in both directions, therefore not 
accounting for the endogeneity effect which may cause the dependent variable to affect as well as 
being affected by other independent variables, (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998).  In this case corruption may be caused by human capital and social development as much 
as they might be affected by corruption. As corruption is likely to impact adversely human capital 
and social development (Gupta, 2002) Ordinary Least Square (OLS) may overestimate the 
coefficient for CPI values.  Any possibility to infer a causal relationship from a cross-sectional 
parameter is restricted by the potential of endogeneity bias (Hausman, 1978; Finkel, 1995) and 
unobserved variable bias (Duncan, 1972; Holland, 1986).  
To address causality between corruption and human capital, and between corruption and social 
development the study applies Engle-Granger causality test of panel (Wald test). Engle and 
Granger (1969) which posed causality between variables as: “a given variable Granger causes 
another variable if better predictions of the latter variable are obtained using lagged and current 
information on the former variable”.   
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In other words, Granger causality is verified when the coefficients of the lagged variable are 
statistically significant when a variable is regressed both against its own lagged value and the past 
value of variable.  Precisely in this case if corruption can be better explained on the basis of past 
corruption and human capital (or social development) than on the basis of past corruption alone, 
then a causal relationship exists from human capital (or social development) to corruption.  That 
is corruption is said to Granger-cause human capital if human capital (or social development) can 
be better predicted using the histories of both corruption and human capital (or social 
development) than it can by using the history of human capital (or social development) alone. 
Wald tests on lags of corruption in below equations (1 and 2) and on lags of human capital and 
social development in equation (3 and 4) are used to infer whether corruption causes human capital 
or human capital causes corruption, and similar determination is made for social development.  
The possible Granger causal relations between Corruption (CORR) and Human Capital (HC) can 
be expressed using the parameters of equations (1) and (2) which form a vector autoregressive 
system.  We can test for the absence of Granger causality by estimating the following VAR model:  
 
CORRt = a0 + a1CORRt-1 + ... + apCORRt-p + b1HCt-1 + ... + bpHCt-p + ut      (1) 
HCt = c0 + c1HCt-1 + ... + cpHCt-p + d1CORRt-1 + ... + dpCORRt-p + vt        (2) 
 
Where t = time (t= 2, 3, …T) 
p = no of lags included (p = 1, 2 ….n)  
There is Granger causality from corruption to human capital if: 
b1 ≠ 0 and b2 = 0                                                  
Equally there is causality from human capital to corruption if:  
b1 =  0 and b2  ≠0 
The causality is seen as reciprocal if: 
b1 ≠ 0 and b2  ≠0                                                       
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There is no relation between corruption and human capital (Null hypothesis H0 rejected) if: 
b1 =  0 and b2  = 0   
SC = Human Capital  
CORR = corruption  
 
Testing null hypothesis H0: b1 = b2  ... = bp = 0, against HA: Not H0 is that corruption (CORR) does 
not Granger-cause human capital (HC). 
Similarly, testing H0: d1 = d2  ... = dp = 0, against HA: Not H0, is that human capital (HC) does not 
Granger-cause corruption (CORR). In each case, a rejection of the null implies there is Granger 
causality 
Similar approach is applied to assess Granger causality for social development with the following 
specification:  
CORRt = a0 + a1CORRt-1 + ... + apCORRt-p + b1SDt-1 + ... + bpSDt-p + ut      (3) 
SDt = c0 + c1SDt-1 + ... + cpSDt-p + d1CORRt-1 + ... + dpCORRt-p + vt        (4) 
Where  
SD = Social development  
CORR = corruption 
6.3.2.9 Granger results estimation  
Wald test on lags of corruption, human capital and social development are used in below equations 
(5,6,7,8,9,10)   to infer (with a 5% probability benchmark) whether corruption causes human 
capital or social development and vice versa.  
NB: We assign p the value of 0.05 (R.A. Fisher, 1925) as a benchmark measure of evidence against 
null effect. 
 
Test summary 5. Wald test results 
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Ho (Null hypothesis) = HC lag1 and HC lag2 cannot cause CORR that is C (3) +C (4) = 0  
p value is more than 5% (73.9%) that is we accept null hypothesis (Ho) meaning that HC (-1) and 
HC (-2) jointly cannot cause CORR. We cannot reject Ho meaning that human capital (HC) cannot 
granger cause corruption (CORR) 
  
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  0.602775  2  0.7398
Null Hypothesis: C(3)=C(4)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(3)  11.80900  15.21705
C(4) -11.86692  15.29383
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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Test summary 6. Wald test results 
 
Ho = CORR lag1 and CORR lag2 cannot cause that is C (5) +C (6) = 0  
p value is more than 5% (38.9%) that is we accept null hypothesis (Ho) which means that SD (-1) 
+SD (-2) jointly cannot cause CORR. We cannot reject Ho meaning that social development (SD) 
cannot granger cause corruption (CORR) 
Test summary7. Wald test results 
 
Ho = CORR lag1 and CORR lag2 cannot cause jointly HC that is C (8) +C (9) = 0  
 P value is more than 5% (11, 6%) that is we accept null hypothesis (Ho) which means that CORR 
(-1) +CORR (-2) jointly cannot cause HC. We cannot reject Ho meaning that is corruption (CORR) 
cannot granger cause human capital (HC) 
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  1.884055  2  0.3898
Null Hypothesis: C(5) =C(6)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(5)  90.34497  109.3003
C(6) -103.8928  111.1992
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  4.404364  2  0.1106
Null Hypothesis: C(8)=C(9)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(8)  0.000792  0.000586
C(9) -0.001108  0.000595
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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Test summary 8. Wald test results 
 
Ho = SD lag1 and SD lag2 cannot cause jointly HC that is C (12) +C (13) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (63%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that SD (-1) + SD (-2) 
jointly cannot cause HC. We cannot reject Ho which means that is social development (SD) cannot 
granger cause human capital (HC). 
Test summary 9. Wald test results 
 
Ho = CORR lag1 and CORR lag2 cannot cause jointly SD that is C (15) +C (16) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (78%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that CORR (-1) + CORR 
(-2) jointly cannot cause SD. We cannot reject Ho meaning that is corruption (CORR) cannot 
granger cause social development (SD) 
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  0.922434  2  0.6305
Null Hypothesis: C(12)=C(13)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(12)  0.539239  0.647119
C(13) -0.577880  0.658362
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  0.482009  2  0.7858
Null Hypothesis: C(15)=C(16)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(15) -5.82E-05  8.65E-05
C(16)  6.03E-05  8.77E-05
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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The above results are confirmed using Pairwise Granger causality tests 
Test summary 10. Granger test results 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 01/19/16   Time: 17:06 
Sample: 2005 2013 
Lags: 3  
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob.  
    
     HC does not Granger Cause CORRTI  90  1.12168 0.3451 
 CORRTI does not Granger Cause HC  1.04546 0.3769 
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Test Summary 11: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 01/19/16   Time: 17:10 
Sample: 2005 2013  
Lags: 3   
     
     
 Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob.   
     
      SD does not Granger Cause CORRTI  90  0.26552 0.8501  
 CORRTI does not Granger Cause SD  0.11967 0.9483  
     
 
Based on the probability values reported in the above tables (p > 5%) for all variables the 
hypothesis that human capital (HC) does not Granger cause corruption (CORR/TI) or the opposite 
i.e. corruption (CORR) does not cause human capital (HC) cannot be rejected therefore no 
causality runs from one variable to the other and vice versa.  This suggests from the above 
statistical evidence that associations between corruption and human capital or social development 
while displaying various correlations types are not of (Granger) causal nature in any direction.   
6.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
It is an established practice to confirm the results robustness by undertaking sensitivity tests 
which include investigating the results found with alternative definitions of key variables of 
the regression equation (Siebert and Zubanov, 2009).  In this study we document the 
robustness of the above findings through other sensitivity check using replacement analysis 
with alternative measure of corruption.  To mitigate concerns of omitted variable bias the 
above models are extended to incorporate additional variables (such as GDP growth, GDP 
per capita, Trade openness, Income per Capita, Democracy, Press freedom, Social 
connectivity) to further test the robustness of the models (Verbeek, 2008) and find out if 
their inclusion affects the significance of the two main covariates (Human capital and Social 
Development).  This sensitivity analysis approach allows for added layers of complexity 
with added variables that are likely to influence the outcome variable (Kennedy, 2008) which 
is corruption in this case.  Indeed, corruption is influenced by many variables (Chowdhury, 
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2004; Shen and Williamson, 2005) which may create the temptation of controlling for too 
many factors while the data may not have enough variation to distinguish clearly between 
all the factors (Treisman, 2000).  
6.4.3 Replacement Analysis 
The next step is to test the impact of human capital and social development on corruption 
using World Bank corruption control index (CCI) index as an alternative measure of 
corruption instead of Transparency International’s (TI) corruption perception index (CPI).  
Control of Corruption Index (CCI) is constructed by the World Bank.  It ranges from –2.5 to 
2.5, with positive scores representing low levels of corruption.  Both indexes have been used 
widely by noteworthy empirical studies on corruption (Treismans, 2000; Gupta, et al., 2002).  
Table 9.  OLS estimates for explanatory variables and corruption (CCI) relationships 
Dependent Variable: Corruption Control Index (CCI / WB)  
Variables  PLS (1) PLS (2)  PLS (3)  PLS (4)  PLS (5)  PLS (6) PLS (7)  PLS (8) 
HC 0.209*** 
(0.022) 
 0.047 
(0.038) 
0.118*** 
(0.015) 
0.196*** 
(0.022) 
  0.080** 
(0.031) 
SD  2.569*** 
(0.230) 
2.119*** 
(0.432) 
  2.433*** 
(0.256) 
1.281*** 
(0.191) 
0.180 
(0.387) 
GDP     -0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
 -
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
GDPPC     5.450*** 
(1.240) 
2.770** 
(1.250) 
 -1.960* 
(1.030) 
TRA     0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.002** 
(0.001) 
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DEM    -0.061* 
(0.034) 
  -
0.126*** 
(0.035) 
-0.046 
(0.037) 
PF    -
0.020*** 
(0.003) 
  -
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
CONN    0.003*** 
(0.000) 
  0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
         
Legend: HC is human capital, SD is social development, GDP is gross domestic product, GDPPC 
is GDP per capita, TRA is trade openness, DEM is democracy, PF is press freedom, and CONN 
is social connectivity. 
Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported 
***, **, * indicate significance level at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
The previous section has described the results of testing the various hypotheses and variables 
configuration to explain the levels of corruption (with CPI /TI as a proxy) to explain the 
relationships between corruption, human capital (HC) and social development (SD).  In order 
to check the robustness of the results this section will res-estimate the basic regression for 
the panel analysis.  An alternative measure of corruption (control of corruption index / CCI 
from the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators /WGI),) is used instead of 
the CPI from Transparency International.  The results are discussed in this subsection as per 
above table 7.  
Columns (1) and (2) estimate the results of human capital (HC) and social development (SD).  
Unexpectedly the signs are positive - which is not consistent with the results for the CPI / TI 
corruption and seems to suggest that corruption is not negatively affected.  Some variables 
do not confirm their signs under CCI / corruption except for certain institutional variables. 
Both democracy (DEM) and press freedom (PF) under columns (4, 7, and 8) display 
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significant coefficients which would tend to reaffirm that a widely accepted causal 
hypothesis that is good governance factors are strong predictors of low corruption. Economic 
variables (GDP, GDPPC, and TRA) do not confirm their respective signs when corruption 
/CCI is used instead of instead / CPI.  This partial confirmation of earlier CPI corruption 
tests also points to the difference in their approaches and methodologies between these main 
aggregate measures of corruption which sometimes lead to “different data sets used in 
quantitative research are routinely associated with different findings, and that the relative 
validity of different measures of corruption and hence of the different findings is not readily 
apparent” (Hawken and Munck, 2009: 2). 
6.5 Conclusion 
This analysis has reviewed several dimensions of the relationships between human capital, social 
development and corruption with the aim of adding to the riches of the empirical literature.  The 
focus has been directed towards the determinants of corruption using a number of models and 
methods to find out the associations between those three main variables along with a host of both 
socio- economic and institutional variables.  The empirical evidence gathered through various 
regression models suggest that indeed both human capital (HC) and social development (SD) are 
key determinants of corruption levels in SADC countries.  Both are found to be negatively 
correlated with corruption with high magnitude coefficients.   
The test results reliably support such conclusion which appears robust under several estimation 
models and for various control variables.  One key finding suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in the human capital level dents corruption by 27.61 points while a one standard deviation 
increase in the social development variable level triggers a drop of corruption by 19.724 points on 
the CPI scale of 100.  
The analysis used pointers from the existing literature on the footsteps of seminal studies 
(Triesman, 2000) to identify other relevant determinants to test the robustness of such relationships 
in relation to a range of potential factors using OLS panel data estimation methods.  For instance, 
the results for economic control variables provide some unforeseen observations.  The correlations 
reported between corruption and GDP and trade openness with most coefficients under various 
estimates displaying positive signs tend to challenge the linear relationship conventionally 
116 
 
expected between these variables and corruption. With the exception of GDP per capita (GDPPC) 
which is found to be significantly and negatively correlated with corruption, the proposed 
hypotheses for the other economic variables are not confirmed.  Equally the institutional variables 
do not confirm for SADC countries the mostly recognized negative association of corruption with 
democracy / press freedom (Goldsmith 1999, Brunetti and Weder, 2003).   
The non-linear relationship of democracy and corruption suggests that political freedom does not 
carry much weight on corruption for SADC countries.  It also indicates that in order to fight 
corruption we must perhaps provide for people’s education first before people’s political rights.  
However, one variable which runs counter to the non-linear pattern is social connectivity (CONN) 
which shows consistently the expected negative sign.  This suggests that social interaction is seen 
to be critically relevant to the incidence of corruption and that indeed social connectivity – proxied 
here by lines of communication - provides for added social network density which contributes to 
curbing corruption levels.  The fixed effects estimates which were introduced to account for fixed 
- across time and time-varying characteristics of specific countries, do not generally contradict but 
rather confirms previous results with higher R – squared and coefficients.  
The results remain consistent through sensitivity analysis under various estimation models and 
alternate measure of corruption.  The review also presented evidence to control for endogeneity 
through Granger causality tests.  
It appears that despite significant associations between the considered variables no conclusive 
argument can be made as to the directions and effects of causality between human capital, social 
development and corruption in anyway.  As Mauro (1997) found earlier the directional causation 
of corruption and development remains unresolved.  This reiterates the view that corruption 
remains a multiform phenomenon which complexity is still perplexing as ever and remains 
difficult to unravel.  
Overall the results in totality indicate that corruption levels in concerned SADC countries are 
socially - triggered outcomes crucially determined by human development conditions rather than 
affected by anti – corruption strategies and bureaucratic enforcement schemes.  Hence it is 
concluded that anti – corruption policies not framed within the wider ambit of progressive social 
117 
 
policies of human development will remain ineffective in the long run and have only marginal 
effect on curbing corruption.   
Put simply, policies aimed at curbing corruption in Africa and SADC in particular ought not to 
focus so much on regulatory frameworks, but must begin first and foremost with laying the 
foundation for strong institutions and transformative initiatives geared at enhancing human capital 
formation and uplifting standards of human development.   
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This last chapter provides the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis.  Firstly, the main 
objectives of the research are restated.  Secondly the major findings of are highlighted before the 
policy implications are discussed.  And lastly in light of this present study possible avenues for 
future research are identified. 
Corruption remains a complex and enduring socio - political practice across the world.  Its 
detrimental externality effects on society at large and the distortive influence of rent - seeking 
activities on market efficiencies along with its distributional impact on poverty levels have 
generally and overwhelmingly been recognized.  Yet despite much scrutiny both from academia 
and policy makers the phenomenon has proved tenacious and even possibly on the rise notably in 
sub Saharan Africa as most cross - country indices tend to suggest.  This provides an appropriate 
justification for this study’s focus on the region and particularly on SADC countries which have 
shown historically stable patterns of high levels of corruption (Peters, 2011).  The scale and 
perpetuation of such scourge - along with both the local and international awareness on the issue 
- have fortified this study’s interest in the assessment of the prevalence of corruption in the SADC 
region which remains sadly a malignant disease of contemporary African societies. 
The central aim of the present study was to investigate the relationships between human capital, 
social development and corruption in order to arrive at possible theoretical models of associations 
and causal links.  And more holistically to offer a theoretical framework and practical policy 
prescriptions on the impact of human capital and social development in explaining the incidence 
of corruption.  Then it sought to identify other key determinants and covariates both economic and 
institutional, and their functional dependence to the hypothesised nexus of human capital and 
social development - that may explain the diversity of corruption level outcomes among SADC 
countries.  As a result of this study new rationalities for corruption occurrences are found and new 
perspectives on public policy approaches are formulated  
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The theoretical rationale of this review stems from an extensive body of knowledge on the causes 
and consequences of corruption which despite its scope and intensity has remained largely 
inconclusive.  This thesis attempted to add to such perennial quest by answering these crucial 
research questions: 
1 What is the effect of human capital formation on corruption?  How does the causal direction of 
their relationship operate? 
2 What is the effect of social development on corruption?  How does the causal direction of their 
relationship operate? 
3 What is the simultaneous effect of human capital and social development on corruption? 
In fact, the effects of corruption have largely been scrutinized by socio - economists as its 
pervasiveness was seen to have detrimental effects on a country’s economic advancement by 
shackling growth, distorting market efficiencies and producing inequality through misallocated 
resources (Mauro, 1995; Murphy, et al., 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Kaufmann, 2003).  
Corruption appears indeed in the literature as a multifaceted proposition driven by socio- economic 
determinants which are examined as to their functional dependence to human capital and social 
development.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) conclude that corruption is a factor of disruption in the 
development process.  Jain (2001) inconclusively found, that the causes and consequences of 
corruption are often entangled.  Earlier Mauro (1997) found the directional causation of corruption 
and development remains unresolved.  As a key determinant of socio - economic growth corruption 
is found to increase inequality (Dreher, et al., 2007) through unequal redistribution of income and 
wealth and to disfavour social programs intended for the poor (Ackerman, 2008). 
Human capital formation through education is also affected by corruption; Mauro (1997) 
concludes that education spending is negatively correlated with corruption.  This will generally 
result according to Dreher, et al., (2007) in low levels of school enrolment causing higher 
corruption, while Buehn and Schneider (2012) could not arrive at similar correlation. 
From a governance perspective political and institutional factors have relevant impact on the level 
of corruption according to Dreher, et al., (2007) who argue that deficit in democratic controls are 
likely to increase corruption and conversely stronger transparency and accountability systems are 
likely to deter corruption.  Buehn and Schneider (2012) find similar evidence while Tanzi (1998) 
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seems to emphasize particularly the effect of bureaucratic inefficiency - through convoluted 
regulations - as a major conduit for corruption.  When dealing with causality aspects Treisman 
(2000) uses quantitative analysis to find the causes of corruption.  He arrives at mixed conclusions 
finding no effect of the current degree of democratization on corruption levels while on the 
contrary economic development appeared to have curbing effects on corruption. (2000: 46). He 
also suggests that more advanced countries with long established institutions may have less 
exposure to corruption. 
In fact, political scientists and economists have widely examined corruption primarily in relation 
to economic performance and GDP growth rather than in relation to social development.  
Moreover, much of the interest in corruption and its socio-economic ills have been expressed 
generally in “normative” terms (Gould, 1991: 468) largely advocated on ethical or human right 
grounds if not on political claims.  When corruption is linked to inequality or poverty the analysis 
is generally framed in qualitative if not ideological terms whether political, ethical or both.  Most 
studies for Southern Africa offer narratives framed in descriptive terms (Naidu and Roberts, 2004; 
Kalaba, et al., 2006; Peters, 2011, Jauch, et al., 2011) which for some amount to political scientists’ 
diatribes mainly arguing that corruption is caused by the failure of the institutions or by rent 
seeking, if not by state capture leading to harmful effects on economic performance (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, et al., 2005; Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011). 
Despite abundant literature on corruption and economic growth the link to human capital (Rogers, 
2008) is seldom considered.  The analysis remains confined to the human capital-growth equation 
(Romer, 1990; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro, 1999; Atardi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Pritchett, 
2006; Kwabena, et al., 2010; Schundeln, et al., 2014) or corruption - growth relationships (Tanzi, 
et al., 1997; Mauro, 1995; Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Kaufmann, 2003) and stop short of 
examining the relationship with poverty reduction aspect and social development.  Therefore, 
failing to recognize (Szeftel, 1998) that indeed corruption levels are to be construed as outcomes 
of socioeconomic undercurrents.  In light of the theoretical ambiguities this study put forward a 
contention that even fewer have contemplated that is the crucial question of why for similar 
resource endowments and comparable economic outlooks, a number of SADC countries display 
striking heterogeneities in corruption levels linked to similarly discrepant levels of human capital 
stock and social development?  Does human capital stock and its uneven dispersion have a pivotal 
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role to play in unravelling the links between corruption and social development?  Such conjectures 
then led to the major research question at the core of this review that is meant to uncover the 
associations and causal relationships of corruption with the human capital and social development 
variables.  
7.2 Thesis structure. 
This dissertation is structured in seven chapters.  The introduction in Chapter 1 lays the foundation 
for this thesis by first discussing the rationale and the purpose for pursuing the study.  This is 
followed by the formulation of the conceptual foundation of this work through the review of the 
existing body of knowledge which provided the framework for the research problem and the 
research questions, before the philosophical underpinnings and theoretical assumptions were 
outlined.  The introduction is followed by an extensive literature review in chapters 2 and 3 where 
the economics of human capital and the political economy of corruption are discussed thoroughly.  
The outcome of literature review provides the groundwork for the theoretical framework in chapter 
4 which articulates how and why the key variables namely human capital and social development 
affect the phenomenon of interest to this review that is corruption.  The framework then gives a 
well - supported rationale that informs the research hypotheses and questions.  To address the 
research questions chapter 5 provides the methodology for the empirical validation of the 
theoretical arguments raised earlier.  The theoretical premises, the research design and the data 
analysis procedures in the form of quantitative methods - using various panel data regression 
models - that were deemed most suitable for the formulated research questions are presented.  
Chapter 6 addresses the results from the statistical data analysis and discusses the findings in 
connection with the existing body of knowledge around corruption and highlight their pertinence 
relative to the research questions.  And finally, this Chapter 7 presents the conclusions as detailed 
earlier.  
7.3 Summary of Findings and Contribution 
This dissertation empirically investigated the relationships between corruption human capital and 
social development for a panel of SADC countries over the period 2005 -2013.  The quantitative 
approach is based on a number of panel regression models with the view to find out various 
association types and possible correlations or causes.  The hypotheses considered and tested 
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suggest that both human capital (HC) and social development (SD) are key determinants of 
corruption levels.  The research reports consistently strong R squared (R2) and high magnitude 
coefficients for the two variables under various estimates which indicate that together they account 
for high degree of the variation in the regression estimate of corruption levels.  Both OLS and FE 
models find consistent results in the estimations which support such conclusion which appears 
robust under several estimation models and for various control variables.  Furthermore, corruption 
data from different sources (TI, WB) also corroborates the results. 
Human capital is found to be negatively and significantly correlated with corruption under various 
estimations.  This suggests that countries with higher literacy rates are likely to be less corrupt 
whereas low levels of education prompt low demand for transparency and accountability which 
breeds higher corrupt practices.  This research reports that a one standard deviation increase in the 
human capital level decreases corruption by 27.61 points.  Similarly, social development appears 
to run significantly in opposite direction of corruption under various estimates.  This suggests that 
countries experience less corruption as they build higher standards of living at least in the long 
run.  This finding is consistent with most of the empirical conclusions on the subject matter 
(Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; La Porta, et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000).  
This research reports that a one standard deviation increase in the social development variable 
level decreases corruption 19.724 points. 
The results for economic and institutional control variables provide some intriguing and 
unexpected observations.  The observed correlations between corruption and GDP and trade 
openness with most coefficients under several estimates showing weak significance and positive 
signs tend to challenge the expected linear relationship between these variables and corruption.  
Examination of the non - linear relationship between corruption and trade openness finds that trade 
liberalization has no particular role in decreasing opportunities for corruption while GDP growth 
seems to increase opportunities for rent seeking.  Except for GDP per capita (GDPPC) which is 
found to be significantly and negatively correlated with corruption the proposed hypotheses for 
the other economic variables are not confirmed. 
From the above findings it can be concluded that corruption levels are more responsive to human 
development conditions of living than to macro - economic conditions and aggregates.  This 
association is robust under different estimation methodologies and for various control variables.  
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Similarly, the inclusion of the institutional variables do not confirm for SADC countries the largely 
found negative association of corruption with democracy / press freedom (Goldsmith, 1999; 
Triesman, 2000; Brunetti and Weder 2003). 
Examination of the non-linear relationship of democracy and corruption suggest that political 
rights have no significant impact on corruption for SADC countries, which may be explained by 
the fact that in most countries democracy amounts at best to free and fair elections without the 
active and effective institutions indispensable to combat corruption.  Hence young and developing 
democracies across SADC may not benefit from lower levels of corruption in the short run as 
institutional frameworks in formation remain weak to deter political corruption in particular as 
confirmed by previous findings in the literature (Dahl, 1971; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  In the 
long run however enduring and mature democracies have achieved significant reductions in the 
level of corruption as seen among developed western countries. 
One crucial result and noteworthy exception however is the social connectivity variable (CONN) 
variable which shows consistently under various estimates the expected negative sign and 
significance.  This would suggest that social connectivity through means of communication may 
contribute – to a greater degree than recognized in the literature - to social network density which 
in turn leads to increased transparency and decreased corruption level. 
Using fixed effects - to account for characteristics that are fixed across time and time-varying 
characteristics that are constant among SADC countries – does not lead to opposing conclusions 
but rather confirms previous results with higher R – squared and more significant coefficients 
suggesting a better model fit for the selected variables. 
Clearly in this study, human capital and social development in particular were found to be good 
and consistent predictors of corruption control which remains robust and significant under 
numerous specifications.  Indeed, if higher social development standards are negatively associated 
with corruption this finding has crucial policy implication.  Policies that rest solely on an anti – 
corruption agencies even with vigorous prosecution – may be simply inadequate and will not have 
the desired results.  What would be required first is a sustained socially progressive agenda towards 
better living conditions, only then anti- corruption strategies have a chance to be effective in 
curbing the scourge of public corruption.  
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Meanwhile this research did not allow to derive clear arguments with regards to true causality and 
effects’ directions.  At the end the results remain agnostic with regards to causation between 
corruption and the selected explanatory variables – albeit the analysis did exhibit significant 
relationships - as our conclusions remain careful not to derive active causation from simple 
correlation.  This confirms corruption as a double - edge, endogenous phenomenon which 
complexity remains still hard to disentangle. In the end the results strongly support that corruption 
control level is indeed a socially induced outcome critically impacted by human development 
conditions – including levels of social engagement through social networks - rather than 
engineered out of anti - corruption schemes and enforcement actions which effectiveness is largely 
predicated on the former prerequisite. 
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis isn’t over claiming to revolutionize the current debate on corruption practices but it is 
keen to add new perspectives to the existing body of academic research at various levels.   
Topically, this researcher is not aware of a study that captures the interaction effect of human 
capital and social development on corruption and even less so for the SADC region.  Indeed, there 
is a relative scarcity of tests for the functional relationships of such variables notably for African 
countries.  To the best of this researcher’s knowledge little grand theoretical explanation of this 
phenomenon has been argued, the present study has offered one of the first systematic cross-
country analysis of such a conceptual combination. 
This review offers an empirically grounded contribution and add to the mostly normative and 
descriptive studies about public corruption in SADC countries.  The approach moves from a 
deontological approach mostly focused on the narrative of policy and rights imperatives to a 
positivist perspective for the empirical analysis - using panel data - of the formation mechanisms 
that affect corruption levels across SADC countries 
Theoretically this study offers a political economy - based approach of corruption which breaks 
away from the views of corruption as a political or morally - loaded concept mostly seen as a 
matter of individual rent - seeking or public morality to turn the focus on the macro foundations 
which explain the structural socio - economic dimensions of societies that allow the preponderance 
of corruption.  It is also a departure from the market – based views of corruption which explain 
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corruption through the categories of supply and demand or principal - agent.  It argues a paradigm 
shift which provides a new scheme of intelligibility, an “episteme” of corruption - conditions of 
possibility for knowledge (Foucault, 1966) - which refer to the order of developmental structures 
underlying the production of corruption 
Empirically using panel data analytical framework, the study examines the implication / causation 
forms as they affect human capital, social development and corruption in order to elicit the patterns 
of relationships underlying the three theoretical strands.  The analysis put forth valuable empirical 
findings, which question some of the basic assumptions in the field of corruption research.  The 
nexus corruption - human capital and - social development is examined.  It is argued that both 
human capital (HC) and social development (SD) are consistent predictors and structural 
determinants of corruption levels in SADC countries under several estimation models and for 
various control variables.  Significant non - linearities are investigated for various components of 
economic and institutional indicators.  
Ultimately this dissertation claims to contribute to the broader understanding of the composite 
nature of corruption.  It takes the framework of corruption one step further from an analytically if 
not politically - contested concept to a policy - loaded concept which emphasizes corruption as an 
outcome of macro – development factors rather than borne out of the failures of governance 
controls or limitations of the human nature.  From a government perspective, it encourages the 
exploration of human development - based policies as effective means to dealing with the 
generation of corruption and battling sustainably its prevalence. 
7.5 Policy implications 
What can be derived from this review and done about corruption?  One perennial question often 
debated in deliberations about policy responses and their adequateness in tackling corruption is 
whether to focus chiefly on the pursuit and prosecution of the crimes committed or to engage in 
more preventive actions designed to minimize rent- seeking opportunities and reduce incentives 
to engage in corrupt acts.  
In light of the aforementioned findings the answer is unequivocal.  Corruption is not fundamentally 
rooted in decadent ethics or deficient governance frameworks, with the policy implication that 
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bureaucratic and enforcement actions cannot be seen as panacea in anti- corruption national 
strategies. 
Countries equipped with all the requisite institutions still experience pervasive levels of corruption.  
Other nations interested in combating durably corruption ought to focus more on socio- economic 
policies towards better education and higher living standards and less on sanctions measures and 
oversight agencies all of which may be in vain without the requisite enabling developmental 
context.  And while many noteworthy anti – corruption strategies including by the World Bank 
(2007) acknowledge the need to consider the root causes of poor governance or lackluster 
economic performance, their diagnosis generally fall short of recognizing the underlying human 
capabilities functionality of corruption.  Hence there is no real emphasis on the developmental 
process involved in creating more effective and sustained anti - corruption strategies. 
From another evidence – based policy perspective this crucial conclusion also would compel 
governments, when prioritizing resources allocation to focus more on education spending than anti 
– corruption regulations as higher human capital productivity will in turn yield higher returns in 
curbing corruption in the long run than law enforcement actions or even enhanced democratic 
institutions. 
Efforts to stamp out corruption should be designed first to eliminate or mitigate the root - 
conditions of its incidence.  Lending to much focus on enforcement actions and regulatory 
frameworks would indeed prove to be a misplaced priority. 
7.6 Study Limitations and Further Research 
First this study was constrained by limited data availability concerning SADC affairs.  The 
unavailability of corruption time series data from the SADC organization series data caused this 
research to use mostly World Bank databases and proxies for the measurement of variables which 
might affect the accuracy of our estimations. 
Then the researcher’s attempt at drawing conclusions on data relationships and making inferences 
on causality did not yield positive conclusions.  Despite the causality tests this empirical analysis 
could not arrive at confident inferences on causality and effects directions between corruption and 
the selected variables.  One reason is surely linked to the potential high endogeneity of the 
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variables of interest as often seen in social sciences.  This should however not deter from pursuing 
the causality inquiry around corruption using other variables and or quantitative models as such 
endeavour remains critical to fighting the scourge and to priority setting in policy formulation.  
Also in the sensitivity analysis we did not pay further attention to possible interaction and indirect 
interplay among the corruption determinants. 
Furthermore, there a number of new topical avenues that may be of interest on the heels of this 
research.  By using quantitative method on the SADC countries which in many ways share both 
economical and institutional similarities this review has produced empirical conclusions which 
may benefit from the generalizability to be derived from cross- country quantitative analysis.  
Meanwhile such approach fails to account for countries’ heterogeneities and for the intricacies of 
the corruption phenomenon.   
A more country - specific method using possibly both quantitative and qualitative analysis should 
be considered to account for the complex associations between corruption and the independent 
variables and provide a better context – specific understanding leading to a more country – 
sensitive policy formulation.  Such approach could include a wider range of more societal variables 
such as culture, social norms -including power distance - which have not been considered in this 
review and which may provide explanations to variables’ associations that quantitative analysis 
alone would not deliver.  
Another approach of corruption worth considering is the need to investigate the practical 
modalities of corruption.  Such study would focus on the concrete manifestations of corruption to 
ascertain where, how and why such incidences, moving theoretically beyond macro data from 
particular concrete occurrences of corruption to generalizable theory. 
Finally, as we find that human capital and social development are important in elucidating 
corruption, it would be worthwhile investigating factors explaining the pre-eminence of those 
variables. 
7.7 Conclusion  
Corruption remains universally tenacious to a lesser or greater degree among nations but notably 
in Africa with an unprecedented scope and scale (Medard, 2002).  A considerable amount of 
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research has been directed towards the comprehension of the nefarious effects of the phenomenon.  
Much of this research has paid attention to the microeconomic aspects of private supply and 
demand or individual incentives and opportunities that may encourage or dissuade corrupt acts.  
Much less has applied scrutiny on the causes and possible joint determination of the scourge as 
tested in this study. The objective was to explore the formation conditions of corruption through 
its interaction with human capital and social development.  The conclusions of the empirical 
analysis accord to some degree with existing findings while challenging or subjecting others to 
significant qualifications. 
The direction of causality for the considered variables has remained unresolved suggesting that the 
mutual dependencies between human capital, social development and corruption are still to be 
disentangled.  Meanwhile this study claims to have contributed towards unlocking one among the 
most baffling mystery in academic anti- corruption research.  That is, why does widespread and 
systemic corruption continue to persist in developing countries and particularly in the selected 
countries despite laudable anti-corruption initiatives and brave enforcement efforts and how 
countries in the SADC region with similar economic profiles continue to display glaring 
heterogeneities for their corruption outcome levels? 
This thesis which has sought to ascertain the macro conditions underlying the production of 
corruption, in effect provides additional evidence - which fundamentally refers to the need for the 
human and social order to be transformed for corruption to be curbed - that gets us hopefully closer 
to answering this perplexing question. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Eviews Test Results - Descriptive Statistics 
Correlation Matrix  
 
 
 
Summary Statistics  
 
 
  
CON01 CORR__TI DEM GDP GDPPC HC PF SD TRADE
CON01  1.000000 -0.170627  0.138882  0.027050  0.311655  0.208421  0.129656  0.219100  0.332363
CORR__TI -0.170627  1.000000  0.746540  0.139703 -0.270193 -0.686674  0.739048 -0.720853 -0.277765
DEM  0.138882  0.746540  1.000000 -0.030180 -0.254308 -0.376260  0.897807 -0.442227 -0.054386
GDP  0.027050  0.139703 -0.030180  1.000000  0.018777 -0.211118 -0.042110 -0.048857 -0.069192
GDPPC  0.311655 -0.270193 -0.254308  0.018777  1.000000 -0.000914 -0.425086  0.201771 -0.039869
HC  0.208421 -0.686674 -0.376260 -0.211118 -0.000914  1.000000 -0.321221  0.846651  0.289069
PF  0.129656  0.739048  0.897807 -0.042110 -0.425086 -0.321221  1.000000 -0.497659 -0.001005
SD  0.219100 -0.720853 -0.442227 -0.048857  0.201771  0.846651 -0.497659  1.000000  0.416123
TRADE  0.332363 -0.277765 -0.054386 -0.069192 -0.039869  0.289069 -0.001005  0.416123  1.000000
CONN CORRTI DEM GDP GDPPC HC PF RESID SD TRADE
 Mean  53.87245  93.04444  3.762963  5.210708  3221.416  6.181481  53.68148 -1.91E-14  0.524533  79.39383
 Median  43.41215  91.00000  3.000000  5.382346  1437.884  6.100000  52.00000 -1.732461  0.498000  72.97729
 Maximum  160.6411  171.0000  7.000000  22.59305  16185.90  9.900000  90.00000  51.81947  0.832000  164.5975
 Minimum  2.789820  30.00000  1.000000 -17.66895  213.1567  2.900000  26.00000 -46.71301  0.185000  29.33353
 Std. Dev.  39.74328  40.23306  1.853627  4.509609  3450.910  2.044694  17.75230  17.77637  0.183853  32.55491
 Skewness  0.816823  0.321562  0.413050 -0.465216  1.233142  0.109209  0.204947  0.360066 -0.067128  0.847717
 Kurtosis  2.831695  2.036456  1.947066  9.764406  3.978817  1.965457  2.032337  3.482760  1.756004  2.997193
 Jarque-Bera  15.17134  7.548894  10.07500  262.2537  39.60362  6.288671  6.212165  4.228009  8.806218  16.16908
 Probability  0.000508  0.022950  0.006490  0.000000  0.000000  0.043096  0.044776  0.120753  0.012239  0.000308
 Sum  7272.780  12561.00  508.0000  703.4455  434891.1  834.5000  7247.000 -2.60E-12  70.81200  10718.17
 Sum Sq. Dev.  211656.8  216905.7  460.4148  2725.101  1.60E+09  560.2237  42229.30  42343.91  4.529440  142016.2
 Observations  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135
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APPENDIX B 
Eviews Regression Results 
Panel Least Squares - Fixed Effects - Random Effects 
                                                            
 
 
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:11
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 176.5658 8.072790 21.87172 0.0000
HC -13.51155 1.240346 -10.89337 0.0000
R-squared 0.471521     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.467547     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 29.35782     Akaike info criterion 9.611699
Sum squared resid 114630.2     Schwarz criterion 9.654740
Log likelihood -646.7897     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.629189
F-statistic 118.6654     Durbin-Watson stat 0.126124
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:39
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 116.0356 52.74571 2.199906 0.0299
HC -3.719357 8.531465 -0.435958 0.6637
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.937198     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.924185     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 11.07801     Akaike info criterion 7.807613
Sum squared resid 13622.19     Schwarz criterion 8.324106
Log likelihood -503.0139     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.017501
F-statistic 72.01957     Durbin-Watson stat 0.979319
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:39
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 137.1656 19.90676 6.890401 0.0000
HC -7.137631 2.984031 -2.391943 0.0182
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 28.75546 0.8708
Idiosyncratic random 11.07823 0.1292
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.038980     Mean dependent var 11.85133
Adjusted R-squared 0.031754     S.D. dependent var 11.59445
S.E. of regression 11.40888     Sum squared resid 17311.61
F-statistic 5.394560     Durbin-Watson stat 0.827682
Prob(F-statistic) 0.021718
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.366590     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 137390.3     Durbin-Watson stat 0.104290
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:12
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 85.61434 8.308631 10.30427 0.0000
HC -8.450570 0.859008 -9.837591 0.0000
DEM 5.489156 1.966618 2.791165 0.0060
PF 0.896947 0.199590 4.493948 0.0000
CONN -0.169618 0.041315 -4.105451 0.0001
R-squared 0.804782     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.798775     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 18.04778     Akaike info criterion 8.660256
Sum squared resid 42343.91     Schwarz criterion 8.767859
Log likelihood -579.5673     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.703983
F-statistic 133.9805     Durbin-Watson stat 0.348322
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:42
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 82.23038 55.25231 1.488270 0.1396
HC -2.320874 8.705055 -0.266612 0.7903
DEM 3.365313 2.597025 1.295834 0.1978
PF 0.249150 0.417739 0.596425 0.5521
CONN -0.016293 0.093294 -0.174646 0.8617
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.940061     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.925631     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.97185     Akaike info criterion 7.805400
Sum squared resid 13001.21     Schwarz criterion 8.386455
Log likelihood -499.8645     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.041525
F-statistic 65.14685     Durbin-Watson stat 1.006243
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
156 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:42
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 92.19549 17.17878 5.366825 0.0000
HC -9.298162 1.948935 -4.770894 0.0000
DEM 2.941596 2.284691 1.287525 0.2002
PF 0.841936 0.277289 3.036311 0.0029
CONN 0.038236 0.039587 0.965876 0.3359
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 14.55432 0.6375
Idiosyncratic random 10.97604 0.3625
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.368164     Mean dependent var 22.68387
Adjusted R-squared 0.348723     S.D. dependent var 14.12898
S.E. of regression 11.40233     Sum squared resid 16901.72
F-statistic 18.93740     Durbin-Watson stat 0.809165
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.757437     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 52613.31     Durbin-Watson stat 0.259940
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:14
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 193.1799 9.766835 19.77917 0.0000
HC -12.96112 1.229298 -10.54351 0.0000
GDP -0.009004 0.534897 -0.016834 0.9866
GDPPC -0.003203 0.000684 -4.683557 0.0000
TRA -0.121580 0.075707 -1.605932 0.1107
R-squared 0.553718     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.539986     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 27.28779     Akaike info criterion 9.487090
Sum squared resid 96801.07     Schwarz criterion 9.594692
Log likelihood -635.3786     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.530816
F-statistic 40.32395     Durbin-Watson stat 0.165694
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:44
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 115.6184 56.21663 2.056659 0.0421
HC -2.952510 9.032234 -0.326886 0.7444
TRA -0.031424 0.101595 -0.309303 0.7577
GDP -0.254479 0.272451 -0.934035 0.3524
GDPPC -0.000156 0.001627 -0.095822 0.9238
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.937715     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.922721     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 11.18447     Akaike info criterion 7.843785
Sum squared resid 13509.97     Schwarz criterion 8.424840
Log likelihood -502.4555     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.079910
F-statistic 62.53714     Durbin-Watson stat 0.966258
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:44
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 141.4398 21.08785 6.707172 0.0000
HC -7.595736 3.141318 -2.418009 0.0170
GDP -0.258603 0.250799 -1.031115 0.3044
GDPPC 0.000588 0.001119 0.525594 0.6001
TRA -0.025066 0.089305 -0.280677 0.7794
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 29.00156 0.8710
Idiosyncratic random 11.16091 0.1290
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.048345     Mean dependent var 11.83868
Adjusted R-squared 0.019063     S.D. dependent var 11.59219
S.E. of regression 11.48117     Sum squared resid 17136.24
F-statistic 1.651034     Durbin-Watson stat 0.815729
Prob(F-statistic) 0.165357
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.353452     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 140240.0     Durbin-Watson stat 0.099676
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:16
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 89.09576 9.738725 9.148607 0.0000
HC -7.515865 1.606589 -4.678149 0.0000
SD -13.34589 19.36914 -0.689029 0.4920
DEM 5.974919 2.092916 2.854830 0.0050
PF 0.815736 0.232140 3.513980 0.0006
CONN -0.164557 0.042046 -3.913780 0.0001
R-squared 0.805498     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.797959     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 18.08435     Akaike info criterion 8.671397
Sum squared resid 42188.64     Schwarz criterion 8.800521
Log likelihood -579.3193     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.723870
F-statistic 106.8463     Durbin-Watson stat 0.349791
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:46
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 199.2461 79.18144 2.516323 0.0133
HC -5.774176 8.747029 -0.660130 0.5106
SD -186.0632 91.38785 -2.035973 0.0442
DEM 3.191422 2.561440 1.245948 0.2155
PF 0.264203 0.411852 0.641499 0.5226
CONN 0.016626 0.093375 0.178057 0.8590
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.942296     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.927735     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.81550     Akaike info criterion 7.782206
Sum squared resid 12516.33     Schwarz criterion 8.384782
Log likelihood -497.2989     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.027076
F-statistic 64.71448     Durbin-Watson stat 0.966526
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:46
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 109.5818 19.84314 5.522404 0.0000
HC -4.391453 3.262161 -1.346179 0.1806
SD -73.57661 38.38115 -1.916999 0.0574
DEM 3.683876 2.333606 1.578620 0.1169
PF 0.611228 0.304115 2.009862 0.0465
CONN 0.046921 0.039832 1.177984 0.2410
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 15.38433 0.6645
Idiosyncratic random 10.93040 0.3355
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.363179     Mean dependent var 21.44256
Adjusted R-squared 0.338496     S.D. dependent var 13.78703
S.E. of regression 11.21340     Sum squared resid 16220.49
F-statistic 14.71373     Durbin-Watson stat 0.830069
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.749485     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 54338.20     Durbin-Watson stat 0.247784
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:20
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 186.8166 9.833733 18.99752 0.0000
HC -7.295747 2.431686 -3.000283 0.0032
SD -77.02122 28.74485 -2.679479 0.0083
TRA -0.035810 0.080598 -0.444301 0.6576
GDP 0.410470 0.545563 0.752379 0.4532
GDPPC -0.002350 0.000740 -3.174871 0.0019
R-squared 0.577247     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.560861     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 26.66147     Akaike info criterion 9.447742
Sum squared resid 91697.57     Schwarz criterion 9.576866
Log likelihood -631.7226     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.500214
F-statistic 35.22853     Durbin-Watson stat 0.173168
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:48
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 241.9929 82.71623 2.925579 0.0042
HC -7.478531 9.167919 -0.815728 0.4165
SD -192.4312 93.53805 -2.057250 0.0421
TRA -0.028602 0.100117 -0.285680 0.7757
GDP -0.212994 0.269220 -0.791151 0.4306
GDPPC 0.000496 0.001634 0.303403 0.7622
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.940085     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.924966     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 11.02076     Akaike info criterion 7.819808
Sum squared resid 12995.93     Schwarz criterion 8.422384
Log likelihood -499.8371     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.064678
F-statistic 62.18003     Durbin-Watson stat 0.939100
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:49
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 159.6793 22.14147 7.211773 0.0000
HC 0.424506 4.346139 0.097674 0.9223
SD -138.6185 51.92233 -2.669728 0.0086
TRA 0.019089 0.090790 0.210250 0.8338
GDP -0.231348 0.250937 -0.921938 0.3583
GDPPC 0.000975 0.001128 0.864418 0.3890
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 28.96389 0.8708
Idiosyncratic random 11.15789 0.1292
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.097729     Mean dependent var 11.85067
Adjusted R-squared 0.062757     S.D. dependent var 11.59433
S.E. of regression 11.22462     Sum squared resid 16252.99
F-statistic 2.794499     Durbin-Watson stat 0.823719
Prob(F-statistic) 0.019756
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.466938     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 115624.2     Durbin-Watson stat 0.115788
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 14:16
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 175.7877 7.306932 24.05767 0.0000
SD -157.7465 13.15153 -11.99454 0.0000
R-squared 0.519628     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.516017     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 27.98971     Akaike info criterion 9.516255
Sum squared resid 104195.4     Schwarz criterion 9.559296
Log likelihood -640.3472     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.533746
F-statistic 143.8690     Durbin-Watson stat 0.132144
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:51
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 185.3937 46.60171 3.978259 0.0001
SD -176.0598 88.82614 -1.982072 0.0499
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.939241     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.926651     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.89634     Akaike info criterion 7.774543
Sum squared resid 13179.07     Schwarz criterion 8.291036
Log likelihood -500.7816     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.984431
F-statistic 74.60336     Durbin-Watson stat 0.949894
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:52
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 159.2732 19.10261 8.337771 0.0000
SD -126.2622 33.79203 -3.736450 0.0003
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 27.33589 0.8580
Idiosyncratic random 11.11848 0.1420
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.093885     Mean dependent var 12.50047
Adjusted R-squared 0.087072     S.D. dependent var 11.71265
S.E. of regression 11.19111     Sum squared resid 16657.06
F-statistic 13.78043     Durbin-Watson stat 0.829551
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000301
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.498929     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 108685.2     Durbin-Watson stat 0.127137
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 14:17
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 182.3806 7.670852 23.77580 0.0000
HC -5.306067 2.182273 -2.431441 0.0164
SD -107.7850 24.26988 -4.441102 0.0000
R-squared 0.540221     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.533254     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 27.48675     Akaike info criterion 9.487256
Sum squared resid 99728.79     Schwarz criterion 9.551818
Log likelihood -637.3898     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.513492
F-statistic 77.54709     Durbin-Watson stat 0.139504
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 14:45
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 238.1455 77.82561 3.059989 0.0028
HC -7.256763 8.568335 -0.846928 0.3989
SD -191.1100 90.69738 -2.107117 0.0374
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.939634     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.926463     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.91025     Akaike info criterion 7.782858
Sum squared resid 13093.68     Schwarz criterion 8.320872
Log likelihood -500.3429     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.001492
F-statistic 71.34268     Durbin-Watson stat 0.946848
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:54
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 157.7988 20.63068 7.648744 0.0000
HC 0.614005 4.212744 0.145749 0.8843
SD -130.6873 49.30860 -2.650395 0.0090
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 27.68787 0.8619
Idiosyncratic random 11.08254 0.1381
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.091290     Mean dependent var 12.30516
Adjusted R-squared 0.077522     S.D. dependent var 11.67655
S.E. of regression 11.21482     Sum squared resid 16601.94
F-statistic 6.630463     Durbin-Watson stat 0.831592
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001803
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.492065     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 110173.9     Durbin-Watson stat 0.125311
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 18:12
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 80.62517 11.64268 6.924968 0.0000
SD -4.383837 22.46110 -0.195175 0.8456
HC -7.167237 1.821937 -3.933856 0.0001
DEM 5.194440 2.178026 2.384929 0.0186
PF 0.974851 0.259651 3.754473 0.0003
CONN -0.159734 0.048554 -3.289850 0.0013
GDP 0.755641 0.368634 2.049841 0.0425
GDPPC 0.000247 0.000600 0.411053 0.6817
TRA -0.113131 0.059707 -1.894763 0.0604
R-squared 0.819581     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.808126     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 17.62345     Akaike info criterion 8.640679
Sum squared resid 39133.85     Schwarz criterion 8.834364
Log likelihood -574.2458     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.719387
F-statistic 71.54694     Durbin-Watson stat 0.464457
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 18:27
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 208.6454 83.79362 2.489991 0.0144
HC -6.491345 9.454308 -0.686602 0.4939
SD -191.1697 93.86926 -2.036553 0.0442
DEM 3.177542 2.615325 1.214970 0.2271
CONN 0.022692 0.099308 0.228504 0.8197
PF 0.238203 0.437231 0.544799 0.5871
GDP -0.100910 0.291456 -0.346227 0.7299
GDPPC 0.000547 0.001648 0.331901 0.7406
TRA -0.030260 0.102025 -0.296595 0.7674
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.942472     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.925878     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.95363     Akaike info criterion 7.823594
Sum squared resid 12478.12     Schwarz criterion 8.490731
Log likelihood -497.0926     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.094700
F-statistic 56.79399     Durbin-Watson stat 0.961998
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 18:56
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 106.7769 19.68396 5.424566 0.0000
SD -56.17587 37.16619 -1.511478 0.1332
HC -5.380284 3.059112 -1.758773 0.0810
DEM 3.685800 2.324491 1.585637 0.1153
PF 0.688299 0.307765 2.236443 0.0271
CONN 0.041863 0.045822 0.913592 0.3627
GDP 0.018838 0.254752 0.073948 0.9412
GDPPC -9.76E-05 0.000954 -0.102252 0.9187
TRA -0.048691 0.079079 -0.615721 0.5392
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 13.07596 0.5834
Idiosyncratic random 11.04856 0.4166
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.426632     Mean dependent var 25.22463
Adjusted R-squared 0.390228     S.D. dependent var 14.86074
S.E. of regression 11.60444     Sum squared resid 16967.56
F-statistic 11.71926     Durbin-Watson stat 0.809438
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.766073     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 50740.10     Durbin-Watson stat 0.270677
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 14:16
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 175.7877 7.306932 24.05767 0.0000
SD -157.7465 13.15153 -11.99454 0.0000
R-squared 0.519628     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.516017     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 27.98971     Akaike info criterion 9.516255
Sum squared resid 104195.4     Schwarz criterion 9.559296
Log likelihood -640.3472     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.533746
F-statistic 143.8690     Durbin-Watson stat 0.132144
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:32
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 94.02329 10.43034 9.014404 0.0000
SD -89.85564 11.17978 -8.037336 0.0000
DEM 9.911053 2.064545 4.800599 0.0000
PF 0.330608 0.223752 1.477564 0.1419
CONN -0.165002 0.045297 -3.642641 0.0004
R-squared 0.772500     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.765500     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 19.48293     Akaike info criterion 8.813289
Sum squared resid 49346.02     Schwarz criterion 8.920891
Log likelihood -589.8970     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.857015
F-statistic 110.3572     Durbin-Watson stat 0.317735
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:33
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 158.9631 50.32507 3.158725 0.0021
SD -174.3650 89.41874 -1.949983 0.0538
DEM 3.580562 2.486165 1.440195 0.1527
PF 0.211309 0.402926 0.524435 0.6011
CONN 0.013453 0.093007 0.144643 0.8853
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.942061     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.928113     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.78721     Akaike info criterion 7.771456
Sum squared resid 12567.30     Schwarz criterion 8.352511
Log likelihood -497.5733     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.007580
F-statistic 67.53958     Durbin-Watson stat 0.976890
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 19:04
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 109.4060 21.16552 5.169064 0.0000
SD -115.8675 26.30758 -4.404338 0.0000
DEM 4.165186 2.296280 1.813884 0.0720
PF 0.490510 0.302569 1.621149 0.1074
CONN 0.044737 0.039676 1.127551 0.2616
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 17.29772 0.7162
Idiosyncratic random 10.88828 0.2838
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.315495     Mean dependent var 19.10664
Adjusted R-squared 0.294433     S.D. dependent var 13.17479
S.E. of regression 11.06656     Sum squared resid 15920.94
F-statistic 14.97958     Durbin-Watson stat 0.845060
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.715645     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 61678.23     Durbin-Watson stat 0.218134
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:35
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 171.3092 8.619472 19.87467 0.0000
SD -152.0094 14.62837 -10.39141 0.0000
GDP 0.974029 0.527736 1.845674 0.0672
GDPPC -0.001534 0.000709 -2.162621 0.0324
TRA 0.016806 0.081052 0.207353 0.8361
R-squared 0.547747     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.533831     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 27.46974     Akaike info criterion 9.500381
Sum squared resid 98096.28     Schwarz criterion 9.607984
Log likelihood -636.2757     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.544108
F-statistic 39.36243     Durbin-Watson stat 0.180956
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:36
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 186.7476 47.41628 3.938471 0.0001
SD -174.1210 90.66411 -1.920506 0.0574
GDP -0.241521 0.266525 -0.906184 0.3669
GDPPC 0.000104 0.001560 0.066893 0.9468
TRA -0.018244 0.099155 -0.183999 0.8544
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.939712     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.925199     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 11.00368     Akaike info criterion 7.811193
Sum squared resid 13076.75     Schwarz criterion 8.392248
Log likelihood -500.2555     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.047317
F-statistic 64.74656     Durbin-Watson stat 0.942595
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 19:02
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 161.4086 19.77374 8.162776 0.0000
SD -136.6863 36.15050 -3.781033 0.0002
GDP -0.229639 0.250872 -0.915367 0.3617
GDPPC 0.000936 0.001107 0.845616 0.3993
TRA 0.019066 0.089955 0.211953 0.8325
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 27.57192 0.8591
Idiosyncratic random 11.16464 0.1409
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.105175     Mean dependent var 12.44590
Adjusted R-squared 0.077642     S.D. dependent var 11.70251
S.E. of regression 11.23903     Sum squared resid 16421.06
F-statistic 3.819953     Durbin-Watson stat 0.815798
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005716
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.473824     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 114130.7     Durbin-Watson stat 0.117377
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APPENDIX C 
Eviews Test Results - Hausman Test 
 
 
We run the Hausman test to choose the appropriate estimation method. 
The generally accepted way of choosing between a fixed and a random effect model is running a 
Hausman test. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis if the coefficients of the random effects 
model are the same as the ones of fixed effects model. If they are and therefore have an 
insignificant p-value, then it is safe to use random-effect models. The Hausman test conducted for 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 5.169996 2 0.0754
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
HC 7.448756 0.614005 13.544501 0.0633
SD -70.845269 -130.687282 3100.109569 0.2825
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 19:45
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 84.16080 39.77937 2.115690 0.0365
HC 7.448756 5.593899 1.331586 0.1856
SD -70.84527 74.37370 -0.952558 0.3428
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.933183     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.924123     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 11.08254     Akaike info criterion 7.765880
Sum squared resid 14493.08     Schwarz criterion 8.131730
Log likelihood -507.1969     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.914551
F-statistic 103.0004     Durbin-Watson stat 0.965504
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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the model in this study however shows insignificant p- value (> 5%) and therefore suggests the 
use of random effect. Thus in this context to estimate the coefficients, a panel data analysis with 
random effect models is also conducted.  
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 5.769110 2 0.0559
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
HC 0.088280 0.010222 0.001519 0.0452
SD -1.026937 -1.669009 0.349741 0.2776
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: LNCORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/22/15   Time: 15:32
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.423484 0.425694 10.39122 0.0000
HC 0.088280 0.059862 1.474713 0.1430
SD -1.026937 0.795901 -1.290281 0.1995
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.944003     Mean dependent var 4.430522
Adjusted R-squared 0.936410     S.D. dependent var 0.470311
S.E. of regression 0.118598     Akaike info criterion -1.308884
Sum squared resid 1.659741     Schwarz criterion -0.943035
Log likelihood 105.3497     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.160213
F-statistic 124.3285     Durbin-Watson stat 0.965581
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 21:04
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 238.1455 77.82561 3.059989 0.0028
HC -7.256763 8.568335 -0.846928 0.3989
SD -191.1100 90.69738 -2.107117 0.0374
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.939634     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.926463     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 10.91025     Akaike info criterion 7.782858
Sum squared resid 13093.68     Schwarz criterion 8.320872
Log likelihood -500.3429     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.001492
F-statistic 71.34268     Durbin-Watson stat 0.946848
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 12/18/15   Time: 21:05
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 157.7988 20.63068 7.648744 0.0000
HC 0.614005 4.212744 0.145749 0.8843
SD -130.6873 49.30860 -2.650395 0.0090
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 27.68787 0.8619
Idiosyncratic random 11.08254 0.1381
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.091290     Mean dependent var 12.30516
Adjusted R-squared 0.077522     S.D. dependent var 11.67655
S.E. of regression 11.21482     Sum squared resid 16601.94
F-statistic 6.630463     Durbin-Watson stat 0.831592
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001803
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.492065     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Sum squared resid 110173.9     Durbin-Watson stat 0.125311
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APPENDIX D 
Eviews Test Results Panel Unit Root - Stationarity 
 
 
 
Ho = CORR has unit root 
H1 = CORR does not have unit  
If P value (0%) is less than 5%  Ho is rejected that is corruption (CORR) does not have unit the 
data is stationary 
Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  CORRTI
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 19:24
Sample: 2005 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -10.3759  0.0000  15  114
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -2.70952  0.0034  15  114
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  61.5508  0.0006  15  114
PP - Fisher Chi-square  60.2536  0.0009  15  120
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
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Ho = HC has unit root 
H1 = HC does not have unit  
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Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  HC
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 19:35
Sample: 2005 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.58559  0.0000  13  102
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -0.60493  0.2726  13  102
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  29.5442  0.2869  13  102
PP - Fisher Chi-square  45.9151  0.0093  13  104
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
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If P value ( 0%) is less than 5%  Ho is rejected that is human capital ( HC) does not have unit the 
data is stationary 
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Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  SD
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 19:38
Sample: 2005 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.16149  0.0153  15  118
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  1.11864  0.8684  15  118
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  24.3689  0.7551  15  118
PP - Fisher Chi-square  38.4225  0.1392  15  120
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
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Ho = SD has unit root 
H1 = SD does not have unit  
If P value ( 0%) is less than 5%  Ho is rejected that is social development (SD) does not have unit 
the data is stationary 
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APPENDIX E 
Eviews Test Results - Autocorrelation 
 
Dependent Variable: CORRTI                      
Method: Panel Least Squares                      
Date: 02/04/16   Time: 13:55                      
Sample (adjusted): 2006 2013                      
Periods included: 8                       
Cross-sections included: 15                      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120                     
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C 17.29317 8.154944 2.120575 0.0362                     
CORRTI (-1) 0.826170 0.053788 15.35988 0.0000                     
SD -6.041813 12.83878 -0.470591 0.6389                     
HC -0.815660 1.121362 -0.727384 0.4685                     
DEM 1.187344 1.281398 0.926600 0.3562                     
PF 0.186473 0.160040 1.165162 0.2465                     
CONN -0.077539 0.030273 -2.561352 0.0118                     
TRA -0.025651 0.036048 -0.711560 0.4782                     
GDP -0.200504 0.227272 -0.882219 0.3796                     
GDPPC 0.000306 0.000351 0.873346 0.3844                     
                         
                         R-squared 0.945644     Mean dependent var 93.90000                     
Adjusted R-squared 0.941197     S.D. dependent var 40.83095                     
S.E. of regression 9.901253     Akaike info criterion 7.502855                     
Sum squared resid 10783.83     Schwarz criterion 7.735146                     
Log likelihood -440.1713     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.597189                     
F-statistic 212.6331     Durbin-Watson stat 2.072365                     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000                        
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Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test 
Null hypothesis: No cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals 
Equation: Untitled                      
Periods included: 8                      
Cross-sections included: 15                     
Total panel observations: 120                     
Note: non-zero cross-section means detected in data 
Cross-section means were removed during computation of correlations 
                        
                        Test Statistic   d.f.   Prob.                       
                        
                        Breusch-Pagan LM 124.7907 105 0.0912                     
Pesaran scaled LM 1.365691  0.1720                     
Pesaran CD 0.311271  0.7556                     
                        
                                                
                        
P greater than 5 in all 3 cases. 
Meaning we cannot reject Ho 
meaning model is free from 
correlation                         
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI                      
Method: Panel Least Squares                      
Date: 02/04/16   Time: 17:22                      
Sample (adjusted): 2006 2013                      
Periods included: 8                       
Cross-sections included: 15                      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120                     
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         LAG1CORRTI 0.885162 0.046755 18.93211 0.0000                     
SD -0.767510 12.79242 -0.059997 0.9523                     
HC -0.096019 1.085482 -0.088458 0.9297                     
DEM 0.330151 1.234974 0.267334 0.7897                     
PF 0.290676 0.154690 1.879088 0.0629                     
CONN -0.086657 0.030434 -2.847381 0.0053                     
TRA -0.011665 0.035994 -0.324093 0.7465                     
GDP -0.141761 0.229103 -0.618762 0.5373                     
GDPPC 0.000632 0.000320 1.974433 0.0508                     
                         
                         R-squared 0.943422     Mean dependent var 93.90000                     
Adjusted R-squared 0.939344     S.D. dependent var 40.83095                     
S.E. of regression 10.05600     Akaike info criterion 7.526255                     
Sum squared resid 11224.68     Schwarz criterion 7.735317                     
Log likelihood -442.5753     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.611156                     
Durbin-Watson stat 2.096345                        
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APPENDICE F 
Eviews Test Results - Granger Causality in VAR environment 
 
Null hypothesis is:  HC (lag1 & lag2) cannot cause CORR 
Alternative hypothesis: HC (lag1 & lag2) can cause CORR 
Dependent Variable: CORR 
- P value is more than 5% (73.98%) so we cannot reject Ho that is HC cannot cause CORR 
- P value is more than 5% (38.98%) so we cannot reject Ho that is SD cannot cause CORR 
Dependent Variable HC 
- P value is more than 5% (11%) so we cannot reject Ho that is CORR cannot cause HC 
- P value is more than 5% (63%) so we cannot reject Ho that is SD cannot cause HC 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 16:04
Sample: 2005 2013
Included observations: 105
Dependent variable: CORRTI
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
HC  0.602775 2  0.7398
SD  1.884055 2  0.3898
All  3.963878 4  0.4109
Dependent variable: HC
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
CORRTI  4.404364 2  0.1106
SD  0.922434 2  0.6305
All  4.607438 4  0.3300
Dependent variable: SD
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
CORRTI  0.482009 2  0.7858
HC  0.573679 2  0.7506
All  1.055236 4  0.9013
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Dependent Variable SD 
- P value is more than 5% (78%) so we cannot reject Ho that is CORR cannot cause SD 
- P value is more than 5% (75%) so we cannot reject Ho that is HC cannot cause SD 
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WALD TEST 
 
CORRTI = C(1)*CORRTI(-1) + C(2)*CORRTI(-2) + C(3)*HC(-1) + C(4)*HC(-2) + C(5)*SD(-
1) + C(6)*SD(-2) + C(7) 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates
 Date: 12/19/15   Time: 16:24
 Sample (adjusted): 2007 2013
 Included observations: 105 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
CORRTI HC SD
CORRTI(-1)  0.962487  0.000792 -5.82E-05
 (0.09906)  (0.00059)  (8.7E-05)
[ 9.71651] [ 1.35076] [-0.67281]
CORRTI(-2) -0.021345 -0.001108  6.03E-05
 (0.10044)  (0.00059)  (8.8E-05)
[-0.21251] [-1.86265] [ 0.68713]
HC(-1)  11.80900  1.419543 -0.008067
 (15.2171)  (0.09009)  (0.01329)
[ 0.77604] [ 15.7563] [-0.60683]
HC(-2) -11.86692 -0.418912  0.007702
 (15.2938)  (0.09055)  (0.01336)
[-0.77593] [-4.62641] [ 0.57646]
SD(-1)  90.34497  0.539239  1.036140
 (109.300)  (0.64712)  (0.09548)
[ 0.82658] [ 0.83329] [ 10.8517]
SD(-2) -103.8928 -0.577880 -0.032445
 (111.199)  (0.65836)  (0.09714)
[-0.93429] [-0.87775] [-0.33400]
C  12.10361  0.068818  0.004123
 (7.94234)  (0.04702)  (0.00694)
[ 1.52393] [ 1.46350] [ 0.59420]
 R-squared  0.940625  0.999151  0.997711
 Adj. R-squared  0.936990  0.999099  0.997571
 Sum sq. resids  10638.03  0.372896  0.008118
 S.E. equation  10.41880  0.061685  0.009102
 F-statistic  258.7554  19228.29  7120.082
 Log likelihood -391.4456  147.1333  348.0610
 Akaike AIC  7.589440 -2.669207 -6.496399
 Schwarz SC  7.766371 -2.492276 -6.319469
 Mean dependent  94.28571  6.246667  0.528371
 S.D. dependent  41.50619  2.055390  0.184678
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.18E-05
 Determinant resid covariance  2.58E-05
 Log likelihood  107.6377
 Akaike information criterion -1.650243
 Schwarz criterion -1.119451
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HC = C(8)*CORRTI(-1) + C(9)*CORRTI(-2) + C(10)*HC(-1) + C(11)*HC(-2) + C(12)*SD(-1) 
+ C(13)*SD(-2) + C(14) 
 
SD = C(15)*CORRTI(-1) + C(16)*CORRTI(-2) + C(17)*HC(-1) + C(18)*HC(-2) + C(19)*SD(-
1) + C(20)*SD(-2) + C(21) 
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System: UNTITLED
Estimation Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/19/15   Time: 16:25
Sample: 2007 2013
Included observations: 105
Total system (balanced) observations 315
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.962487 0.099057 9.716508 0.0000
C(2) -0.021345 0.100443 -0.212508 0.8319
C(3) 11.80900 15.21705 0.776037 0.4384
C(4) -11.86692 15.29383 -0.775929 0.4384
C(5) 90.34497 109.3003 0.826576 0.4091
C(6) -103.8928 111.1992 -0.934294 0.3509
C(7) 12.10361 7.942343 1.523935 0.1286
C(8) 0.000792 0.000586 1.350758 0.1778
C(9) -0.001108 0.000595 -1.862652 0.0635
C(10) 1.419543 0.090094 15.75632 0.0000
C(11) -0.418912 0.090548 -4.626406 0.0000
C(12) 0.539239 0.647119 0.833291 0.4054
C(13) -0.577880 0.658362 -0.877755 0.3808
C(14) 0.068818 0.047023 1.463501 0.1444
C(15) -5.82E-05 8.65E-05 -0.672810 0.5016
C(16) 6.03E-05 8.77E-05 0.687135 0.4925
C(17) -0.008067 0.013293 -0.606829 0.5444
C(18) 0.007702 0.013360 0.576461 0.5647
C(19) 1.036140 0.095482 10.85172 0.0000
C(20) -0.032445 0.097140 -0.334005 0.7386
C(21) 0.004123 0.006938 0.594201 0.5528
Determinant residual covariance 2.58E-05
Equation: CORRTI = C(1)*CORRTI(-1) + C(2)*CORRTI(-2) + C(3)*HC(
        -1) + C(4)*HC(-2) + C(5)*SD(-1) + C(6)*SD(-2) + C(7)
Observations: 105
R-squared 0.940625     Mean dependent var 94.28571
Adjusted R-squared 0.936990     S.D. dependent var 41.50619
S.E. of regression 10.41880     Sum squared resid 10638.03
Durbin-Watson stat 1.940877
Equation: HC = C(8)*CORRTI(-1) + C(9)*CORRTI(-2) + C(10)*HC(-1) +
        C(11)*HC(-2) + C(12)*SD(-1) + C(13)*SD(-2) + C(14)
Observations: 105
R-squared 0.999151     Mean dependent var 6.246666
Adjusted R-squared 0.999099     S.D. dependent var 2.055390
S.E. of regression 0.061685     Sum squared resid 0.372896
Durbin-Watson stat 2.288597
Equation: SD = C(15)*CORRTI(-1) + C(16)*CORRTI(-2) + C(17)*HC(-1)
        + C(18)*HC(-2) + C(19)*SD(-1) + C(20)*SD(-2) + C(21)
Observations: 105
R-squared 0.997711     Mean dependent var 0.528371
Adjusted R-squared 0.997571     S.D. dependent var 0.184678
S.E. of regression 0.009102     Sum squared resid 0.008118
Durbin-Watson stat 2.362202
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WALD TEST 
 
Ho  = HC lag1 and HC lag2 cannot cause CORR that is C(3) +C(4) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (73.9%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that HC (-1) and HC 
(-2) jointly cannot cause CORR. We cannot reject Ho meaning that HC cannot granger cause 
CORR 
 
 
Ho  = CORR lag1 and CORR lag2 cannot cause  that is C(5) +C(6) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (38.9%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that SD (-1) +SD (-2) 
jointly cannot cause CORR. We cannot reject Ho meaning that SD cannot granger cause CORR 
 
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  0.602775  2  0.7398
Null Hypothesis: C(3)=C(4)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(3)  11.80900  15.21705
C(4) -11.86692  15.29383
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  1.884055  2  0.3898
Null Hypothesis: C(5) =C(6)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(5)  90.34497  109.3003
C(6) -103.8928  111.1992
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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Ho  = CORR lag1 and CORR lag2 cannot cause jointly HC that is C(8) +C(9) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (11,6%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that CORR (-1) 
+CORR (-2) jointly cannot cause HC. We cannot reject Ho meaning that is CORR cannot granger 
cause HC 
 
 
Ho  = SD lag1 and SD lag2 cannot cause jointly HC that is C(12) +C(13) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (63%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that SD (-1) + SD(-2) 
jointly cannot cause HC. We cannot reject Ho meaning that is SD cannot granger cause HC 
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  4.404364  2  0.1106
Null Hypothesis: C(8)=C(9)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(8)  0.000792  0.000586
C(9) -0.001108  0.000595
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  0.922434  2  0.6305
Null Hypothesis: C(12)=C(13)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(12)  0.539239  0.647119
C(13) -0.577880  0.658362
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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Ho  = CORR lag1 and CORR lag2 cannot cause jointly SD that is C(15) +C(16) = 0  
P value is more than 5% (78%) that is we accept null hypothesis meaning that CORR (-1) + 
CORR(-2) jointly cannot cause SD. We cannot reject Ho meaning that is CORR cannot granger 
cause S 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 01/19/16   Time: 17:06 
Sample: 2005 2013                     
Lags: 3                      
                        
                        
 Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob.                      
                        
                         HC does not Granger Cause CORRTI  90  1.12168 0.3451                     
 CORRTI does not Granger Cause HC  1.04546 0.3769                     
                        
                                                
                        
                        
                        
 
  
Wald Test:
System: {%system}
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square  0.482009  2  0.7858
Null Hypothesis: C(15)=C(16)=0
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(15) -5.82E-05  8.65E-05
C(16)  6.03E-05  8.77E-05
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 01/19/16   Time: 17:10 
Sample: 2005 2013                     
Lags: 3                      
                        
                         Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.                      
                        
                         SD does not Granger Cause CORRTI  90  0.26552 0.8501                     
 CORRTI does not Granger Cause SD  0.11967 0.9483                     
                        
                                                
Based on the probability values reported in the 
above tables (way over 5%) the hypothesis 
that human capital (HC) does not Granger 
cause corruption (CORR/TI) or its opposite 
i.e. corruption (CORR/TI) does not cause 
human capital (HC) cannot be rejected 
therefore no causality runs from one variable 
to the other and vice versa.                          
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APPENDICE G 
                                                     Eviews Test Results - Residuals  
 
  
Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 16:07
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 18.71042 10.48942 1.783741 0.0768
DEM 7.259284 2.437332 2.978373 0.0035
PF 1.205464 0.276545 4.359018 0.0000
CONN -0.280788 0.056630 -4.958304 0.0000
TRA -0.186094 0.062870 -2.959977 0.0037
GDP 1.490427 0.417165 3.572752 0.0005
GDPPC 0.001379 0.000706 1.954016 0.0529
R-squared 0.723314     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.710344     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 21.65330     Akaike info criterion 9.038652
Sum squared resid 60014.78     Schwarz criterion 9.189296
Log likelihood -603.1090     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.099870
F-statistic 55.76971     Durbin-Watson stat 0.436212
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Residuals 
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Low R2 
 
Low R2 
 
Dependent Variable: ERRCORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 16:14
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 30.80482 5.119576 6.017064 0.0000
HC -4.983403 0.786599 -6.335380 0.0000
R-squared 0.231822     Mean dependent var -2.59E-14
Adjusted R-squared 0.226047     S.D. dependent var 21.16297
S.E. of regression 18.61805     Akaike info criterion 8.700844
Sum squared resid 46102.01     Schwarz criterion 8.743885
Log likelihood -585.3070     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.718334
F-statistic 40.13704     Durbin-Watson stat 0.569806
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: ERRCORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 16:17
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 23.01632 5.126759 4.489449 0.0000
SD -43.87961 9.227498 -4.755310 0.0000
R-squared 0.145315     Mean dependent var -2.59E-14
Adjusted R-squared 0.138889     S.D. dependent var 21.16297
S.E. of regression 19.63840     Akaike info criterion 8.807555
Sum squared resid 51293.70     Schwarz criterion 8.850596
Log likelihood -592.5100     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.825046
F-statistic 22.61297     Durbin-Watson stat 0.503797
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000005
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Dependent Variable: CORRTI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 16:24
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 80.62517 11.64268 6.924968 0.0000
SD -4.383837 22.46110 -0.195175 0.8456
HC -7.167237 1.821937 -3.933856 0.0001
DEM 5.194440 2.178026 2.384929 0.0186
PF 0.974851 0.259651 3.754473 0.0003
CONN -0.159734 0.048554 -3.289850 0.0013
TRA -0.113131 0.059707 -1.894763 0.0604
GDP 0.755641 0.368634 2.049841 0.0425
GDPPC 0.000247 0.000600 0.411053 0.6817
R-squared 0.819581     Mean dependent var 93.04444
Adjusted R-squared 0.808126     S.D. dependent var 40.23306
S.E. of regression 17.62345     Akaike info criterion 8.640679
Sum squared resid 39133.85     Schwarz criterion 8.834364
Log likelihood -574.2458     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.719387
F-statistic 71.54694     Durbin-Watson stat 0.464457
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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RESIDUALS CORRTI (ALL) 
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CORRCCI 
 
 
Low R2  
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 17:08
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.132166 0.165028 6.860469 0.0000
DEM -0.067304 0.038346 -1.755180 0.0816
PF -0.027443 0.004351 -6.307599 0.0000
CONN 0.005325 0.000891 5.976486 0.0000
TRA 0.003155 0.000989 3.189341 0.0018
GDP -0.025137 0.006563 -3.830093 0.0002
GDPPC -3.31E-05 1.11E-05 -2.981316 0.0034
R-squared 0.760367     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.749134     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.340666     Akaike info criterion 0.734631
Sum squared resid 14.85483     Schwarz criterion 0.885275
Log likelihood -42.58760     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.795849
F-statistic 67.69151     Durbin-Watson stat 0.272578
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: ERRCORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 17:11
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.382081 0.085020 -4.493989 0.0000
HC 0.061811 0.013063 4.731731 0.0000
R-squared 0.144085     Mean dependent var 1.44E-16
Adjusted R-squared 0.137650     S.D. dependent var 0.332952
S.E. of regression 0.309188     Akaike info criterion 0.504973
Sum squared resid 12.71447     Schwarz criterion 0.548014
Log likelihood -32.08566     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.522463
F-statistic 22.38928     Durbin-Watson stat 0.320013
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000006
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Low R2  
 
Dependent Variable: ERRCORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 17:13
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.294440 0.082949 -3.549661 0.0005
SD 0.561337 0.149297 3.759868 0.0003
R-squared 0.096078     Mean dependent var 1.44E-16
Adjusted R-squared 0.089282     S.D. dependent var 0.332952
S.E. of regression 0.317741     Akaike info criterion 0.559545
Sum squared resid 13.42761     Schwarz criterion 0.602586
Log likelihood -35.76926     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.577035
F-statistic 14.13661     Durbin-Watson stat 0.298853
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000254
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/21/15   Time: 17:17
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.349917 0.200660 1.743831 0.0836
HC 0.080069 0.031401 2.549917 0.0120
SD 0.180083 0.387114 0.465195 0.6426
DEM -0.046490 0.037538 -1.238471 0.2178
PF -0.023872 0.004475 -5.334489 0.0000
CONN 0.003843 0.000837 4.592472 0.0000
TRA 0.002084 0.001029 2.024866 0.0450
GDP -0.016639 0.006353 -2.618993 0.0099
GDPPC -1.96E-05 1.03E-05 -1.897914 0.0600
R-squared 0.812480     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.800574     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.303738     Akaike info criterion 0.519036
Sum squared resid 11.62433     Schwarz criterion 0.712721
Log likelihood -26.03495     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.597744
F-statistic 68.24098     Durbin-Watson stat 0.231317
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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APPENDIX H 
Eviews Test Results - Robustness Check 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:56
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.587432 0.145980 -10.87427 0.0000
HC 0.209150 0.022429 9.324871 0.0000
R-squared 0.395326     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.390780     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.530878     Akaike info criterion 1.586136
Sum squared resid 37.48362     Schwarz criterion 1.629177
Log likelihood -105.0642     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.603627
F-statistic 86.95322     Durbin-Watson stat 0.043690
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 16:57
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.581211 0.636575 0.913028 0.3632
HC -0.141679 0.102964 -1.376007 0.1716
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.967993     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.961360     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.133698     Akaike info criterion -1.026659
Sum squared resid 1.984136     Schwarz criterion -0.510165
Log likelihood 93.29945     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.816770
F-statistic 145.9539     Durbin-Watson stat 0.717881
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:00
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.701776 0.136807 -12.43920 0.0000
HC 0.047794 0.038920 1.228009 0.2216
SD 2.119519 0.432846 4.896701 0.0000
R-squared 0.488280     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.480526     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.490218     Akaike info criterion 1.434040
Sum squared resid 31.72145     Schwarz criterion 1.498601
Log likelihood -93.79768     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.460276
F-statistic 62.97667     Durbin-Watson stat 0.050760
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:01
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.433339 0.949177 -0.456542 0.6489
HC -0.112289 0.104501 -1.074522 0.2849
SD 1.587837 1.106164 1.435444 0.1540
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.968581     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.961726     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.133064     Akaike info criterion -1.030402
Sum squared resid 1.947653     Schwarz criterion -0.492388
Log likelihood 94.55215     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.811768
F-statistic 141.2947     Durbin-Watson stat 0.723609
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:03
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.097648 0.147277 0.663024 0.5085
HC 0.118010 0.015227 7.750232 0.0000
DEM -0.061890 0.034860 -1.775395 0.0782
PF -0.020052 0.003538 -5.667708 0.0000
CONN 0.003482 0.000732 4.754880 0.0000
R-squared 0.785373     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.778769     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.319912     Akaike info criterion 0.594791
Sum squared resid 13.30466     Schwarz criterion 0.702394
Log likelihood -35.14838     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.638518
F-statistic 118.9257     Durbin-Watson stat 0.140067
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:03
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.258474 0.612392 2.055012 0.0423
HC -0.156226 0.096483 -1.619205 0.1083
DEM -0.063261 0.028784 -2.197766 0.0301
PF -0.008114 0.004630 -1.752504 0.0825
CONN 0.001602 0.001034 1.548942 0.1243
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.974235     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.968033     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.121607     Akaike info criterion -1.199184
Sum squared resid 1.597138     Schwarz criterion -0.618129
Log likelihood 107.9449     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.963060
F-statistic 157.0695     Durbin-Watson stat 0.849615
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:05
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.884543 0.177723 -10.60381 0.0000
HC 0.196878 0.022369 8.801372 0.0000
GDP -0.001192 0.009733 -0.122499 0.9027
TRA 0.002564 0.001378 1.861148 0.0650
GDPPC 5.45E-05 1.24E-05 4.381339 0.0000
R-squared 0.482941     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.467031     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.496545     Akaike info criterion 1.474048
Sum squared resid 32.05238     Schwarz criterion 1.581651
Log likelihood -94.49823     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.517775
F-statistic 30.35549     Durbin-Watson stat 0.059299
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:06
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.906228 0.670237 1.352102 0.1792
HC -0.195737 0.107686 -1.817669 0.0719
GDP 0.004407 0.003248 1.356754 0.1777
TRA -0.001005 0.001211 -0.829340 0.4087
GDPPC 2.05E-05 1.94E-05 1.055122 0.2937
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.969021     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.961564     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.133346     Akaike info criterion -1.014889
Sum squared resid 1.920352     Schwarz criterion -0.433834
Log likelihood 95.50501     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.778765
F-statistic 129.9341     Durbin-Watson stat 0.748320
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:08
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.024502 0.172498 0.142041 0.8873
HC 0.098371 0.028457 3.456851 0.0007
SD 0.280404 0.343078 0.817319 0.4153
DEM -0.072096 0.037071 -1.944816 0.0540
PF -0.018345 0.004112 -4.461657 0.0000
CONN 0.003376 0.000745 4.533005 0.0000
R-squared 0.786479     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.778203     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.320321     Akaike info criterion 0.604441
Sum squared resid 13.23612     Schwarz criterion 0.733564
Log likelihood -34.79974     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.656913
F-statistic 95.03122     Durbin-Watson stat 0.138373
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:09
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.542929 0.889359 0.610473 0.5428
HC -0.135109 0.098246 -1.375213 0.1719
SD 1.137766 1.026460 1.108437 0.2702
DEM -0.062198 0.028770 -2.161908 0.0329
PF -0.008206 0.004626 -1.773974 0.0789
CONN 0.001400 0.001049 1.335219 0.1846
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.974528     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.968100     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.121479     Akaike info criterion -1.195787
Sum squared resid 1.579007     Schwarz criterion -0.593211
Log likelihood 108.7156     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.950917
F-statistic 151.6179     Durbin-Watson stat 0.849474
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:11
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.745807 0.176758 -9.876810 0.0000
HC 0.073360 0.043709 1.678392 0.0957
SD 1.679235 0.516680 3.250051 0.0015
TRA 0.000694 0.001449 0.479005 0.6327
GDP -0.010338 0.009806 -1.054198 0.2938
GDPPC 3.59E-05 1.33E-05 2.700180 0.0079
R-squared 0.522075     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.503550     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.479231     Akaike info criterion 1.410160
Sum squared resid 29.62649     Schwarz criterion 1.539283
Log likelihood -89.18581     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.462632
F-statistic 28.18333     Durbin-Watson stat 0.062209
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:11
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.004775 0.998619 0.004782 0.9962
HC -0.163452 0.110683 -1.476764 0.1427
SD 1.372648 1.129269 1.215519 0.2268
TRA -0.001025 0.001209 -0.847748 0.3985
GDP 0.004111 0.003250 1.264883 0.2087
GDPPC 1.58E-05 1.97E-05 0.801761 0.4245
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.969443     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.961733     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.133052     Akaike info criterion -1.013788
Sum squared resid 1.894197     Schwarz criterion -0.411213
Log likelihood 96.43070     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.768918
F-statistic 125.7296     Durbin-Watson stat 0.759649
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:15
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.349917 0.200660 1.743831 0.0836
HC 0.080069 0.031401 2.549917 0.0120
SD 0.180083 0.387114 0.465195 0.6426
TRA 0.002084 0.001029 2.024866 0.0450
GDP -0.016639 0.006353 -2.618993 0.0099
GDPPC -1.96E-05 1.03E-05 -1.897914 0.0600
DEM -0.046490 0.037538 -1.238471 0.2178
PF -0.023872 0.004475 -5.334489 0.0000
CONN 0.003843 0.000837 4.592472 0.0000
R-squared 0.812480     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.800574     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.303738     Akaike info criterion 0.519036
Sum squared resid 11.62433     Schwarz criterion 0.712721
Log likelihood -26.03495     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.597744
F-statistic 68.24098     Durbin-Watson stat 0.231317
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 17:16
Sample: 2005 2013
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.807404 0.935687 0.862899 0.3902
HC -0.162561 0.105572 -1.539812 0.1266
SD 1.056889 1.048197 1.008292 0.3157
TRA -0.001350 0.001139 -1.184529 0.2389
GDP -0.000696 0.003255 -0.213990 0.8310
GDPPC 8.10E-06 1.84E-05 0.440239 0.6607
DEM -0.065692 0.029204 -2.249390 0.0266
PF -0.007571 0.004882 -1.550780 0.1240
CONN 0.001612 0.001109 1.453530 0.1491
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.974900     Mean dependent var -0.294577
Adjusted R-squared 0.967660     S.D. dependent var 0.680155
S.E. of regression 0.122314     Akaike info criterion -1.166069
Sum squared resid 1.555924     Schwarz criterion -0.498932
Log likelihood 109.7096     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.894963
F-statistic 134.6493     Durbin-Watson stat 0.834150
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI                      
Method: Panel Least Squares                      
Date: 01/18/16   Time: 15:06                      
Sample: 2005 2013                       
Periods included: 9                       
Cross-sections included: 15                      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135                     
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C -1.589877 0.151421 -10.49973 0.0000                     
SD 2.433259 0.256981 9.468641 0.0000                     
GDP -0.016005 0.009271 -1.726319 0.0867                     
GDPPC 2.77E-05 1.25E-05 2.224633 0.0278                     
TRA 0.000165 0.001424 0.115797 0.9080                     
                         
                         R-squared 0.511638     Mean dependent var -0.294577                     
Adjusted R-squared 0.496612     S.D. dependent var 0.680155                     
S.E. of regression 0.482569     Akaike info criterion 1.416948                     
Sum squared resid 30.27345     Schwarz criterion 1.524550                     
Log likelihood -90.64396     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.460674                     
F-statistic 34.04901     Durbin-Watson stat 0.069118                     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000                        
                         
                                                  
 
 
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI                      
Method: Panel Least Squares                      
Date: 01/18/16   Time: 16:38                      
Sample: 2005 2013                       
Periods included: 9                       
Cross-sections included: 15                      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135                     
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C -0.039992 0.178562 -0.223967 0.8231                     
SD 1.281800 0.191392 6.697235 0.0000                     
DEM -0.123614 0.035344 -3.497458 0.0006                     
PF -0.011996 0.003831 -3.131653 0.0021                     
CONN 0.003382 0.000775 4.360876 0.0000                     
                         
                         R-squared 0.766700     Mean dependent var -0.294577                     
Adjusted R-squared 0.759521     S.D. dependent var 0.680155                     
S.E. of regression 0.333539     Akaike info criterion 0.678217                     
Sum squared resid 14.46224     Schwarz criterion 0.785820                     
Log likelihood -40.77967     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.721944                     
F-statistic 106.8054     Durbin-Watson stat 0.127957                     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000                        
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Dependent Variable: CORRCCI                      
Method: Panel Least Squares                      
Date: 01/18/16   Time: 17:25                      
Sample: 2005 2013                       
Periods included: 9                       
Cross-sections included: 15                      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135                     
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C -1.642391 0.128219 -12.80921 0.0000                     
SD 2.569547 0.230778 11.13426 0.0000                     
                         
                         R-squared 0.482433     Mean dependent var -0.294577                     
Adjusted R-squared 0.478542     S.D. dependent var 0.680155                     
S.E. of regression 0.491154     Akaike info criterion 1.430584                     
Sum squared resid 32.08384     Schwarz criterion 1.473626                     
Log likelihood -94.56445     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.448075                     
F-statistic 123.9718     Durbin-Watson stat 0.050511                     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000                        
                         
                                                  
 
 
Dependent Variable: CORRCCI                      
Method: Panel Least Squares                      
Date: 01/18/16   Time: 17:29                      
Sample: 2005 2013                       
Periods included: 9                       
Cross-sections included: 15                      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 135                     
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C -0.474006 0.440145 -1.076933 0.2837                     
SD 0.342073 0.838812 0.407806 0.6841                     
                         
                          Effects Specification                       
                         
                         Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)                     
                         
                         R-squared 0.963544     Mean dependent var -0.294577                     
Adjusted R-squared 0.958949     S.D. dependent var 0.680155                     
S.E. of regression 0.137806     Akaike info criterion -1.015048                     
Sum squared resid 2.259883     Schwarz criterion -0.670719                     
Log likelihood 84.51572     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.875122                     
F-statistic 209.6822     Durbin-Watson stat 0.703308                     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000                        
                         
                                                  
 
